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In recent history the international community has witnessed the re-emergence of 
maritime piracy at an alarming rate such that it has featured in the agendas of 
multilateral institutions and regional bodies as a security matter in need of urgent 
attention. Piracy is an international crime under customary international law and its 
status as such has been crystallised in the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (―UNCLOS‖). The definition of piracy under the Convention is criticised for 
being vague and thus making it impossible to establish with a degree of certainty what 
the meaning, scope, and content of piracy is. South Africa incorporated the definition 
of piracy in the Defence Act 42 of 2002, and by doing so also imported the issues that 
arise in the interpretation and enforcement of the UNCLOS provisions. This 
dissertation constitutes an analysis of piracy from both legal and security points of 
view, thus it focuses on piratical activity and the essential elements thereof – and it 
also looks at the evolution of law and state policy on piracy which eventually led to 
the adoption of the UNCLOS.  
Chapter I introduces the topic of piracy as an international crime and it introduces the 
research question and also give adequate information about the concepts and 
principles that will inform the schematic theme of the entire research work. This 
chapter further highlights the importance of the research project, states the objective of 
the research project and gives an overall course and stages that the dissertation will 
take. 
Chapter II focuses on the history of the crime of piracy and how it has evolved from 
manner of execution to the way in which sovereign states have dealt with the crime 
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historically. The objective of the chapter is to establish a lucid understanding of the 
historical foundations of piracy, more than that the chapter will discuss concepts such 
as privateering, letters of marque, piracy on the high seas, and the development of 
international law to address piracy. 
Chapter III focuses on the definition of Piracy as provided for by international 
customary law and codified in the UNCLOS. The primary objective is to determine 
which internationally proscribed activity falls within the purview of the definition of 
Piracy, thereby precluding international crimes such as robbery on high seas, maritime 
terror and so on. This chapter also analysis some of the practical problems in 
investigating piracy on the high seas and their constitutional implications. Further, 
there is also an analysis of regional legal and security responses to piracy. 
 Chapter IV constitutes a prognosis on the prosecution of piracy in a South African 
courts, this is done by analysing the South African approach to international criminal 
law and justice, recent developments such as the effort to withdraw from the ICC, and 
the manner in which the courts have interpreted international instruments and 
legislation providing for international crimes. The analysis is done against the 
backdrop of the constitutional supremacy in South Africa, and whether the piracy 
provisions in the Defence Act are aligned with the prevailing South African 
international criminal law framework. 
Chapter V focuses on developments in regional and international legal and 
institutional frameworks. The analysis here is largely on the richness of the 
international criminal law framework and whether it may offer some solutions to the 
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piracy quagmire. Policy from international bodies like the United Nations Security 
Council and judgments of international tribunals are discussed, particularly how 
developments at the international level impact on piracy. 
Chapter VI concludes and makes recommendations for changes from an international 
and South African perspective. It is argued that the elements of the crime of piracy 
must not deviate from the essence of the crime the meaning of which is universal. It is 
further argued that some of the elements in the UNCLOS are outdated and find no 
relevance to contemporary piracy or modern international criminal law principles, and 
therefore must be abandoned in favour of a realistic practical elements which address 
the security threat posed by piracy. 
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1 1 Introduction 
 
Piracy is a concept that attracts a diversity of opinion as regards its very nature, meaning, 
scope, and content. While there is a codification of international customary law on the 
definition of piracy, there is no universal understanding of piracy or the customary law 
substantive meaning of the crime. Generally speaking, one can note that piracy is a crime that 
is as old as international maritime trade. Regardless of its antiquity there still persists 
volumes of literature (old and contemporary) debating on what exactly piracy is and what 
interpretations of its definition are courts to adopt when hearing piracy cases.  During the 
course of this research the point is made that sovereign States have the latitude to regulate 
piratical activity occurring within their territorial waters, and to assign to that activity any 
criminal label as they deem appropriate. This is problematic in the sense that when a 
universal definition is needed, the biases and contextual experiences of maritime nations is 
bound to inform their contributions and views about maritime security, piracy, and other 
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Section A 
1 2 Research Statement and Rationale 
1 3 Methodology 
Section B 
1 4 Relevance of Piracy Today 
1 5 Piracy as a Security Issue 
1 6 Piracy Jure Gentium and Piracy Under Domestic Law 





ocean borne crimes. For instance, some commentators make a compelling argument that 
piracy under a field of law called Islamic international criminal law is conceptualised 
differently from (traditional or universal) international criminal law in that the term of art 
―piracy‖ is not used in isolation but land piracy is very much used when referring to plunder 
by bandits on the desert plains.
1
 This is obviously a view of piracy informed by culture, 
religion and geographical location. It is contrasted with the European or Anglo/Saxon idea of 
piracy on the high seas that is oft presented in the media and entertainment spaces. Thus, 
even from an academic point of view it would be unwise to think of piracy in stringently 
defined ideas, but rather one can focus on the essential elements universal to all acts deemed 
piratical by a variety of stakeholders. This difference in understanding of piracy is the main 
reason why the prosecution of piracy is controversial, whether drawing from the international 
criminal law framework or from national laws. From a South African perspective, the 
prosecution of piracy under the current framework is likely to raise constitutional issues since 
the definition itself is vague and open to a variety of interpretations which cannot be 
explained away by reliance on customary international law codified in the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (―UNCLOS‖). This instrument is generally accepted as 
constituting the codification of customary international law and thus having the status of law 
binding all states regardless of whether or not they ratified and adopted the treaty.
2
 The 
UNCLOS definition of piracy,
3
 is analysed in greater detail in chapters that follow. Suffice it 
to say at this point that the definition in the UNCLOS casts the scope of the crime of piracy 
far and wide, making the piracy provisions vague. The UNCLOS definition also is based on 
dated and primarily western views of piracy which make the prosecution of global 
                                                             
1 F Malekian Principles of Islamic International Criminal Law: A comparative Search 1ed (2011) 300. See also 
M T Ghunaimi The Muslim Conception of International Law and Western Approach 1ed (1968) 15. 
2L Azubuike ―International Law Regime Against Piracy‖ (2009) 15 Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 43 49.  
3 Art 101 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas of 1982. See also Art 14-22 of the Geneva 




contemporary piracy a challenge.
4
 This is the point of departure in trying to understand the 
problems associated with bringing pirates to justice.  
 
The history of piracy is helpful in providing insight as to the issues that have arisen in 
modern international law. Customary international law prohibits piracy and in ancient times 
pirates were deemed to be enemies of mankind.
5
 Today pirates are (in theory at least) 
international criminals in that they are associated with all things inimical to the positive 
progression and civilization of humankind,
6
 and this is pronounced when the effects of piracy 
are considered against general maritime security. However, this has not always been the case. 
In the 16
th
 Century, during times of war States used so-called privateers, these were private 
persons authorised by official letters of marque and reprisal issued by their States to carry out 
piratical activity, while on the high seas, against ships, cargo and crews of enemy States 
during times of war, for their own private benefit.
7
 Given the geo-political and historical 
context, the law afforded de facto pirates exemption from prosecution; their activities were 
pigeonholed as acts of war by States rather than acts of piracy by individuals.
8
 However, 
privateers were in actual fact pirates – only they were authorised to carry out piratical attacks 
as a war strategy. It should not therefore be assumed that pirates were soldiers at war, they 
                                                             
4 Mensah ―Piracy at Sea – A New Approach to an Old Menace‖ in Hestermeyer, Matz-Luck, Seibert-Fohr and 
Voneky (eds) Law of the Sea in Dialogue 161 161.  
5 For a general historical perspective, see Alfred Rubin The Law of Piracy 2 ed (1998) tracing the ancient 
history of sea piracy and the evolution of the modern legal framework to combat this international crime. 
6See Prosecutor v. Anto Furundzija (Trial Judgement), IT-95-17/1-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
former Yugoslavia (ICTY), 10 December 1998, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/40276a8a4.html [accessed 7 September 2011]. In casu, the judge 
associates pirates with torturers and slave traders as a matter of law. 
7Nyakwaka ―The Third United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty and the Piracy Question: The Case of the East 
African Coast‖ 2010 (40) Africa Insight 74 78; Dubner ―On the Definition of the Crime of Sea Piracy Revisited: 
Customary vs. Treaty Law and the Jurisdictional Implications Thereof‖ (42) J. Mar. L. & Com 71 81. 
8Skelton ―The World for Ransom: Piracy is Terrorism, Terrorism is Piracy by D R Burgess‖ 2011 (47) Stan. J. 




were merely a means to an end driven by their desire for ill gains, not patriotic conviction. 
This would become clear in the late 17
th
 century when war between States involved 
considerable naval warfare, the privateers turned against authorising States that had 
previously licensed them and started committing piratical acts against ships sailing under the 
flags of those States.
9
 The tide subsequently changed where pirates and piracy were 
concerned. Five centuries of customary practice in the Western World were consequently 




In the beginning of the 20
th
 Century it was widely assumed (and for all practical purposes 
accepted) that piracy had died and the law pertaining to it was obsolete
11
. This led to the 
long-time belief and general attitude of legal scholars and practitioners alike towards piracy 
that the traditional definition, available case law and the ultimate codification of the 
traditional definition was adequate basis for establishing the elements of the crime, and 
furthermore to determine the measures which sovereign states could lawfully use to address 
piracy.
12
 There were however academic commentators who felt that this was not an accurate 
view. As far back as 1935, Lenoir warned against the view that piracy was of no concern to 
the international community of civilised nations. In actual fact, he predicted the inevitable 
rise of piracy and thus advocated for more attention to be given to piracy and for the law to 
be crystallized in that regard.
13
 Piracy has indeed arisen over the decades as predicted. In 
1958, the international community attempted to adopt a positive and proactive legal 
                                                             
9Sterio ―Fighting Piracy in Somalia (and Elsewhere): Why More is Needed‖ 2010 (33) Fordham Int'l L.J. 
372 378. 
10Nyakwaka 2010 (40) Africa Insight 78. 
11Bento ―Toward an International Law of Piracy Sui Generis: How the Dual Nature of Maritime Piracy Law 
Enables Piracy to Flourish‖ 2011 (29) Berkeley J. Int'l L. 399 405. 
12 Mensah ―Piracy at Sea – A New Approach to an Old Menace‖ in Law of the Sea in Dialogue 162. 




framework. This end was to be achieved by the Geneva Convention of the High Seas of 1958, 
a multilateral treaty that tendered a formal definition of piracy. Moreover it made it the 
responsibility of every state to participate in the war against piracy. In 1982 the UNCLOS 
replaced the Geneva Convention. However, the former still restates some provisions of the 
latter that emphasize the status of piracy as a crime under International Law.  
 
The current state of international treaty law vis-a-vis piracy is that the UNCLOS leaves too 
much to invention in that it does not effectively provide a solid legal framework for states to 
work with when dealing with Piracy.
14
 This observation has particular relevance in an 
international criminal law context, where the focus is obviously on individual criminal 
liability (and the concomitant foundations underlying this notion – not least of all the 
fundamental principle of legality - nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege). 
 
As far as customary international law is concerned, the theoretical cliché  that piracy is one 
of the oldest crimes under international law (even an international crime par excellence) is 
simply not reflected in the empirical fact that states are – generally speaking – reluctant to 




The inefficiency (from an international criminal law point of view) frustrates all efforts to 
combat piracy in that it makes it burdensome on a state desirous of prosecuting pirates to 
attain that goal, especially where such state does not have well defined anti-piracy laws and 
                                                             
14Guilfoyle ―Counter-Piracy Law Enforcement and Human Rights‖ 2010 (55) ICLQ 141 142. 
15Gregory Stanton ―Why the world needs an International Convention on Crimes Against Humanity‖ in Leila 




wishes to incorporate international law by statutory or constitutional provision.
16
 The trend 
seems to be that pirates captured are released without trial or punishment, which has in turn 
created a culture of impunity.
17
 There are exceptions, like the efforts of a multinational fleet 
and taskforce aimed at eradicating the problem of Somali piracy along the east coast of 
Africa. Part of that strategy (which originally formed part of the so-called ‗War on Terror‘ led 
by the United States) is indeed to capture and prosecute pirates.
18
 It is submitted that this 
strategy is neither coherent nor based on a comprehensive legal framework and certainly not 
a blueprint for South Africa. 
 
There are also jurisdictional complexities that work against the successful prosecution of 
piracy. The international law principle as codified in the UNCLOS is that the high seas do not 
belong under the sovereign rule of any state.
19
 As such, the high seas are open to all 
recognised states that form the international community. The International Maritime 
Organization (―IMO‖) has made attempts to address the jurisdiction problem by passing 
resolution A. 1025 (26) which suggests that states must take measures to codify their 
                                                             
16This is especially relevant in dualist systems like South Africa – where international law norms should be 
transformed into domestic law in order to become applicable and enforceable in domestic courts – including 
domestic criminal courts. There is a contentious debate about the relevance and applicability (from an 
international criminal law perspective) of s 232 of the Constitution of South Africa (1996), which provides that 
customary international law is law in the Republic. See G Erasmus & G Kemp ―The Application Of 
International Criminal Law Before Domestic Courts In The Light Of Recent Developments In International And 
Constitutional Law‖ (2002) 27 S. Afr. Yearbook  Int’lL.64-81 – for the argument that criminal courts in South 
Africa cannot directly rely on s 232 of the Constitution to exercise substantive jurisdiction over crimes under 
customary international law (mainly because of problems generated by the legality principle – also a key 
constitutional norm). For a contrary view see Ward Ferdinandusse Direct application of International Criminal 
Law in National Courts (2006) 82. 
17 See Y Dutton ―Pirates and Impunity: Is the Threat of Asylum Claims a Reason to Allow Pirates to Escape 
Justice?‖ 2011 (34) Fordham Int'l L.J.236 246 - 254 
18J Kraska and B Wilson ―The Pirates of the Gulf of Aden: The Coalition is the Strategy‖ (2009) 43 Stan. J. Int’l 
L. 241244.  




universal jurisdiction over piracy and further lay down a clear procedural framework that 
would support Piracy prosecution.  
SECTION A 
 
1 2 Research Statement and Rationale 
 
The primary aim of conducting this research project is to make an original contribution to the 
existing body of academic discourse in the field of international criminal law, as well as 
South African domestic criminal law and regional law, on the topic of maritime piracy. The 
main objective is to identify lacunae and legal problems that frustrate the international 
community‘s efforts (via members like South Africa) to combat piracy and try to address 
these defects. The vast body of international law principles will be examined thoroughly and 
systematically, but with the central aim in mind, namely the application of international 
criminal law in South Africa with respect to the crime of piracy. To this end, South African 
and regional law (to the extent that there is) will be considered in the course of the research 
project. The purpose of such evaluation is to determine whether the current laws and 
principles suffice in the war against piracy, or if more needs to be done by the international 
community, regional bodies and sovereign governments, and, ultimately and crucially, South 
Africa as a regional power with maritime capabilities and an assumed commitment to 
international criminal justice and the rule of law. 
 
The domestic, comparative, regional and international criminal justice responses to piracy 
will ultimately be analysed not only in terms of the positivist content, but also in terms of 
general international criminal law theories on substantive and enforcement jurisdiction. The 




African) response to maritime piracy, in the context of a complementary regional and 
international enforcement regime. 
 
The essential premise of this dissertation is that maritime piracy is not only a serious threat to 
national and regional security, but also threatens the stability of the international legal order. 
Be that as it may, military responses and use of force under international law cannot be the 
primary response, but must be complementary to a sound international, regional, and 
domestic legal (criminal justice) framework. 
 
1 3 Methodology 
 
The research project will be carried out by means of a thorough study of available literature 
on the subject of piracy. To achieve this endeavour, academic journals, commentaries and 
books written on piracy (in particular) and international criminal law (more generally) will be 
consulted extensively so as to facilitate a holistic understanding of piracy and the legal 
challenges in addressing it.  
 
 Principles and precepts of international (criminal) law will be discussed vis-à-vis  
the crime of piracy. Such principles and precepts shall be drawn from recognised 
sources of International lawviz; (i) International instruments such as the UNCLOS, 
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 1998 etc; (ii) International 
custom established over time so as to be given the status of law; (iii) The general 
principles of law; and (iv) Judicial decisions and precedent. These sources are also 





 South African law will be studied at length, with focus directed to the Constitution,20 
in particular where the provisions of international law are stated. Sections 231 to 233 
will be relevant in this regard. Statutory law pertaining to legal issues around piracy 
will also be examined. Statutes to be consulted include inter alia the South African 
Maritime Zones Act,
21




 and the Protection 




 A comparative study of selected jurisdictions will be conducted, notably the laws 
of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Tanzania, Kenya and the 
Netherlands. These jurisdictions are not selected without reason:  States like the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the United States have long histories of dealing 
with piracy. The two African states (Kenya and Tanzania) are in the firing line of 
arguably the most acute contemporary problem of piracy — the activities of the 
Somali pirates off the east coast of Africa.  
 
 Lastly, there are numerous protocols and policy papers directed at making a 
contribution towards the war against piracy that have been published by various 
organisations. These will be considered and discussed. These include the Protocol for 
the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on 
the Continental Shelf,
25
Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and 
                                                             
20The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
21 15 of 1994. 
2242 of 2002. 
23 48 of 1967. 
24 33 of 2004. 




Security Council of the African Union,
26
 and the Protocol to the African Union 
Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism.
27
 Of particular interest 
will be developments regarding the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the 
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (the ―Malabo Protocol‖), 




1 4 Relevance of Piracy Today 
 
Currently there are multiple international organisations concerned with the piracy problems 
on the world‘s oceans, including the International Maritime Organisation, United Nations 
Office for Drugs and Crime, International Chambers of Commerce, African Union, Southern 
African Development Community, and think tanks such as the Institute for Security Studies. 
The International Maritime Bureau figures state that 174 piracy incidents were reported in 
2018,
28
 and it is estimated that on the whole, piracy leaves an exorbitant bill between USD1 
billion and USD16 billion a year.
29
 While piracy off the coast of Somalia has received 
widespread attention in the media in recent years, it has been reported that currently the 
highest recorded piracy incidents globally occur in the Gulf of Guinea – off Africa‘s west 
coast.
30
 In April 2019, it was reported that two shipping vessels were attacked by pirates 280 
                                                             
26 Done at Durban 9th July 2002. 
27 Done at Algiers 1999. 
28https://www.icc-ccs.org/index.php/piracy-reporting-centre/piracynewsafigures.  
29
F C Onuoha ―Sea Piracy and Maritime Security in the Horn of Africa: The Somali Coast and Gulf of Aden in 






nautical miles off the coast of Somalia, and the international military outfit patrolling that 




There is a variety of global developments that when considered together have occasioned the 
rise in piracy incidents in the world‘s oceans. The first and perhaps obvious development is 
the historic rise in seafaring, shipping lanes proven as a commercially viable option for trade 
and tourism amongst other things. The United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (―UNCTAD‖) estimates that global ocean borne trade alone accounted saw the 
transportation of 10.7 billion tons of cargo in 2017, and this is projected to grow by a median 
rate of 3.8% between 2018 and 2023.
32
Maritime trade and ocean borne transportation of 





                                                             
31https://eunavfor.eu/piracy-attack-off-the-coast-of-somalia/ 
32United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Review of Maritime Transport 2018 
UNCTAD/RMT/2018 
33 UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data supplied by reporting countries and as published on 




The rise of valuable cargo transported on the oceans everyday means that ships are easy 
targets for pirates. Furthermore, crew and passengers onboard seaborne vessels have been 
treated as lucrative bargaining chips by pirates and ransomed for release. The ransom factor 
is an important dynamic in the criminal enterprise carried on by pirates, both as regards the 
release of cargo and hostages. From 2013 to 2017, the recorded number of hostages held for 
ransom is 201.
34
 The highest recorded number of persons taken at sea as hostages held for 
ransom was in 2009, pirates off the coast of Somalia alone detained 867 hostages – 263 of 
which were still held by the end of the year.
35
 In depth studies of the complex structure that 
underscores piracy as a lucrative criminal enterprise in Somalia have been conducted, and 
they clearly indicate that the dire economic status in that country has driven many to opt for 
piracy as a career of choice – the amount of money to be made is life changing.
36
 The same 
issues that fuel piracy in Somalia ring true for piracy in Southeast Asia where dire economic 
conditions have seen criminals turn to piracy as a lucrative crime.
37
 Piracy off the Coast of 
Guinea in West Africa is somewhat different from that occurring in East African oceans but 
have some resemblance to attacks that have occurred in Southeast Asia. Off the West African 
Coast there operates a self-proclaimed liberation movement made up of numerous militant 
groups known as Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta, notwithstanding their 
liberation struggle cause they too have engaged in piracy and held hostages for ransom.
38
 So, 
both cargo and potential hostages coupled with the volume of maritime traffic represent 
                                                             
34International Chamber of Commerce - International Maritime Bureau Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
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incentives for pirates to continue with piracy. This may also be exacerbated by the fact that 
ransoms are actually paid by shipping companies for release of cargo and crew. However, 
from a business perspective, it could be argued that when profit ranks first in priority it may 
be commercially sound to pay a fraction of the profit rather than have cargo and personnel 
detained indefinitely pending a very complex investigation and rescue mission.  
 
A second and important reason that allows piracy to flourish with minimal hindrance is the 
progression of technology and increase of illegal arms and ammunition in the global black 
market.
39
 Piracy incident reports are often detailed with the type of weaponry used to carry 
out the attack and bring the ship‘s crew to submission, and there are many reports of injuries 
or fatalities inflicted by pirates using weapons which they are most likely unlicensed to use. 
Weapons are treated as an investment into the business of piracy by pirates, and funds 
collected through ransoms have been used to add on to artillery and tools of the trade.
40
 This 
very fact caused panic in 2008 when the Faina was hijacked off the Coast of Somalia, the 
vessel was hauling a consignment of weapons headed for either Kenya or South Sudan 
depending on which government is making a statement.
41
 It is reported that the incident 
attracted the attention of governments which resulted in a concerted effort by different navies 
to monitor the situation and ensure the weaponry consignment does not end up in Somalia.
42
 
In any event, pirates have found ways to secure traditional weapons and to weaponize 
gadgetry and use it to commit piracy. 
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1 5 Piracy as a Security Issue 
 
Piracy does not only find relevance in purely legal discourse, it is also a security issue and 
thus from a policy point of view approaches to combat piracy must bear elements of both 
legal and security measures. The phenomenon has multifaceted dimensions to it that manifest 
depending on the perspective from which one observes. It poses a threat to the security of 
maritime trade, travel, and ocean resources – and the nature of such a threat cannot be met by 
prosecution only – a military response has its place in the fight against piracy and impunity 
for piratical acts. For purposes of this research there are two broad themes that are explored. 
The first being the security issues that arise as a result of piracy, and how regional 
communities of states have been adversely impacted by the rise of piracy. The second theme 
pertains to the security implications of having private ship-owners bear the responsibility of 
protecting their vessels on voyage against pirates. The discussion of these themes constitute a 
general discussion of piracy in relation to security, specific military approaches and the 
success thereof are discussed in Chapter III. This analysis only serves to feed into the 
overarching narrative that piracy is a menace to peace, stability, and security of international 
maritime navigation.  
 
In times of war, epidemics, famines, and other natural disasters, international humanitarian 
organisations use the world‘s oceans to transport and deliver humanitarian aid to countries in 
need of such support. Such aid includes food, medicines, clothing, and blankets. 
Humanitarian relief measures are underscored by the mandate to secure the lives of those in 
need by providing solutions for sustenance and improvement of life.
43
 It is therefore 
important that whatever form of aid is being shipped reaches its destination in time so that it 
                                                             




is in the condition required to improve the food or health security of the recipients. Piracy, in 
the context of delivering humanitarian aid, constitutes a threat to the security of peoples in 
need of aid. It has been reported that 3 UN ships were hijacked by Somali pirates between 
2005 and 2007.
44
 Another vessel transporting World Food Programme humanitarian aid for 
tsunami victims in Somalia was hijacked by Somali pirates.
45
 Somalia has been locked in a 
protracted civil war, and with the right factual, evidentiary and contextual matrix, the 
hijacking could be in contravention of international humanitarian and international criminal 
law. For instance, in terms of the Rome Statute of the ICC (which does not provide for piracy 





Piracy also poses a threat to the marine environment and economy. This threat is also linked 
to the nature of cargo onboard some vessels at sea. In the Gulf of Guinea, off the coast of 
West Africa, piracy cases against offshore oil rigs and oil tankers transporting 
environmentally hazardous substance with the potential to devastate the marine ecosystem.
47
 
One commentator has observed that oil and chemical tankers are especially vulnerable to 
piracy attacks because any resistance to an attack may result in an environmental catastrophe 
from damage to the vessel‘s hull and resultant leakage of hazardous cargo into the marine 
environment – or worse, the explosion of the vessel itself.
48
 Another potentially devastating 
possibility is that pirates may successfully hijack a vessel with hazardous cargo, and due to 
lack of technical operational knowledge the vessel either sinks or there is a leakage that 
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cannot be met with the expertise to minimise the environmental damage. Any oil or chemical 
spillage in the oceans would have an adverse impact on coastal communities who rely on 
ocean resources for food and commerce, thereby threatening their stability and security. 
 
International trade and economic relations between States are also adversely affected by 
piracy. It is estimated that about 80% of all global shipments are conveyed via maritime 
transportation, thus it constitutes the backbone upon which global trade depends. However 
when pirates disturb the free flow of maritime traffic, it is bound to have a ripple effect on 
economies of international trading partners. A rise in piracy incidents has led to diplomatic 
tensions where ship-owners have boycotted ports in Hong Kong because of rampant piratical 
activity – and the same fate is reportedly befalling ports in Southeast Asia, the Gulf of 
Guinea, and the Gulf of Aden.
49
 The ability of piracy incidents to destabilise regions has been 
noted by the United Nations Security Council and has exercised its Chapter VII powers in 
relation to piracy incidents which were threatening the security of maritime navigation in the 
Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean.
50
 Acting in accordance with the said powers the Security 
Council called upon States and Regional Organisations to: 
 
―…take part actively in the fight against piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast   of   
Somalia,   in   particular,   consistent   with   this   resolution   and   relevant   international  
law,  by  deploying  naval  vessels  and  military  aircraft,  and  through  seizure  and  
disposition  of  boats,  vessels,  arms  and  other  related  equipment  used  in  the commission 
of piracy and armed robbery off the coast of Somalia, or for which there is reasonable ground 
for suspecting such use.‖
51
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A comprehensive multinational military response was adopted by the Security Council to 
ensure that piracy is met with force so that peace and security are restored in the region. Like 
all strategies, no military response is perfect and therefore there arose a practice in the 
maritime shipping industry to hire private security for the purposes of thwarting piracy 
attacks when voyaging in piracy prone regions. The analysis of this practice constitutes the 
second broad theme pertaining to the general security of maritime travel.  
 
1 6 Piracy Jure Gentium and Piracy Under Domestic Law 
 
Throughout this research reference will be made to piracy as an international crime, however 
it must be clarified that the controversy that surrounds the definition of piracy extends to 
parts of the sea upon which piratical activity has taken place. For certain sectors such as in 
the insurance industry, the term ―piracy‖ may have a wider scope that is in no way related to 
the law of the sea. For our purposes and as a point of departure, piratical acts that fall within 
the territory of a coastal state must be differentiated from piratical acts which happen on the 
high seas. This research is concerned with the latter. Piracy under international law falls 
under delicta juris gentium and therefore contemporary piracy is governed by the UNCLOS. 
Piracy under domestic law is left to the states concerned to define as they choose and taking 
into account the context of their own territorial maritime security issues.
52
 The UNCLOS 
provides for a delineation regime which separates territorial waters from the high seas. In 
terms of the said regime, waters from the coastline of a maritime state up to twelve nautical 
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miles form part of the territory of that state.
53
 The UNCLOS provides for an Exclusive 
Economic Zone stretching from the base of territorial waters, upon which coastal states enjoy 
certain exclusive rights,
54
 however these rights amount to limited sovereign interests – unlike 
within territorial waters.
55
 The Exclusive Economic Zone is  an additional two hundred 
nautical miles stretch of water.
56
 While some authors are of the view that the Exclusive 
Economic Zone forms part of international waters for purposes of Article 101 of the 
UNCLOS,
57
 Chapter III of this research discusses the UNCLOS piracy regime and the 
jurisdictional issues that arise.  
 
The prohibition of piracy jure gentium is a peremptory norm of international law, otherwise 
referred to as jus cogens.
58
 This class of norms are binding on all States notwithstanding any 
treaty exemption between States or any unilateral objection by a State to be bound by jus 
cogens norms. As regards piracy in particular, there are two rules that flow from its jus 
cogens status. The first being that States bear a duty to ensure that their territorial waters do 
not become a base from which pirates operate to further their criminal activities.
59
 This of 
course is not to say that there will never be incidents of piracy, but it impresses the point that 
where a State is aware of a drive by criminals to systematically carry out maritime piracy 
attacks then such State should mobilise resources to frustrate and bring those criminal efforts 
to an end. A discharge of this duty found expression in the move by the recognised 
government of Somalia to go as far as allowing foreign naval ships and military aircraft to 
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(subject to consent) enter Somali territorial waters and when necessary use force to eliminate 
piracy. There is a view that the prohibition of piracy does not enjoy the status of a jus cogens 
norm, the rationale behind this view is as follows: 
 
―Although such private acts may be illegal under international law, they are not violations of 
jus cogens because they do not in and of themselves address the limits of sovereign authority 
in the state-subject fiduciary relation. To merit recognition as a peremptory norm, the 
international norm against piracy would have to be repackaged as a constraint on state 
authority satisfying the fiduciary theory's formal and substantive criteria. This might be 
accomplished, for example, by shifting the piracy prohibition's focus from pure private 
conduct to state-sponsored or state-condoned piracy-practices tantamount to aggression. 
Absent a clear nexus to the state-subject fiduciary relationship, however, the prohibition 




This view makes a compelling argument, however it is criticised for seemingly making 
submissions without considering the historical context of piracy and the development of 
international humanitarian law to date – focus is solely on the UNCLOS provisions read in 
isolation. It is well documented in history that there has been a practice by States to 
weaponize pirates against private vessels sailing under the flag of an enemy State.
61
 This was 
done primarily by authorising piracy via letters of marque and reprisals. The question then 
becomes whether the prohibition of piracy under customary international law includes the 
prohibition of States to sanction piracy by issuing letters of marque to private persons today. 
It is submitted that such an authorisation would be in violation of a jus cogens norm for a 
variety of reasons. It must be borne in mind that piracy can only be committed by private 
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individuals against other private individuals, which is why piracy can only be state-
sanctioned but cannot be committed by a State, it would therefore be impossible for a State to 
carry out its duty to ensure that it is not a haven for pirates if that same State itself authorised 
piracy. Further, international humanitarian law effectively prohibits the use of piracy as a 
method of warring.
62
 This addresses the issue of state sovereignty, in that no State may cause 
reprisals to be visited upon private persons or their property during armed conflict. The 
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, dealing with the crime of torture, 
summed up this point as follows: 
 
―The fact that torture is prohibited by a peremptory norm of international law has 
other effects at the inter-state and individual levels. At the inter-state level, it serves to 
internationally de-legitimise any legislative, administrative or judicial act authorising 
torture. It would be senseless to argue, on the one hand, that on account of the jus 
cogens value of the prohibition against torture, treaties or customary rules providing 
for torture would be null and void ab initio, and then be unmindful of a State say, 
taking national measures authorising or condoning torture or absolving its perpetrators 
through an amnesty law. If such a situation were to arise, the national measures, 
violating the general principle and any relevant treaty provision, would produce the 
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The second rule that flows from the jus cogens status of the prohibition of piracy is that every 
recognised State has the right to exercise jurisdiction over pirates and pirate ships on the high 
seas.
64
 All members of the international community of states have a common interest in the 
security of the oceans and maritime navigation, piracy is a menace to that interest and thus 
pirates are not protected by the laws of the flag State of the vessel on which they sail. This 
rule is also an exposition of the obligation erga omnes on all states to apply a zero-tolerance 
policy for impunity for acts of piracy.
65
 It is submitted that the UNCLOS supports this 
proposition in that it provides for the universal duty to ―cooperate to the fullest extent 
possible‖ in suppressing piracy and it may well be that legally sound prosecutions constitute 
an effort to suppress piracy.
66
 In the modern fight against piracy via the deployment of naval 
vessels on the high seas, some national navies have adopted a catch-and-release practice in 
terms of which apprehended pirates are released without having being tried for their crimes 
by a court of law.
67
 This practice is not novel, in medieval England it was used as a 
diplomacy tool where pirates would be released in return for diplomatic amities.
68
 It is 
submitted that this practice is carried out in contravention of the obligation erga omnes as it 
relates to piracy; the release of captured pirates is at best an inchoate effort to meet 
international law obligations. States have a duty to prosecute pirates, and this is a duty owed 
by the capturing state to the international community of states.
69
 In contemporary 
international criminal law, the duty to prosecute pirates is buttressed by the UNCLOS piracy 
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provisions which make piracy a crime which falls within the jurisdiction of any capturing 
State. Further, the Malabo Protocol envisions the very first international court with 
jurisdiction over piracy jure gentium, attesting to erga omnes obligations flowing from the jus 
cogens status of the prohibition of piracy.  
 
1 7 Conclusion 
 
Piracy is a crime under international law, and for the longest time there has not been an 
international institutional framework to address it. During the course of the research it will be 
shown that international tribunals and national courts have recognised that piracy is a crime 
under international customary law and that it attracts universal jurisdiction. Be that as it may, 
there are concerns obtaining re the prosecution of piracy. Generally, the definition of piracy 
is outdated, and it is argued that it must be developed to meet the needs the criminal justice 
needs in relation to contemporary piracy. Connected to that, some elements of the crime are 
vague meaning that they do not meet the requirements of the principle of legality which 
underscores the sound prosecution of crimes both at national and international level. South 
Africa is a Constitutional state, and it argued progressively throughout this research that 
although piracy is criminalised under the Defence Act 42 of 2002 the success of a 
prosecution in a South African court remains doubtful. There is also the anomaly that the 
Defence Act does not provide for universal adjudicative jurisdiction, meaning if a pirate was 
to enter the territory of South Africa prosecution would be impossible unless there is a nexus 
to South Africa upon which jurisdiction could be established. This is termed an anomaly for 
the reason that in the scheme of legislation criminalising international crimes such as the core 




universal adjudicative jurisdiction even when the crime was committed outside South Africa 
by a non-citizen, against non-citizens of South Africa. 
 
The chapter that follows sheds insight as to the historical foundations of piracy and how it has 
evolved from the early ages to contemporary times. The chapter analyses both the security 
and legal aspects of piracy, and in particular how the historical changing attitudes towards 
































2 1 Introduction 
 
The crime of maritime piracy has rich historical foundations which surprisingly still inform 
the nature of the crime today. The development of international trade by maritime routes 
centuries ago saw the rise of this ominous crime, such that it is said that piracy is as old as 
maritime commerce stretching as far back as 77 B.C.
70
 With development of technology, 
maritime travel, ocean tourism, and globalisation over time, piracy like most things also went 
through numerous stages of evolving from manner of execution to how States perceive and 
punish the crime. The history of piracy not only as a crime, but also as a concept in marine 
navigation is particularly chequered and thus is worth study. Its historical foundations and 
development over time lends insight into how it has become a menace in recent history, and 
quite costly for shipping and tourism in contemporary times. The history of the world has 
seen numerous developments such as the rise of civilisations, the emergence and fall of 
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superpowers, two world wars, and piracy features prominently in some major developments 
both as a crime and as a weapon in the arsenal of States. This chapter therefore seeks to 
contextualise the rise and seemingly incorrigible scourge of piracy today by relating the 
historical key highlights relating to piracy in a chronological fashion. The aforementioned 
goal will be achieved by engaging in a study of piratical concepts and activity such as the 
letter of marque, privateering, reprisals, and piracy on the high seas. Moreover, this chapter 
will consider the history of legislative approaches taken by superpowers, maritime nations in 
different times in history, and the international community by assessing the development of 
international law vis-a-vis piracy. While piracy is not regarded a so-called ―core crime‖ in 
international criminal law today, the menace and regard of piracy being enemies to all in 
present times and historically is such that it ranks high in the list of threats to international 
trade, maritime security, and regional stability. 
 
2 2Origins of Piracy in Early Ages  
 
Available literature on the topic of piracy does not point to a specific person or group of 
persons as the inventors, in a manner of speaking, of the crime of piracy. However, the 
antiquity of the crime is so indisputable that it is said that the very instant goods of value 
were known to leave for sail on a raft, there was a pirate to plunder it.
71
 Though it may not be 
said in certain terms who the first pirate was, active piracy recorded in history dating back to 
early ages provides insight as to the evolution of the crime and how it found popularity in 
different parts of the globe.  
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The earliest known recording of the oldest form of piracy is found in Homer‘s The Iliad and 
The Odyssey which give an account of piracy not as a crime, but as a profession of esteem, in 
ancient Greek mythology.
72
 This attitude towards piracy is also reflected in writings by 
Aristotle who recorded that Greek pirates fancied themselves purveyors with a legitimate role 
to play in trade and business operations of ancient Greece.
73
 This created a peculiar view of 
piracy such that there was little distinction, if any, between piracy, trade and warfare because 
the spoils of piratical activity in ancient Greece, whether acquired during wartime or times of 
peace, was to be sold legally.
74
 Historians and archaeologists have discovered certain Greek 
writings estimated to be from as far back as the 6
th
 Century B.C, where the author thereof 
records the consultation of oracles
75
 by persons desirous of conducting piratical activity.
76
 
These writings are understood to mean that the pirate asked an oracle whether it was 
justifiable to plunder certain persons; such consultation without impiety is a strong suggestion 
that unprovoked piracy was not considered to be criminal activity in ancient Greece.
77
 Upon 
consideration of the language used here, one notices that the consultation is not to determine 
the legality of piratical activity in general, but to ascertain whether a certain class or type of 
persons may be justly be plundered. It was also not uncommon in ancient Greece that when 
peoples from foreign destinations arrived by sea, they would be met with common courtesy 
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and asked without concern for safety or security if they travel in their own business of if they 
were pirates.
78
 This too is an indication of the prevailing attitude towards piracy in ancient 
Greece. This is an important factor to be considered when addressing the question as to how 
piracy became prevalent, the absence of preventative measures may well have contributed to 
the ultimate incorrigible rise of piracy as a practice and eventually as an international crime 
viewed by all maritime as a menace common to all. Piracy and general naval activity for loot 
became an acceptable way of making money amongst the Greeks, it is actually the Greeks 
who are credited with initiating piracy in the Mediterranean Sea.
79
 Since that era, the 





Historical records show that pirates in ancient times went over and above looting cargo but 
also detained hostages for ransom,
81
 this same modus operandi is still used today by 
contemporary pirates at a more sophisticated scale of course. The antiquity of this motive and 
the fact that it has sustained till today indicates that this is an essential element of the crime – 
its commercial roots make a crime for economic gain. There were periods where naval 
powers of that day were able to monitor maritime routes, and thus suppress piracy.  
 
To understand why piracy flourished from ancient history, it is germane to conduct a 
contextual assessment of Greece at the time. Ancient Greece did not have a central 
government that administered all the politico-legal affairs of all of Greece; it was in fact 
made up of tiny kingdoms and aristocratic states (such as Sparta and Athens) which had their 
own army, currency and government handling affairs within their respective geographical 
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 Even in their existence, none of the individual states had the military or 
political power to rule over others, it was a time where the concept of a superpower was 
virtually non-existent.
83
 This meant that all efforts to fight the rising menace of piracy could 
not be concerted, especially considering that these independent states were often at war with 
each other, each state would thus have to counter piratical activity as allowed by resources 
and pressing needs.  
 
The first attempts of a civilised state to counter piracy point to early Crete. The Cretans are 
recorded in history as the first nation to adopt organised anti-piracy measures,
84
 they 
vigorously defended all maritime trade routes, notwithstanding that total suppression was 
seldom realised.
85
 Whilst some Greek cities fostered the escalation of piracy as a wealth 
creation stratagem, some cities such as Athens followed Crete by forming so-called anti-
piracy fleets to keep trade routes pirate free for their own trading vessels.
86
 It was not until 
the first century B.C when the Roman Empire was gaining impetus as a super power in the 
west, that the Mediterranean was effectively regulated, and thus pacified.
87
 Piracy and the 
harassment of coastal communities in the Aegean and as far as Italy prompted the Roman 
senate to adopt a resolution to suppress piracy, for it was feared that the status of Roman 
Empire would face the threat of economic isolation through the strangulation of trade. This 
occasioned the passing of the first known anti-piracy law in 101 B.C. which provided, inter 
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alia, permanent preventative measures against piracy and a campaign to rulers of free states 
that formed clientele for the Romans to disallow pirates from their ports.
88
 Cicero the Roman 
orator was involved in the formulation of anti-piracy laws by the senate, he made the 
argument that pirata non est ex perdullium numero definitus, sed communis hostis omnium 
which was accepted and formed the basis of the declaration of pirates to be hostis humani 
generi.
89
This being the case, the law provided that all nations had the right to prosecute 
pirates under their laws if the piracy occurred outside the jurisdictional competence of any 
nation, the creation of universal jurisdiction.
90
 Roman law thus provides the basis of piracy 
being an international crime, however it will be seen later that this did not remain the position 
in later years. 
 
The law in itself did not deter pirates from perpetrating what was now a criminal offence in 
the Roman Empire. Piracy continued to exist, and there is a suggestion that the regardless of 
the Law passed in the end of the second century B.C., the Romans turned a blind eye on the 
practice when it provided them with slaves to be sold in their market places.
91
 However the 
attitude fast changed when pirates became a nuisance and piratical activity adversely affected 
Roman interests. This was especially the case when the Cilician pirates supported the slave 
revolt in 73 – 71 B.C.
92
 Furthermore, at some point between 81 B.C. and 75 B.C. a young 
Julius Caesar was captured and held captive for days by pirates, he was released after a 
                                                             
88 Konstam Piracy 18. H A Omerod ―The Campaigns of Servilius Isauricus against the Pirates‖ (1922) 12 J. 
Rom Stud. 35 35. 
89D R Burges ―Hostis Humani Generi: Piracy, Terrorism and a New International Law‖ (2006) 13 U. Miami 
Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 293 302. 
90M Boot ―Pirates, Then and Now How Piracy Was Defeated in the Past and Can Be Again‖ (2009) 88 Foreign 
Aff. 94 100. 
91 Sterio (2010) Fordham Int’l L. J. 376.  




ransom was paid on his account.
93
 Although the involuntary stay with the pirates was not an 
unpleasant one, after his release Caesar set sail, captured his erstwhile captors and ultimately 
had them crucified for their piracy.
94
 This was the attitude towards piracy, as it was outlawed 
by the Romans and its trade partners. In 68 B.C the Republic that was Rome suffered a 
massive attack at the hands of pirates, this attack prompted a milestone to be recorded in the 
history of piracy. Pompey, a Roman war general, was granted imperium pro consulare by the 
Senate, and unlimited resources he needed to destroy the pirates responsible for the massive 
attack.  The campaign led by Pompey cleared the western Mediterranean of pirates in 40 days 
and the eastern Mediterranean and Cilicia in about 50 days.
95
 This marked the total 
annihilation of piracy in the Mediterranean. It was not until 400 years lapsed and the decline 
of the Roman Empire that piratical activity regained noteworthy momentum.
96
 Much of the 
piracy recorded in the middle ages occurred in the context of Europe. This was an era where 
there was an overlap between piracy and warfare with no clear distinction between the two, 
for pirates were a weapon in the arsenal of warring nations.
97
 This was also the time when 
letters of marque and privateering gained popularity, and these are discussed below. Piracy 
continued to be on the rise and in the 18
th
 century A.D went through what has been phrased 
as the ―golden age‖, a period in history where piracy was at its prime.
98
 This was a time in 
history when many significant 17
th
 Century wars ended and employment in the maritime 
labour market decrease, leaving many erstwhile naval employees with piracy as a viable 
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 What is particularly interesting for purposes of this research is that in the 
golden age, England met piracy with legislative reforms making piracy prosecutions easier – 
and these reforms are recorded in history as being effective.
100
 That said, it must be noted that 
in those days piracy was a capital crime – and between 1716 and 1726 alone it is estimated 
that 400 to 600 convicted pirates were given the death penalty as punishment.
101
 That of 
course must also be qualified against the context of the time, namely that pirates were used 
by sovereign governments in Europe for purposes of war. Queen Elizabeth who was ruler of 
England in the 16
th
 Century considered pirates as para-military fighting for the Crown in its 
war with Spain.
102
 Thus the progression and evolution of the crime depicts a warped 
relationship between pirate and state, where they once were labelled enemies of mankind and 
later on were seen more as comrades – enemies of the contracting state‘s enemies. Another 
contextual factor which must be considered is that piracy was not necessarily limited to 
plunder and attack on the high seas in the context of medieval Great Britain, sea shipping is 
described as being generally a coast-hugging affair notwithstanding the usage of the term 
―high sea‖ to describe the place of occurrence of the crime.
103
 It is unclear what the 
understanding of the term ―high sea(s)‖ was at the time, it was only after 1608 that the Dutch 
Jurist Hugo de Groot (Grotius) published the Mare Liberum that there was a codified 
principle that the world‘s oceans and all in them belonged to all.
104
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To consider the exhaustive substantive history of piracy is beyond the scope of this research, 
however due consideration will be given to the legal concepts that constitute a significant part 
of the history of piracy. These concepts are relevant to the piracy debate today, in that they 
give an accurate account of the relationship between piracy and the law. One such concept is 
to be considered is the practice of privateering. This controversial practice will be considered 
against the context of the time in which it started, also taking into account the maturity of 






 Century Developments re Piracy and Law 
 
2 3 Letter of Marque and Reprisal 
 
The letter of marque and reprisal (―letter of marque‖) is an international legal instrument  
developed in historic maritime law, and especially gained popularity as a legitimate strategy 
of war in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.
105
 It generally refers to the practice of 
sovereign governments issuing to private individuals a licence, known as a letter of marque, 
to plunder foreign vessels, usually in return the plundered booty would be shared between the 
state and  the holder of such licence.
106
 Initially, there were two different instruments known 
as the letter of marque, and the letter of reprisal respectively. With time however, a single 
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The letter of marque served two purposes whilst it was operative.
108
 The first purpose it 
served was that of a vindication mechanism, the process for acquiring a letter of marque in 
medieval England was very similar to the condictio furtiva action in modern day South 
Africa. An earlier recording of this process tells of an incident in 1585 where Spaniards 
arrested vessels and seized cargo from British ships docked at Spanish harbours, merchants 
entreated the Queen for redress.
109
 The Queens‘s government ordered that the Lord Admiral 
assess all claims made by any merchant and to him who proves his claim in a satisfactory 
manner issue a letter of marque and reprisal.
110
 A claim was proved by filing pleadings in the 
High Court of Admiralty, with the support of witnesses. If successful, an order of the court 
would be issued detailing the amount compensation sought, and stipulating the rights of the 
claimant to recover his monetary loss by any means necessary.
111
 This was the first use of 
letters of marque on a large scale by the English.
112
 However, the practice had started as far 
back as the late thirteenth Century. In actual fact, the earliest known issue of a letter of 
marque was in 1295 when King Edward I authorised a private individual who had been 
plundered by so-called sea robbers from Lisbon while docked at Lagos (Portugal), to seize by 
force the goods of the King of Portugal or any of that king‘s subject wherever he may find 
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them, up to the amount of the loss he suffered from the robbery.
113
 The second purpose for 
the letter of marque and reprisal was to commission privateers who were also known as men 
of war, to harass enemy ships during times of war. Available literature often does not 
differentiate the two uses of the letter of marque, it is invariably associated with only 
privateering whereas the two functions it served are mutually exclusive in as far as the 
substantive law of privateering and the law of reprisals are concerned.  
 
2 3 1 Privateering 
 
The term ―privateer‖ refers to an armed vessel owned and officered by private persons, and 
holding a commission from the government, called ‗letters of marque‘, authorizing the 
owners to use it against a hostile nation, and especially in the capture of enemy merchant 
shipping. The term is said to be a derivative term from the combination of the words 
―private‖ and ―volunteer‖.  The law of nations did not consider privateering to be piracy, thus 
privateers were not pirates and therefore were not classified as hostis humani generi, but 
enemies of only those whom their attacks were directed.
114
 Not only was it used in Europe 
but it was also used extensively in North America in eighteenth century warfare, where 
colonial governors encouraged the practice, merchants invested in naval predators and 
qualified marines signed up to serve on board privateer vessels.
115
 Privateering was thus a 
legitimate war strategy, in naval warfare across all maritime nations.  
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Privateering is the result of a convenient incongruity between principles of international law 
as it relates to warfare, this being that in naval conflict private property becomes the property 
of the capturing state, whereas in war fought over dry land the private property of enemy 
state subjects remains such and is not included in spoils of war.
116
 In the instance of 
privateering, a letter of marque was attained by petitioning a special tribunal known as a prize 
court, this was an ad hoc tribunal set up specifically for maritime and shipping matters during 
times of war.
117
 The relevance of prize courts where privateers are concerned is founded upon 
the precept that privateering could be carried out only during wartime. A state of conflict 
between sovereign states was so essential to the concept of privateering such that when a 
privateer was commissioned to attack ships of a foreign flag that, per se would be deemed an 




It is for its use in warfare that has led some authors to dub privateering as ―weapons in the 
arsenals of states‖.
119
  Furthermore, the link between privateering and war has led to the 
controversy in legal scholarship surrounding the practice. The controversy emanates from the 
fact that sometimes individual who were known to be pirates, and thus hostis humani generi, 
were commissioned by sovereign governments as privateers. The distinction between pirate 
and privateer became increasingly blurred when privateers, post the war they were 
commissioned for, started to harass and seize naval property of states which maintained 
friendly relations with the commissioning states.
120
 The law around privateering was such 
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that even pirates could legitimately seek commissions as privateers from their national 
governments, however pirates were known to seek defective commissions and thus 
masquerade unlawful plunders as activity authorised by their government.
121
 Some states 
tried to cure this mischief by passing laws to regulate privateering under a now defunct field 
of law known as prize law. For instance, in 1803 France passed a law that criminalised 
privateering under multiple flags.
122
 In Honduras, those who engaged in privateering using 
illegitimate letters of marque were deemed and were to be tried under Honduran piracy 
laws.
123
 What is interesting to note is that the laws passed were, in effect, laws geared at 
separating de facto pirates from lawful privateers. It is submitted that this may have 
galvanised the link between piracy and privateering, in that a new crime was not created nor 
were unlawful privateers tried under fraud law or even treason. They were tried as pirates, 
and to them was available the defence that they were acting under the authority of a sovereign 
government. Pirates even did all they could to obtain letters of marque that would hold before 
a court of law, as a defence against a charge of piracy for their unauthorised activity.
124
 Thus 
legitimate state sponsorship of private individuals and sinister facades and manipulation of 
laws by pirates have occasioned diluted opinions on the efficacy of privateering. On the one 
hand there is the point of view that privateering was a necessary measure, especially in 
history where European and North American nations did not have established navy corps and 
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 On the other hand, there are those that hold the view that privateering 
was state sponsored piracy. The suggestion here is that sovereign states knowingly 
commissioned individuals widely known to be pirates to carry out privateering activity.
126
 
This view is also founded on fact, in practice piracy and privateering constituted identical 





The conflicting views also found way into the court systems of various states. There has been 
many a case where the courts have had a hard time drawing the line between piracy and 
privateering. This was mostly the case where such privateers carried out their activity under a 
commission given by an unrecognised government.
128
 The importance of the distinction 
between the two is that privateering was dealt with under the international law governing 
warfare, whereas piracy was adjudicated under municipal laws most of which at that time 




The line between pirate and privateer was very thin, and one could quite easily find himself 
on either category of persons. It seems that the test really was whether a holder of a letter of 
marque held such marque lawfully. Lawful in this context means that such holder was 
                                                             
125C K Marshall ―Putting Privateers in their Place: The Applicability of the Marque and Reprisal Clause to 
Undeclared Wars‖ (1997) 64 University of Chicago Law Review964 & 966 953; H W Malkin ―The Inner 
History of the Declaration of Paris‖ (1927) 8 Brit. Y. B. Int’l L. 24 1; and Barbour (1911) Am. Hist. R. 541. 
126 C Skelton ―The World at Ransom: Piracy is Terrorism, Terrorism is Piracy by D R Burgess‖ (2011) 47 Stan 
J. Int’l L. 275 275; Paradiso (2010) Penn St. Int'l L. Rev. 190. 
127W F Craven ―The Earl of Warwick, A Speculator in Piracy‖ (1930) 10 Hispanic American Historical Review 
258457 – 459; Anderson (1995) Journal of World History 3 n4.  
128 Lenoir (1934 – 1935) Am. Inst. Crim. L. & Criminology 537 – 538. 
129 Azubuike (2009) Ann. Surv. Int'l & Comp. L. 52; and J W Bingham (Reporter) ―Part IV – Piracy‖ (1932) 26 
Am. J. Int’l L. 739 853 – 855. See also K Keith ―Piracy and other Perils: Can the Law Cope‖ (2002) 16 Austl. & 




granted a marque by a recognised government, for specific marine activity, to be carried out 
during times of war. Anything outside the purview of a letter of marque and lawful 
privateering activity was not recognised by enemy states, such action was thus punishable 
under piracy laws. Letters of marque found wanting were simply not acceptable. To illustrate 
this point, the state of Mexico in 1847 started issuing blank letters of marque for the use of 
privateers and for arbitrary sale by agents who had authority to insert names of those to 
whom they sold the letters of marque. The United States did not recognise nor lend any 




The practice of privateering continued to be used during war time until it was abolished 
through a multilateral treaty which came to be known as the Declaration of Paris Respecting 
Maritime Law (―Declaration‖), in 1856.
131
 The Declaration criminalised privateering and all 
government sponsorship of maritime harassment. Signatories passed laws and formulated 
policies to give effect to the declaration in their jurisdictions. For example in France, 
instructions were given to naval officers to the effect that the captain, officers and crew 
operating under a government commission, and such government is a signatory to the 
Declaration, shall not be treated as prisoners of war when captured, but must be proceeded 
against under piracy laws of France.
132
 The Declaration represented a multilateral acceptance 
of responsibility for the unfavourable results of privateering, moreover, it was a vow by 
signatory States that the practice of privateering would be abolished never again to be 
resumed.
133
 Its effect was not only on privateering, but it also validated the status of pirates as 
common enemies of all mankind. Pirates were divested of all rights obtaining to citizens of 
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any State or sovereign governments in themselves, described as malevolent satellites to the 
law of nations, and isolated entities.
134
 There were also strong arguments by British theorists, 
advocating for European states to deem all governments practising privateering as hostis 
humani generi, and thus accountable to the same extent as pirates.
135
 The Declaration thus 
brought an end to privateering as a legitimate method of war inter se the signatory States, 
moreover it associated all privateering activity with piracy. 
 
2 3 2 Reprisals 
 
Reprisals differ from privateering, although the two actions were concepts obtaining to an 
identical legal instrument, they are mutually exclusive and are not concepts that complement 
each other. Reprisals refer to a private law remedy that was available to private citizens of a 
state, where such citizen has suffered plunder at the hands of a foreign sovereign or its 
nationals at sea.
136
 Like privateering, the practice of authorising reprisals was necessitated by 
the lack of military power by states to respond to attacks by foreign nationals on their citizens 
at sea, the ineffectiveness of sovereign states at the time fuelled the rise of reprisal as a 
legitimate legal recourse.
137
 The operation of reprisals was general in that one who was 
authorised to execute a reprisal was given such authority not only against whosoever attacked 
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2 4 Piracy after the Declaration of 1856 – 19
th
 Century to UNCLOS 
 
The Congress of Paris where the Declaration was adopted was not a conference concerned 
with maritime matters, it was a conference organised to address issues of war.
139
 The fact that 
piracy and privateering made the agenda in a conference concerned with matters of warfare is 
telling of the attitude and philosophy that maritime nations and the international community 
were taking towards privateering. Thus the Declaration was agreed upon and signed, 
thereafter there was no longer room for ambiguity as regards privateering activity. All forms 
of maritime harassment were abolished, rendering all privateering and reprisal activity 
classified as piratical as a matter of international law. Although the Declaration was a success 
in Europe, it did not have the desired effect in the United States in as far as influencing a 
change in attitude towards privateering activity. The United States continued to regulate 
privateering as a legitimate practice. An example of recognition of privateering as legitimate 
is found in the Lieber Code,
140
  wherein it is stated, inter alia, that men who plunder without 
commission shall be treated as pirates.
141
 This, by necessary implication, means a 
commission from Government is required for legitimate plunder, however plunder in and of 
itself was not absolutely prohibited. The Lieber Code was finalised in 1863 and was used by 
the United States in warfare for years that followed.
142
 However, as the years progressed 
there was a shift in attitude towards privateering in the United States government of the time, 
which was more or less aligned with the collective view that the rest of the international 
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community was adopting. The Montevideo Convention in 1889 was the first instance where 
consensus was reached between states that suppression of maritime piracy was a 
responsibility held by all of mankind.
143
The aforementioned convention was followed by the 
Washington Treaty
144
 that was signed between the United States, Great Britain, France, Italy 
and Japan in 1922 which also was indicative of the attitude that great powers of those times 
were gravitating towards. The treaty provided in essence that all signatories therein were in 
agreement that any citizen of their respective countries shall be tried for piracy if such citizen 
violates all existing rules of law pertaining to seizure and destruction of merchant vessels, 
regardless of a defence of superior orders.
145
 This meant that even if the act described was 
committed as an act of war, it would still be deemed piracy. Furthermore, the treaty 
criminalised all attacks on merchant shipping whether on the sea surface or by submarines. 
The Washington Treaty was followed by the London Naval Treaty,
146
 this changed the 
position as was provided for by Art III of the Washington treaty. The London Naval Treaty 
provided that army officers acting on superior orders could not be prosecuted for piracy.
147
 
The treaty was not renewed in 1936, however a protocol was formulated and signed by the 
United States, The Dominions of Britain, Japan, France, the United Kingdom and Italy in 
November 1936. The London Treaty together with the protocol galvanised principles of 
international law vis-a-vis piracy, amongst other matters of combat and warfare.
148
 Attacks on 
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ships not involved in warfare during the Spanish civil war necessitated international 
intervention and understanding around the practice. The necessity was addressed in 1937 via 
the Nyon Agreement which was entered into by 9 world naval powers.
149
 The Nyon 
Agreement provided that attacks directed at neutral shipping attracted a piracy charge, and it 
went further to exclude the wartime defence of superior orders.
150
 The common theme in the 
aforementioned multilateral agreements is that they all sought to address piracy, not as a 
crime in and of itself, but in the context of warfare between states. This may be the direct 
result of the rich privateering culture that had prevailed for a long time amongst naval powers 
and maritime nations of the time. Nonetheless, the international community at large 
recognised the need to consider piracy as one of many issues that required attention at 
international law level. 
 
The establishment of the League of Nations (―League‖) to handle issues of peace and security 
common to nations of the world signified an important step, inter alia, in formulating a 
formal definition of piracy in international law. After World War I, the League initiated 
attempts at codifying an international crime of piracy, however such attempts were thwarted 
when researchers asserted universal jurisdiction over pirates as a measure appropriate to 
address the inability (whether due to resources or lack of a proper legal framework) of some 
states to prosecute pirates.
151
 In 1924, during the meeting of the Council of the League in 
Rome, an ad hoc team of international law experts was commissioned to assess a variety of 
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opinions and arguments from treaties, customary law, municipal laws, legal decisions with 
international scope, and secondary sources such opinions by authors, in a bid to formulate an 
appropriate definition of piracy under international law.
152
 Moreover, the purpose of this 
exercise was to also establish the need, desirability and likelihood that the suppression of 
piracy could be achieved by international convention.
153
 On the 29
th
 January 1926, in 
Geneva, the rappoteur of the sub-committee Dr M Matsuda delivered the sub-committee‘s 
report to the League. Relevant to the instant discussion in the report was, inter alia, the 
distinction drawn by the sub-committee between piracy strictu sensu and practices analogous 
to piracy. The report stated that piracy strictu sensu falls within the ambit of international 
law, whereas practices analogous to piracy are criminalised by treaty or municipal law.
154
 
The report by the sub-committee was, by and large, a body of work dedicated to discovering 
the definition piracy from existing sources, rather than formulating or inventing a novel 
definition under the guidance of the body of knowledge available at the time.
155
 The sub-
committee Rapporteur M Matsuda and the Chinese representative M Wang Chung-Hui 
forged a draft treaty on piracy (known as the Matsuda Draft Provisions for the Suppression of 
Piracy) which was not pursued further because piracy was omitted from the list of 
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international law topics for codification due to the projected difficulty in reaching universal 




After piracy was abandoned by the League in 1926, piracy became an ancillary issue to more 
pertinent issues in international law. Authors and commentators such as Lenoir warned 
against the view that piracy was of no concern to the international community of civilised 
nations. In actual fact, he predicted the inevitable rise of Piracy and thus advocated for more 
attention to be given to Piracy and for the law to be crystallized in that regard.
157
 In 1932 the 
League resuscitated piracy for the attention of the international community once again. The 
second attempt into addressing the codification of piracy as an international crime was 
undertaken by the League in 1932. This process involved scholars from Harvard University, 
in concert they produced an instrument popularly known as the Harvard Draft.
158
 The drafters 
of the proposed convention were charged with, firstly, the responsibility to determine the 
significance of piracy in international law. In its bid to carry out their mandate, the drafters 
embarked on a process of assessing the understanding of piracy that nations of the world had 
from an international law perspective. Their finding was that piracy was not understood in an 
identical fashion amongst members of the international community.
159
In the process of 
gathering the differing definitions of piracy, the drafters found that most of the numerous 
definitions which have been either applied or suggested were inaccurate both as to their scope 
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as to what they omit.
160
 The natural consequence of these diverging opinions was a debate as 
to whether an international crime of piracy existed as a matter of fact and law, which was 
ancillary to the pressing question as to how piracy should have been treated in the context of 
formulating a legal instrument common to all nations for the suppression of the crime. 
Needless to say, there consensus was not reached regarding the former. These questions 
demanded a twofold assessment, that being what piracy was been considered to be 
historically, but also what piracy could be in the future. A dramatic evolutionary approach 
worth noting in that regard, was the latitude that the drafters had in answering the question as 
to how the international community was to treat piracy. A paragraph in the Draft illustrates 
the point: 
 
―The pirate of tradition attacked on or from the sea. Certainly today, however, one should not 
deem the possibility of similar attacks in or from the air as too slight or too remote for 
consideration in drafting a convention on jurisdiction over piratical acts. With rapid advance 
in the arts of flying and air-sailing, it may not be long before bands of malefactors, who now 
confine their efforts to land, will find it profitable to engage in depredations in or from the air 
beyond territorial jurisdiction. Indeed there even may occur thus a recrudescence of large 
scale piracy. A codification of the jurisdiction of states under the law of nations should not be 
drafted to fit only cases raised by present conditions of business, the arts, and criminal 




Although the assessment of the drafters constituted a rather wide-ranging study of the subject 
of piracy, their objective fell squarely on expedience and ultimately providing a crime with 
scope, content and definition that could be accepted by all nations as the international law 
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standard. The final Draft is therefore not to be understood to be a study into international law 
precedent and theory, however it is to be accepted as an objective legislative proposal. 
Typical of all legal instruments that require international consensus, the Draft did not enjoy 
immediate acceptance, furthermore, it was not to the benefit of the international community 
to continue with the research such that it was the ultimate submission of the drafters that 
piracy was not a field that required immediate attention vis-a-vis other international law 
issues of the time. Consequently, the status of the document as a draft remained indefinitely.  
 
It would be unfair, however, to say that in sum the Harvard Draft was a total failure. On the 
contrary, it is by and large considered to be the body of work upon which current 
understanding of piracy as an international crime is primed. After it failed to prevent World 
War II, the League was dissolved, and the United Nations Organisation (―UN‖) was founded 
as the new international organization in 1945. The Harvard Draft having achieved more 
success and support than its predecessor the Matsuda Draft, paved the way for the 1958 
Geneva Convention provisions relating to piracy in particular.
162
 The duties that had been 
borne by the drafters of the Harvard Draft were similar to those assigned to the International 
Law Commission (―ILC‖). The ILC‘s draft articles pertaining to piracy were so controversial 
that the General Assembly referred them to a special conference known as the International 
Conference of Plenipotentiaries to Examine the Law of the Sea to be held in Geneva in 1958 
for further scrutiny.
163
 The ILC‘s draft articles and the research carried out on the law of the 
sea were accepted as suitable for international adoption, and thus they formed the 
foundational basis for the 1958 Geneva Convention.
164
 The success of the Geneva 
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Convention is largely attributed to the approach with which the convention was drafted, in 
particular its keen observation of the need for practicality and political expedience, given the 
difference in ideologies amongst UN member states.
165
 The piracy provisions as stipulated in 
the Geneva Convention assumed the status of international law as is clearly laid out by the 
ILC: 
 
‗‗Any State having an opportunity of taking measures against piracy, and neglecting 
to do so, would be failing in a duty laid upon it by international law. Obviously, the 





The Geneva Convention was followed (not succeeded) by the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (―UNCLOS‖) adopted in 1982. The piracy provisions in the UNCLOS 
were identical to those stipulated in the Geneva Convention.
167
 The understanding of piracy 
de jure gentium was thus reaffirmed by the UNCLOS to which 160 states are party, making it 
essentially a codification of customary international law, informally dubbed as the 
―Constitution for the Ocean‖.
168
 The obtaining consequence of the status of the UNCLOS is 
that all states are bound by the piracy provisions, even if not signatory to the convention in 
question. The international law definition of piracy was galvanised by the UNCLOS. 
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2 5 Concluding Remarks 
 
It has been established that piracy has existed from time immemorial, the antiquity of the 
crime together with the absence of international organisation, and a rich history of war 
governed by evolving (rather than static) rules, allowed piracy to flourish. The efforts made 
by certain powerful maritime nations into licensing de facto pirates for expedience in times of 
conflict, worsened the situation. Privateers could not be controlled effectively, nor was there 
any training provided to execute the activities in which privateers engaged. Therefore it was 
really just pirates perpetrating piratical activity under official government permit. Moreover, 
the private law remedy of plunder and reprisals blurred the divide between lawful and 
unlawful action because it was indiscriminate in its application, focusing on the flag hoisted 
by a ship rather than the lawful owner thereof. As maritime nations progressed and the rules 
of armed conflict evolved, issuing of letters of marque was abolished by international 
consensus. Piracy however continued to exist and it still considered a threat to international 
trade and security. 
 
Despite the international instruments that have codified international law regarding piracy, 
the international community still struggles with formulating appropriate legal frameworks for 
the adequate suppression of piracy, and successful prosecution of pirates. It must be conceded 
however, that there are gaping holes in the legislative history of piracy that form basis as to 
why the international community is experiencing difficulty pinning down piracy. Firstly, 
even though the League had a measure of success regarding the codification of international 
law at the early years of the twentieth century, it failed to establish international consensus 
regarding piracy. This was largely due to differences in the understanding and/or definition of 




history of piracy. Moreover, the international community was inclined to supporting the 
conclusion that piracy was a non-factor in as far as issues of international interest were 
concerned because piracy had all but disappeared. Ultimately, the League only produced the 
Harvard Draft in as far as piracy was concerned, and due its failure to prevent World War II it 
was dissolved. Secondly, the UN recognising the need to address piracy only achieved 
international consensus in 1982, thirty seven years from its inception to formulate a 
convention deemed to be codification of customary international law. It must however be 
noted that the UNCLOS definition (practically similar to the Geneva Convention definition) 
is a watered down definition formulated with expedience in mind, leaving much about its 
scope, content, and substantive meaning open to multiple interpretations.
169
 Therefore even if 
there is an international law definition of piracy, it serves little purpose in a domestic context 
where courts require substance and legal certainty to allow prosecution and possibly 
conviction – and this is particularly true in South Africa where the Constitution requires that 
laws are clear and understandable to citizens. This observation has particular relevance in an 
international criminal law context, where the focus is obviously on individual criminal 
liability (and the concomitant foundations underlying this notion – not least of all the 
fundamental principle of legality - nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege). Thirdly, there has 
never been established an international court to prosecute individuals for piracy until recently 
via the Malabo Protocol which has assigned criminal jurisdiction to the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights. The application of international criminal law nonetheless still 
rests with domestic courts in line with the principle of legality that both the ICC and the 
African Court subscribe to. Unfortunately, piracy does not form part of the international 
crimes upon which the scope of the International Criminal Court (―ICC‖) jurisdiction falls. 
The absence of an international organ responsible for prosecuting piracy undoubtedly 
                                                             




contributed to the lacuna in international criminal law, in that no international tribunal has 
had the opportunity to interpret and develop the law of piracy. The issues that plague the 
UNCLOS piracy regime have been so dire that they inspired the formulation of the 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 
(―SUA Convention‖) to remedy some of the shortcomings. However, the SUA Convention is 
not a piracy regime, and it makes no reference whatsoever to piracy. 
 
Having established that there are numerous issues with prosecuting piracy cases, particularly 
stemming from the definition of piracy amongst other things, the chapter to follow will focus 
on the definition of Piracy as provided for by international law and codified in the UNCLOS. 
The primary objective is to determine which internationally proscribed activity falls within 
the purview of the definition of Piracy, thereby precluding international crimes such as 
robbery on high seas, maritime terror and other maritime crimes analogous to piracy. The 
methodology here will be familiar criminal law analysis, informed by the need for clear 
provisions on the elements of a crime (as opposed to vague descriptions of phenomena which 
would not satisfy the strict standard of legality in criminal law). To achieve this end, the 
chapter will discuss the other maritime crimes that may be mistaken for Piracy, but only in so 
far as they relate to the definition of Piracy. The substantive content of the crime of Piracy 
will also be discussed. This will be done by extensively considering the elements of the crime 
of Piracy one at a time. The objective here is to set out a clear numerus clausus that must be 
satisfied so as to say that Piracy has been either committed or there was an attempt thereto. 
The prohibition in criminal law theory to create or identify criminal definitions by way of 





As a matter of clarity and context, it must be noted that the title hostes humani generis was 
coined and used in historic times to describe the status of pirates in society as enemies of all 
and sailing as citizens of no countries. This label continues to follow modern day pirates and 
features in modern literature, sometimes being linked to the universal jurisdiction to which 
piracy is subject.
170
 It is submitted that in modern times, the appropriate classification of the 
pirate is as a criminal, not as an enemy of all of mankind. Piracy is an international crime, 
and pirates much like perpetrators of international crimes are criminals who enjoy human 
rights and liberties afforded to all. The term enemy is a political term and well suited in the 
context of hostilities and warfare. Thus this research focuses on pirates as international 
criminals and therefore the analysis will be in the context of customary and contemporary 
international law developments. Moreover, the analysis will also extend to international 
criminal law from a South African perspective and the criminalisation of piracy in South 
African law taking into account the supremacy of the Constitution. Chapter III constitutes an 
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3 1 Introduction 
 
Having established and defined the evolutionary course of the phenomenon of piracy 
throughout history in the previous chapter, it follows that there must be a critical analysis of 
the crime as it is regulated in international criminal law (including under customary 
international law). 
 
The legal definition of maritime piracy has been subject of controversy and intense 
disagreement throughout the history of maritime nations‘ desire to have a common 
framework to regulate and prosecute piracy. This does not come as a surprise of course, the 
very nature of the crime of piracy will as a matter of common-sense lead to varied and 
divergent views for the reason that different maritime states will have a different experience 
as regards maritime security – even in the same region. When one considers Africa for 
instance, piracy and maritime insecurity has destabilised both the Gulf of Aden at the Horn of 
Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea off the Coast of West Africa. However, the experience is 
different in that piracy in the Gulf of Aden is generally perpetrated by young men driven by 
personal profit from ransom payments. Whereas in the Gulf of Aden, piratical acts are 
reportedly executed by organised militia whose motivation is quasi-political. It therefore 
follows that when governments and policy makers in the two different sub-regions of the 
continent express a view on what constitutes a pirate and piracy, they may well be talking of 
3 7 1 The United States – Case Study 
3 7 2 Republic of Kenya – Case Study 





two markedly different concepts owing to the different experiences that inform their views. 
The same can be said for piracy hotspots such as South-East Asia. Thus, one can say that 
because of that piracy is so hard to define because it ultimately depends on subjective 
experience.  
 
Different states have defined it according to their own understanding in their respective 
national legislation, and this is reflective of the contention that has historically prevailed 
when members of the international community engaged in dialogue directed at formulating a 
common understanding and definition of piracy.
171
 It is these very contentions that have 
yielded the less than effective framework that subsists today, both at national and 
international levels. Piracy is covered by a number of international instruments and in the 
case of South Africa it can arguably be prosecuted under two separate statutes, and much like 
in international law there is an instrument that defines piracy in accordance with the 
UNCLOS and then there is another instrument the provisions of which are so wide and vague 
that piracy falls within the ambit thereof. The latest instrument to be formulated in 
international law, which defines piracy, is the UNCLOS. This instrument enjoys the status of 
customary international law. Nevertheless, it is contended that UNCLOS contains an 
unsatisfactory framework in terms of guiding states in formulating an appropriate definition 
of piracy so as to successfully prosecute the modern pirate, and it is also found wanting in so 
far as it attempts to define piracy as it should be understood in international criminal law. 
 
The El Hiblu incident which occurred recently in the territorial waters of Libya exposes the 
unintended consequences of the current international law regime governing piracy. It is 
reported that on 27
th
 March 2019 a group of migrants were en route to Europe by sea when 
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they were in distress and rescued by the El Hiblu off the Coast of Libya, the migrants 
allegedly forcibly took control of the El Hiblu which was returning them to a port in Libya 
and directed that it sails to Malta instead.
172
  A member of cabinet of the Italian government 
is reported to have categorised the incident as piracy on the high seas by the migrants.
173
 The 
Maltese government arrested three migrants for the incident on charges of terrorism. 
Humanitarian organisations and the NGO Community argued that the migrants acted in self-
defence, overlooking the legal accuracy of the ‗piracy‘ categorisation.
174
 In considering the 
meaning, scope and content of the crime of piracy, reference is made in the chapter to the El 
Hiblu incident. 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to critically analyse the provisions of the UNCLOS with the 
aim to give a comprehensive understanding as to why the international community is 
struggling to prosecute pirates under international criminal law.  
 
The UNCLOS essentially provides that Piracy is any criminal violence committed by 
passengers or crew of a private ship either on the high seas or at any place outside the 
jurisdiction of any state, against another ship, persons or property on board ship, for private 
ends.
175
 This definition casts the scope of the crime of piracy far and wide, however it raises 
more concerns than it does provide answers or solutions in as far as clearly defining piracy is 
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concerned. It exposes the modern international criminal law regime as less effective in 
providing clarity as to what constitutes piracy and thus making it difficult to charge and 
prosecute perpetrators thereof.
176
 This is the point of departure in trying to understand the 
problems associated with bringing pirates to justice. The current state of international law vis-
à-vis piracy is that the UNCLOS leaves too much to invention in that it does not effectively 
provide a solid legal framework for states to work with when dealing with Piracy.
177
 This 
observation has particular relevance in an international criminal law context, where the focus 
is on individual criminal liability. While the analysis here focuses on the elements of the 
crime of piracy as provided for by the UNCLOS, it will also seek to lend a foundation to such 
elements by discussing concomitant matters – not least of all the fundamental principle of 
legality - nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege. 
 
The point of departure is that customary international law provides a workable albeit 
incomplete normative context in which to establish individual criminal liability for piracy. As 
far as customary international law is concerned, the theoretical (and by now trite) position 
that piracy is one of the oldest crimes under international law (even an international crime 
par excellence) is remarkably not reflected in the empirical fact that states are – generally 
speaking – reluctant to follow through and treat piracy as a crime of universal jurisdiction.
178
 
This general reluctance frustrates efforts to combat piracy by the few willing states in that it 
makes it burdensome on a state desirous to prosecuting pirates to attain that goal, especially 
where such state does not have well defined anti-piracy laws and wishes to incorporate 
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international law by statutory or constitutional provision.
179
 This is to say, it would be 
advantageous for willing states to incorporate a strong international criminal law regime, akin 
to, say, the grave breaches regime in the context of war crimes.
180
 As a result, the trend seems 
to be that pirates captured are released without trial or punishment, which has in turn created 
a culture of impunity.
181
 There are exceptions, like the efforts of a multinational fleet and 
taskforce aimed at eradicating the problem of Somali piracy along the east coast of Africa. 
Part of that strategy (which originally formed part of the so-called ‗War on Terror‘ led by the 
United States) is indeed to capture and prosecute pirates.
182
 It is submitted that this quasi-
military or, military-cum-legal strategy, is neither coherent nor based on a comprehensive 
legal framework and certainly not a blueprint for South Africa. 
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There are also jurisdictional complexities that work against the successful prosecution of 
piracy. The international law principle as codified in the UNCLOS is that the high seas do not 
belong under the sovereign rule of any state.
183
 As such, the high seas are open to all 
recognised states that form the international community. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) has made attempts to address the (enforcement) jurisdiction problem by 
passing resolution A. 1025 (26)
184
 which suggests that states must take measures to codify 
their universal jurisdiction over piracy and also lay down a clear procedural framework that 
would support piracy prosecution.  
 
While the debate about piracy as the subject of universal jurisdiction seems to be moot (at 
least insofar as the substantive notion of piracy as a crime against the whole of humankind
185
 
– akin to slavery – is concerned), the same is certainly not true with respect to enforcement 
jurisdiction. In brief, and first of all, the International Criminal Court (ICC) does not have 
jurisdiction to try cases of piracy per se (a creative prosecutor could, of course, with the right 
factual matrix and contextual elements at hand, argue that acts of piracy constitute crimes 
against humanity or even war crimes). Secondly, the vision by AU Member States which was 
contained in the Annex to the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human and Peoples‘ 
Rights (the Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights
186
) or, ‗Malabo Protocol‘, has been realised. The Malabo Protocol 
empowers the African Court to try international crimes such as genocide, crimes against 
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humanity, war crimes and aggression (the so-called ‗core crimes‘ under international criminal 
law). This part of the proposal is controversial, because it has implications for African states‘ 
diplomatic, legal and institutional relationship with the ICC (which, of course, has 
jurisdiction over the four core crimes and many African states are states party to the Rome 
Statute of the International Criminal Court). Given the fact that the ICC (at present, at least 
and as pointed out above) does not have jurisdiction over all crimes of international concern 
(like piracy), piracy was included in the list of other international crimes within the criminal 
jurisdiction of the ‗Criminal Chamber‘ of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights.
187
 
The international criminal law implications of this recent development are discussed at length 




Against the above background, and given the debates and issues as briefly identified, the 
dissertation seeks to develop a coherent legal framework from a South African international 
criminal law perspective, but in the context of international and regional dynamics and legal 
considerations, for the effective combating of piracy as a crime of international concern. 
 
3 2 Principle of Legality in International Criminal Law vis-a-vis Piracy. 
 
The principle of legality in its narrow sense is expressed in the Latin maxim nullum crimen, 
nullum poena sine lege which stipulates that there can be no conviction and/or punishment 
without a law. It is one of the most fundamental principles of criminal justice in modern legal 
systems, meant to protect citizens from arbitrary prosecution and conviction by the state. The 
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importance of the principle of legality in domestic legal systems cannot be overstated as 
modern democratic criminal justice systems provide for it through their constitutions or by 
subscription to international legal instruments championing the principle. The immediate 
question and the that this part of the chapter seeks to answer is whether the principle of 
legality has the same or an equally important status in customary international criminal law, 
and in particular whether it has relevance in the prosecution of maritime piracy. This it seeks 
to do by assessing the jurisprudence of international criminal tribunals set up to try 
international crimes. It is only later on in the chapter when the elements of the crime is 
considered that the author will seek to weigh whether the current definition of piracy as 
provided for by UNCLOS passes muster. Principles of western democracy and international 
socio-political norms require that the interwoven nature of human rights law and 
(international) criminal law be upheld and maintained, as the former lends credence and 
legitimacy to the latter. For instance, in the instant case of piracy no court should endeavour 
to try accused persons if the crime with which they are charged offends the principle of 
legality.  
 
The application and relevance of the principle of legality in international criminal law has 
been subject of debate, primarily because of the inconsistency of international tribunals in 
upholding the principle. The historically significant international trials at Nuremberg and 
Tokyo were particularly controversial in the manner in which they dealt with arguments 
founded upon the principle of legality.  
 
It is trite in legal scholarship that regardless of whether a crime is prosecuted on the basis of 
national law of a state or under customary international law, the principle of legality features 




whether this principle is as exacting in international law as in national law, as there are 
divergent schools of thought with some scholars argue that the standard is near absolute in 
international law,
189
 some scholars argue that it in fact is not.
190
 International criminal 
tribunals have favoured a less strict line of reasoning to the application of the principle of 
legality to international crimes.
191
 In the Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman,
192
 the Special 
Court for Sierra Leone relied on an ICTY case
193
 and held that ―in interpreting the principle 
nullum crimen sine lege it is critical to determine whether the underlying conduct at the time 
of its commission was punishable. The emphasis on conduct, rather than on specific 
description of the offence in substantive criminal law, is of primary relevance.‖
194
 This kind 
of teleological construction of the principle of legality by international criminal tribunals 
seems to be based on justice and policy considerations especially where conduct is malum in 
se. However, there is no written law with clearly defined elements to categorically 
criminalise that conduct. The jurisprudence of the SCSL in this regard is demonstrative of a 
tension between international criminal law and human rights law in that on the one hand 
substantive criminal law requires that a law criminalising conduct must exist (before the 
conduct in question occurs) and it must be clear in its provisions. The principle of legality 
actually encapsulates this requirement as its basic tenet nullum crimen sine lege certa. Human 
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rights on the other hand requires a degree of reasonable flexibility; often dressed as 
dynamism and progressiveness, when the rights of victims to recourse and substantive justice 
are at stake.  
 
In so far as the international crime of piracy is concerned there are provisions in the 
UNCLOS that provide for the elements of the international crime, however it must be borne 
in mind that these elements are constructions of the international community to reach one 
international customary law definition. Prior to the UNCLOS and its predecessor, there was 
not a single unanimously agreed to definition of piracy and the crime was only assigned its 
name based on location of occurrence rather than elements which differentiated it from other 
crimes.
195
 The modern crime of piracy has these differentiating elements, however there 
remains the question as to whether those elements are sufficient to meet the standard of the 
principle of legality.  
 
To determine whether the crime of piracy under international law passes muster, the elements 
of the crime (and possible gaps in the definition) are discussed below.  
 
3 3 The International Legal Framework to Combat Piracy 
 
UNCLOS provides for the codification of the customary crime of piracy in international law. 
At the conference that adopted the Geneva Convention of 1958 which preceded the 
UNCLOS, one of the more complex challenges faced by the delegates was agreement on a 
unanimously acceptable definition of piracy in the midst of a myriad of oft conflicting 
municipal legal traditions and experiences on the law of maritime piracy. This legal 
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instrument also provides the international customary law definition of piracy which forms the 
basis upon which this crime can be prosecuted in international fora and national courts with 
the requisite competence to apply international law. (The application of international law in 
South African courts is considered later in the research.) 
 
The UNCLOS provides that piracy consists of any of the following acts:
196
 
 (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for 
private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and 
directed:  
(i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or 
property on board such ship or aircraft;  
(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the 
jurisdiction of any State;  
(b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with 
knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft;  
(c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph 
(a) or (b). 
 
The foundational premise of the analysis is that criminal actions of an individual have to meet 
the UNCLOS requirements before a court of law can make a finding of guilt on a charge of 
piracy. The UNCLOS definition of piracy is made up different cumulative elements, each of 
which are considered and discussed in detail below. 
 
 
                                                             





3 3 1 Private Ends 
 
One of the elements of the UNCLOS definition that differentiates piracy from other maritime 
crimes is the requirement that the illegal conduct by the perpetrator be committed for private 
ends.
197
 The UNCLOS unfortunately leaves the meaning of ―private ends‖ to interpretation 
and deduction from history. In the era of the United Nations (as opposed to the League of 
Nations era), it was the drafters of the UNCLOS predecessor, the Geneva Convention, who 
incorporated the private ends requirement into the piracy international criminal law 
framework in order to garner international consensus which favoured a shift from wanton 
enforcement by Britain in centuries past.
198
 As will be seen below, the drafters of the Geneva 
Convention were not the first to consider the private ends element/ requirement. The private 
ends element was useful considering the history of pirates being hired by sovereign 
governments to carry out reprisal and plunder on ships sailing under the flag of an enemy 
state, there is however uncertainty as to relevance, scope and content of this requirement in 
modern day piracy and in the age of terrorism, activism, and recognition of liberation armed 
struggle.  
 
Historically, the private ends requirement was tied to the notion that a person who 
perpetuates certain illegal acts associated with piracy on the seas without the sanction of a 
recognised government committed piracy.
199
 The view precedes the existence of the UN 
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which ultimately codified the international law of piracy. The Committee of Experts for the 
Progressive Codification of International Law which was a League of Nations creature 
introduced the private ends requirement, and from the reading of its publication such as the 
Piracy Questionnaire,
200
 the more obvious and perhaps intended interpretation is that the lack 
of government authority or sanction makes for private ends. The private ends requirement 
necessarily isolated the piratical acts from other acts on the high seas which were state 
sponsored since piratical acts could only be assigned to persons who sailed the sea of their 
own interest.
201
 From an (international) criminal law perspective, this construction of the 
private ends requirement further serves to differentiate conduct that may well meet all the 
requirements of piracy during times of war. Since one of the tenets of international criminal 
law is the assignment of criminal responsibility to individuals, there has to be a clear 
distinction between international crimes par excellence and acts of war which may or not be 
illegal given the context within which they are carried out – further, there is the ―war crimes‖ 
facility under which illegal reprisals at sea can be prosecuted. This broad interpretation has 
been applied by the Belgian Court of Cassation (in an appeal from the Court of Appeal at 
Antwerp) where it was held that where a private ship on the high seas commits acts of 
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violence against another ship driven by political motives, those acts amount to piracy under 
international law.
202
 The Court of Cassation stated: 
―The applicants do not argue that the acts at issue were committed in the interest or to the 
detriment of a State or a State system rather than purely in support of a personal point of view 
concerning a particular problem, even if they reflected a political perspective. On the basis of 
these considerations the Court of Appeal was entitled to decide that the acts at issue were 
committed for personal ends within the meaning...of the [1958 Geneva] Convention [on the 




The Court makes the point that while illegal activity may have relevance or even be hailed as 
positive by a particular State or administration, such actions are for private ends if they are 
not carried out at the behest of – or otherwise sponsored by – that State. Thus, this is 
understood to mean that private ends may have a public aspect, but such aspects do not alter 
their orientation – namely that the actions are for personal ends. This is somewhat different 
from the view and narrow interpretation held by some modern authors whose view is that the 
private ends requirement means that illegal acts perpetrated based on conscience or political 
motive are not piratical.
204
 This narrow interpretation appears to draw the line between piracy 
and other maritime illegal activities like terrorism, which are motivated by political ideology 
rather than plunder for personal gain.
205
 While it is accurate that there is and should be a clear 
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demarcation between piracy and maritime terror at least from a principle of legality 
standpoint, the question is whether the private ends requirement is the foundational basis for 
the distinction. If from an interpretation point of view we accept that the opposite of ‗private 
ends‘ is ‗public ends‘, the question is whether it is sound to make the conclusion that terror 
and politically motivated conduct can be assigned a public ends status. The same question 
arises with regards to activism, for the reason that while activism is done for public good – it 
ultimately is an expression of a personally held political view. This interpretation could 
possibly stand if ‗private ends‘ are construed to only mean personal gain as some authors 
seem to understand it.
206
 However, a South African court would likely require robust 
persuasion to adopt this interpretation given that there is no real historical basis for such an 
interpretation under international law and the legal quagmire that obtains if this interpretation 
is favoured. In essence, an accused can raise the private ends requirement as a defence to a 
charge of piracy if for instance he submitted that he attacked a vessel because he did not 
agree with the foreign policy of the state whose flag the vessel sail under.  As highlighted 
above, this requirement presents problems concerning legal certainty and the principle of 
legality. This is actually the same legal challenge that the Russian government faced when it 
charged 30 Greenpeace activists with piracy when they attacked an oil rig in protest of oil 
exploration activity by Russia. President Vladimir Putin, when referring to the activists, is 
quoted as saying: ―it is absolutely evident that they are, of course, not pirates.‖
207
 The piracy 
charges against the activists were dropped,
208
 and for good reason. There is no historical 
account of piracy being used as a form of activism, and thus no basis for governments and 
courts to view it as such. There can, however, be a blurred line between activism and 
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terrorism when activists employ the use of force as a strategy for protest. Thus the overlaps 
between piracy and terrorism seem to fuel this narrow interpretation of the private ends 
requirement.  
In the El Hiblu incident the Maltese courts are yet to decide whether the terrorism charges 
against the migrants will succeed. From the limited information available in the media, it is 
submitted that the charges are unlikely to succeed, whereas if the charge would have been 
one of piracy under international law this element of the crime would prima facie have been 
satisfied. Further, the United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (―UNHCHR) has 
described the charges as exaggerated given the context within which the incident took place. 
A legal explanation as to the choice of charge by the Maltese government can be deduced by 
reference to the fact that the El Hiblu was not hijacked on the high seas but was allegedly 
hijacked in the territorial waters of Libya. Since piracy is a high seas crime, the Maltese 
government did not have the charge of piracy available to them. The high seas requirement is 
discussed below. 
 
In the context of acts – short of ―piracy‖ in the UNCLOS sense – but acts endangering 
maritime safety – see Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation,
209
 drafted in response to the Achille Lauro hijacking has now entered 
into force. This instrument is discussed more in Chapter V of this research. 
 
3 3 2 High Seas 
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The UNCLOS piracy provisions stipulate that piratical conduct be committed on the high 
seas as defined in Article 3 of the UNCLOS.
210
 This is the part of the ocean upon which no 
state may lay a claim as being part of its territory under international law. In sum, it belongs 
to all states that form part of the international community. This does not mean that it is a kind 
of ―free-for-all‖, norm-free realm. Indeed, the international community is constantly trying to 
create normative frameworks that govern the high seas for the benefit of the whole of 
humanity,
211
 this is particularly relevant when one considers that even though the seas are 
divided by boundaries and zones – they in fact are one continuous ecosystem that is not at all 
limited by the boundaries and territorial claim. The recent UN General Assembly discussions 





The UNCLOS provides that piratical conduct which occurs in the territorial waters of any 
State does not constitute piracy under international law. The result is that if a ship is attacked 
within territorial waters, we look to the State within whose territory the attack occurred to 
exercise jurisdiction over that attack, and the matter is dealt with under the laws of the State 
concerned. However, if an attack amounting to piracy is carried out beyond the territorial 
borders of any State (the high seas), according to the UNCLOS it is the arresting State that 
may exercise jurisdiction over the pirates and the seized vessel.
213
 Important to note is that 
the provision is permissive rather than prescriptive, and this has had an effect on how 
contemporary piracy prosecutions are handled in practice. There has to be willingness and 
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ability on the part of the arresting state to prosecute maritime piracy – as the expenses and 
expertise required to successfully prosecute can be prohibitive. The consequence of the 
permissive provision is that some arresting States have either outsourced the prosecution of 
pirates or elected to adopt the so-called catch-and-release policy where pirates are let go with 
no consequences. Nonetheless, it remains that the modern piracy framework makes this 
distinction between territorial waters and the high seas an element of the crime. In legal 
scholarship, piracy as provided for in international law is referred to as piracy jure 
gentium,
214
 while piratical acts that occurs in territorial waters are sometimes referred to as 
municipal piracy (particularly in US scholarship),
215
 or as robbery at sea depending on how a 
State has chosen to classify piratical acts occurring within territorial waters. Piracy jure 
gentium as provided for by the UNCLOS has been recognised as a contravention of the jus 
cogens which all states must defend.
216
 Further, the UNCLOS confirms the customary 
international law position that piracy is a crime of universal jurisdiction. The jurisdictional 
issues are discussed in detail later in the research. 
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The first criticism of this distinction is that it is found wanting vis-à-vis modern piracy and 
modern maritime navigation. The manner in which piracy is carried out and the extent which 
it is reported has changed over time. A significant number of piratical incidents occur in 
territorial waters while a vessel is in transit, at anchor, or when at port.
217
 For instance, in the 
El Hiblu incident this requirement would not be satisfied given the fact that it occurred on 
Libyan territorial waters. This scenario, according to the UNCLOS, is not a matter for 
international (criminal) law but one that must be criminalised by state law. English courts 
have sought to contextualise maritime piracy, particularly on the stringent interpretation that 
piracy for all intents and purposes occurs on the high seas. InAthens Maritime Enterprises 
Corp v Hellenic Mutual War Risks Association (Bermuda) Ltd
218
 the plaintiff‘s vessel The 
Andreas Lemos fell victim to piratical acts which occurred on territorial waters of 
Bangladesh, and thus instituted an insurance claim on the basis that the vessel was insured for 
piracy amongst other things. The defendant who was the insurer association sought to evade 
the claim by arguing that while the incident involved piratical acts, it was not piracy because 
piracy can only occur in the high seas.
219
 The court held that in the context of an insurance 
policy there can be no distinction as to high seas or territorial water, if the vessel is at sea this 
is a maritime offence as the vessel is in a place where piracy can be committed.
220
 This 
judgment must be referred to with a degree of caution for the reason that the rationale behind 
the judgment was not to alter or deviate from the international law concerning piracy but to 
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establish a different rule when interpreting commercial contracts.
221
 It seems that in the realm 
of insurance and commercial law the focus is not so much on the definition of piracy but 
rather on piratical activity.  
The hurdle caused by the high seas requirement manifests in the situation obtaining off the 
coast of Somalia. It is trite that pirate attacks have been rife in the said area, but working with 
the UNCLOS framework means anti-piracy activity can only be lawfully undertaken beyond 
the territorial waters of Somalia, and it is only piratical activity occurring in the high seas that 
can be prosecuted outside of Somalia. The United Nations Security Council, by resolution,
222
 
created a facility in terms of which state-owned vessels could enter the territorial waters of 
Somalia to conduct anti-piracy operations as if such operations were being conducted on the 
high seas.
223
 Regardless of whether this resolution is being considered in isolation or in 
context, it exposes the UNCLOS high seas requirement as more of an impediment than a 
solution to territorial integrity and sovereignty. Worth noting is that this resolution by the 
Security Council was actually triggered by a request from the permanent representative of 
Somalia to the United Nations, for assistance in securing the waters off the coast of 
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 This raises issue with whether the high seas and territorial water distinction has 
any substantive rationale (at least in so far as piracy is concerned). Or, is it thinly hinged on a 
superficial debate about sovereignty? Piratical acts in territorial waters and those occurring on 
the high seas are only differentiated by location, in terms of their effect. The argument can be 
made that the difference is negligible, if at all. This is especially pronounced in the context of 
maritime nations which are either unable (such as Somalia) to engage in anti-piracy 
operations and prosecution of pirates, or countries where there is no real political will to do 
so. The high seas requirement thus promotes de facto and de jure impunity rather than a 
legitimate protection of rights of an alleged pirate.  
 
3 3 3 Two Ships Requirement 
 
The two ships requirement is a self-explanatory element of piracy under UNCLOS. This 
element requires that for there to be piracy there must be two ships involved in the incident. 
There are authors who have argued that the UNCLOS can be interpreted to mean that there 
need not be two ships,
225
 however such an interpretation is a stretch which deviates from the 
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travaux préparatoires of the erstwhile Geneva Convention
226
 – the language of which was 
adopted without any alterations in the UNCLOS.
227
 The travaux préparatoires basically gives 
cogent indication that the international community understood this requirement to mean that 
two (or more) vessels are requisite to fulfil the piracy definition under international law.
228
 
There is also an important argument raised by Dr. Lawrence Azubuike in support of the two 
ships requirement. He makes the argument that every vessel on the seas sails under a flag of a 
state the law of which applies on board that vessel, thus in the case of mutiny aboard a vessel 
the law of the flag state will apply because in any event the vessel is akin to a floating island 
of the flag state.
229
 The gist of the argument is that where piratical acts are committed aboard 
a ship, these do not trigger the application of international criminal law as such  because the 
law of the state under which that ship sails will find application  – further that in the high seas 
international law  serves to protect ―outsiders‖ rather than a vessel‘s crew and passengers so 
another ship is necessarily required for purposes of piracy.
230
 This construction holds true 
even in the context of contemporary maritime security incidents. As with the El Hiblu 
incident, even if it had occurred in the high seas, the fact there was not another vessel would 
have precluded piracy as a crime for consideration. From an interpretation point of view, it is 
submitted that no issue of legitimate concern arises. 
 
There remains the question as to whether the two ship requirement finds relevance with 
modern piracy. This question presents a dilemma which touches on the principle of legality. 
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The two ship requirement is useful in so far as it distinguishes piracy from other maritime 
crimes such terrorism and robbery at sea,
231
 however one of the elements of any crime is that 
there has to be mens rea – the criminal intention to commit the crime with which an accused 
person is charged. The aforesaid dilemma arises when a passenger or crew member intends to 
commit piracy and/or turn the vessel into a pirate ship.
232
 The two ship requirement excludes 
such a person‘s conduct from classification as piracy. The dilemma is demonstrated by the 
Achille Lauro incident where one of the issues was the hijacking of a vessel by ostensible 
passengers of the very same vessel.
233
 The two ship requirement means that the conduct by 
the hijackers could not be classified as piracy at least not under international criminal law. 
The problem with this distinction is that it lends itself to the absurd interpretation that 
members of the crew and/or passengers of a vessel are not capable of formulating an 
intention (mens rea) to commit piracy as understood in international criminal law. They may 
commit piratical acts, but they can only be charged with ordinary crimes, or at least crimes 
other than piracy and the above described sense. 
 
It is argued that the two ship requirement is neither practical nor of any demonstrable legal 
significance in the prosecution of piracy. While the principle of legality is not as stringently 
applied in international criminal law as in most municipal legal contexts, an accused may 
well still argue against being prosecuted under terror or robbery laws on the basis that the 
criminal intent to commit these analogous crimes cannot be established. 
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3 4 Universal Jurisdiction vis-à-vis Piracy 
 
There is general consensus amongst international law scholars and jurists that piracy, like 
slavery, is classically a crime to which all sovereign states can exercise universal 
jurisdiction.
234
 From a classical point of view, universal jurisdiction for piracy is borne from 
the notion that pirates are hostes humani generi, they are enemies of mankind who sail under 
no legitimate flag.
235
 The UNCLOS provides for a ‗loose‘ codification of the principle of 
universal jurisdiction by providing that: 
 
 “on the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State 
may seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the 
control of pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the 
State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may 
also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject 




In simple terms, or at least in principle, the universality of jurisdiction means that every state 
may investigate and prosecute crimes accepted by the international community as universally 
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abhorrent. However, upon closer inspection it appears that universal jurisdiction as a concept 
is not an easy facility to explore practically – not in the least as to when it relates to piracy as 
provided for by the UNCLOS. 
 
The first issue with universal jurisdiction was exposed in the dissenting judgment in the 
Arrest Warrant Case (DRC v Belgium),
237
 where Judge Van den Wyngaert in dissent noted 
that neither conventional nor customary international law provide a generally accepted 
definition of universal jurisdiction.
238
 Therefore, there is not one model to which sovereign 
states can benchmark a claim to universal jurisdiction, save to make the argument that it is a 
facility recognised and sanctioned by customary international law without necessarily 
defining it – especially given the fact that many States such as Belgium have passed 
legislation providing for universal jurisdiction. There have been proposed definitions of 
universal jurisdiction, such as O‘ Keefe who proposes that universal jurisdiction is the 
assertion of (criminal) jurisdiction to prescribe in the absence of any other accepted 




The other issue with universal jurisdiction as it relates to piracy is that its application is 
limited to the high seas which are a body of ocean that belongs to all and none as far as states 
and territorial claims go.
240
 The term ―universal jurisdiction‖ is somewhat deceiving in that 
the universality of the jurisdiction pertains to the unanimous attitude or perception of the 
international community towards certain serious crimes. Thus the concept is not to be 
understood to mean that a state has competence to investigate, capture, and try pirates 
                                                             
237 Judgment of 14th February 2002. 
238At para 44. 
239R O‘Keefe ―Universal Jurisdiction: Clarifying the Basic Concept‖ (2004) J. Int’l Crim. Jus.  




wherever it may locate one. Literature discussing universal jurisdiction makes the case that 
universal jurisdiction is not a unitary concept, but is made up of different facets.
241
 Some 
authors hold a purist view of jurisdiction and there is a suggestion that such a view does not 
take into account that universal jurisdiction refers both to a state‘s competence to prescribe 
and enforcement jurisdiction. Practically and in alignment with O‘Keefe, this means that 
while all states have prescriptive jurisdiction against piracy – essentially meaning any state 
may pass a law that criminalises certain conduct and affords it jurisdiction over persons who 
commit that conduct notwithstanding the lack of a jurisdictional nexus to the conduct. The 
same is certainly not true for enforcement jurisdiction. States cannot for instance violate 
sovereignty of another state by entering its territory to arrest and enforce its law on an 
individual in that state. Explaining this quality of universal jurisdiction in National 
Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre,
242
 the Constitutional Court held that investigations and the exercise of 
adjudicative jurisdiction confined to the territory of the investigating state are not at odds 




This distinction takes one back to the distinction between piracy jure gentium and piracy as 
criminalised by national laws of maritime states. Given the schematic regimes provided for 
by the UNCLOS, there arises a question as to whether enforcement jurisdiction can be 
exercised on the exclusive economic zone. The high seas regime provided for as Part VII of 
the UNCLOS demarcates the high seas as all parts of the sea that are not included in the 
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exclusive economic zone and preceding waters.
244
 Part V of the UNCLOS provides for the 
exclusive economic zone regime,
245
 which is the portion of the ocean immediately 
succeeding territorial waters and can stretch out 200 nautical miles beyond the baseline of 
territorial waters.
246
 That said, the UNCLOS also stipulates that other states enjoy rights (over 
the exclusive economic zone) identical to the rights and freedoms over the high seas which 
are afforded all states in Article 87 of the UNCLOS.
247
 Further, the UNCLOS provides that 
the piracy provisions inter alia are applicable in the exclusive economic zone in so far as they 
are not incompatible with the exclusive economic zone regime.
248
 Which essentially means 
that enforcement jurisdiction over piracy may be exercised on the exclusive economic zone 
of a state, subject to the proviso stipulated in Article (58) (3) that exercise of such jurisdiction 




The UNCLOS approach to jurisdiction in relation to exclusive economic zone and the high 
seas presents some inconsistencies, especially when read against early commentary on the 
negotiations that led to the successful adoption of the UNCLOS.
250
 Sovereignty (over and 
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above economic gain) underscores the exclusive rights afforded the coastal states‘ to exploit 
and protect natural marine resources in the exclusive economic zone. However it seems the 
application of international law on the exclusive economic zone is generally accepted 
notwithstanding that there is no express mention of the exclusive economic zones in the 
definition of piracy.
251
 Some authors maintain that the jurisdictional set up vis-à-vis exclusive 
economic zones is problematic. Birnie holds as follows: 
 
―The situation is complicated because the piracy provisions are in Part VI of the UNCLOS 
relating to the high seas which state (in Article 86) that it applies ―to all parts of the sea that 
are not included in the exclusive economic zone, in the territorial sea or in the international 
waters of an archipelagic state.‖ Although Article 58 states that in the EEZ all states continue 
to enjoy the freedom of navigation and overflight and ―other internationally lawful uses of the 
sea related to them, such as those associated with the operation of ships‖ and aircrafts, it also 
makes these rights subject to the relevant provisions of the Convention without making it 
clear which are the ―relevant provisions‖ or which take priority. Article 86 adds that the 
article ―does not entail any abridgement of the freedoms enjoyed by all States‖ in the EEZ 
under Article 58, which itself also adds that ―Articles 88 to 115 . . .apply to the exclusive 
economic zone so far as they are not incompatible with this Part,‖ but coastal states may 
consider that as the zone's purpose is to secure this exclusive right to its economic uses and as 
its legal status is equally left sui generis by the wording of the UNCLOS since it is not clearly 
stated to be part of the high seas, it is their responsibility to protect navigation from piratical 
assaults; the better view, however, would be that as the zone is by its terms not part of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
200 miles not only emanates as a symbol of asserting territorial rights and sovereignty, but also carries definite 
economic importance for these states as well.‖ 
251See generally Centre for Oceans Law and Policy University of Virginia School of Law United Nations 
Convention on The Law of The Sea: A Commentary. Which discusses the rejection by the United Nations 
Conference on the Law of the Sea to include the exclusive economic zone in the definition of piracy and further 
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territorial sea the piracy articles apply in it. States taking the other line might also argue, 
however, that piracy is an unlawful use out with the residual rights of other states. The fact 
that attempts by the UNCLOS Drafting Committee to eliminate this confusion in favour of 




The thematic regimes in the UNCLOS present some inconsistencies and vagueness in that the 
rights of the coastal state which are not to be violated as regards the exclusive economic zone 
are not obvious. For instance it remains unclear whether the use of lethal force in a bid to 
apprehend pirates in the exclusive economic zone does not militate against the coastal state‘s 
right to police the lawful use of the exclusive economic zone. 
  
 
3 5 Analysis of Comparative Measures to Combat Piracy under the UNCLOS 
 
In conducting the preceding analysis, the shortcomings of the UNCLOS were discussed in 
detail, exposing the legal implications of using the current international criminal law 
framework to prosecute piracy. The analysis was also underscored by considerations of the 
principle of legality in international criminal law and with particular reference to the 
UNCLOS provisions. Notwithstanding the shortcomings highlighted, there have been 
prosecutions of piracy – different tribunals around the globe have had opportunities to 
adjudicate and make determinations on piracy cases before them. Piracy prosecutions and 
judgments thereto have raised some noteworthy insights as to how individual states and 
regional blocs understand the phenomenon that is piracy, more especially against or with 
reference to the international criminal law framework relevant to piracy. A consideration of 
                                                             




recorded prosecutions and judgments in piracy cases will serve to expose the challenges 
encountered with piracy suppression internationally. Further, policy and approaches taken by 
states and regional maritime nations to address the piracy problem are worth studying against 
the UNCLOS which is the primary framework for international criminal prosecution. States 
such as the United Kingdom, the United States of America, Kenya, and Seychelles have 
operative piracy legislation and have tried pirates in their courts. Clusters of states have also 
recognized the supranational nature of the crime and thus have concluded international 
instruments for the suppression of piracy. One such initiative is the Regional Cooperation 
Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships in Asia (―ReCAAP‖), 
the first regional inter-governmental multilateral agreement on piracy suppression. There are 
other international arrangements such as the European Union Naval Force Atalanta (―EU 
NAVFOR‖) launched in December 2008 within the framework of the European Common 
Security and Defence Policy. 
 
It is apparent that naval states recognize that while the UNLCOS is available as a prosecution 
instrument, a comprehensive legislative framework to suppress piracy must cater for 
investigations and other enforcement activities to achieve the desired goal common to all 
naval states affected by piracy. Thus, this section of the chapter (with a comparative angle) 
will particularly focus on issues around the legality of apprehension of pirates, jurisdictional 
issues, investigations, evidentiary concerns, the obtaining costs of prosecution and the effects 
of the lack of an international or regional tribunal to prosecute piracy. 
 
Once the legal hurdles have been identified, defined, and analysed, the chapter will consider 
how the international community‘s obligation or lack thereof, to prosecute influences the 




the responsibility of all states to join in the fight against Piracy,
253
 however, there is nothing 
in the travaux preparatoires, the UNCLOS itself or customary international law that imposes 
a clear duty on sovereign states to prosecute piracy as an international crime. While 
references to South African law and policy considerations are made herein, a thorough 
discussion of the prosecution of piracy from a South African perspective is conducted in the 
following chapter.  
Against the aforesaid, the practical hurdles to the prosecution of pirates are given some 
consideration. 
 
3 5 1 Arresting Pirates on the High Seas 
 
The UNCLOS provides for a framework regulating the arrest of pirates on the high seas. 
Under Article 105, which is the universal jurisdiction provision, it is stipulated that any State 
may seize a pirate ship and arrest the occupants thereof. Without deviating from the 
generality of Article 105, the UNCLOS provides for certain qualifications for the execution 
of a lawful arrest of pirates and thereby setting up legal hurdles that add on to the 
complexities of prosecuting a crime whose definition is equally mired in controversy. The 
qualifications of a lawful arrest are considered below 
 
3 5 1 1 State Action 
 
The UNCLOS provides that a seizure on account of piracy may be carried out only by 
warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as 
                                                             




being on government service and authorized to that effect.
254
 The legal capacity to effect an 
arrest on suspected pirates is limited to recognized States only, thus making it unlawful for 
any other interested non-State actor to do so. This qualification exposes two impediments to 
the international drive to suppress piracy, the first being the fact that there is no international 
maritime force charged with the mandate and exclusive jurisdiction to police the high seas to 
enforce the UNCLOS provisions. The second impediment, inextricably linked to the first one, 
is that while the duty to seize and arrest suspected pirate ships and pirates rests with every 
State naval forces by and large do not have an automatic mandate to seize and carry out 
arrests in the sense that police officers are lawfully mandated. The coordination by different 
national ministries to facilitate the lawful apprehension of pirates at sea has been described as 
a legal chain of authorities which requires executive coordination that will invariably be a 
time intensive and complex process.
255
 It is submitted that the wording of the UNCLOS 
provisions are to be construed to mean that only state sanctioned warships and military 
vessels may carry out an arrest on the high seas, however this is not to say the UNCLOS 
creates a rule in international law that assigns such a mandate to national militaries. It 
therefore follows that individual states would have to craft the necessary national framework 
which would include legislation, policy, and a defence strategy for the arrest of pirates and 
pirate ships on the high seas. That said, the UNCLOS does not compel States to formulate 
and pass national anti-piracy laws or domesticate the UNCLOS provisions. Such a treaty 
obligation would have contributed positively to the fight against piracy given that in some 
countries international law does not automatically become the law of the land 
notwithstanding being a signatory of any treaty. The relationship between international law 
and domestic law in South Africa is considered extensively in Chapter IV. 
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3 5 1 2 Adequate Grounds 
 
The UNCLOS framework provides that where an arrest is made by a state warship without 
adequate grounds for such an arrest, the arresting state assumes liability to the state whose 
flag the arrested/victim ship sails under.
256
 There is no guidance as to the meaning and 
content of ‗adequate grounds‘ however it remains a qualification. For instance, when 
assessing whether there were adequate grounds it is unclear whether the test for adequacy is 
subjective or objective. Moreover, an objective test for adequate grounds determined at high 
seas is one that relies heavily on hindsight and the actual discovery that the arrested ship was 
in fact a pirate ship for purposes of the UNCLOS, while a subjective test is unlikely to be 
contemplated given the fact that the provision is understood to be a mechanism to curb abuse 





The ‗adequate grounds‘ qualification must also be considered against the fact that there is no 
international law duty for States to fight or thwart piratical activities on the high seas. Which 
in turn means that when a State vessel engages in anti-piracy enforcement action it does so 
voluntarily and thus exposes itself to liability. Judge Jesus of the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea notes that small and developing maritime nations may be wary of 
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undertaking anti-piracy action due to the consequences of engaging in anti-piracy efforts, 
more especially if there is a risk of incurring financial liability to the state whose flag the 




3 5 1 3 High Seas 
 
When examining the scope and content of the crime of piracy earlier in this chapter, the high 
seas requirement was considered, and a conclusion was drawn that piratical acts constitute 
piracy under international law only when they are committed on the high seas. The same high 
sea requirement qualifies a lawful arrest. The UNCLOS states that an arrest of suspected 
pirates must be effected on the high seas, thus making it a general rule that where an arrest is 
effected within parts of the ocean where a naval State exercises jurisdiction it is 
unlawful.
259
The practical considerations of maritime navigation and the manner in which 
piracy is carried out raise questions as to hot pursuit from high seas into territorial waters. 
Territorial waters cover an area up to 12 nautical miles from shore and it has been recorded 
that the modus operandi of pirates has been small rubber boats which are designed for speed 
and utilizing global positioning systems.
260
 The UNCLOS upholds the international law 
precept of state sovereignty and respect for the territorial integrity of States. This creates a 
legal impediment to pursuing pirates beyond high seas because they can simply flee back into 
territorial water when pursued, and thus impunity continues to prevail. 
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3 5 2 Investigation Challenges 
 
It is trite that the successful prosecution of a crime depends on a good investigation, and the 
court is persuaded by legal arguments supported by oral and physical evidence collected at 
investigation stage. Difficulties encountered during the investigation stage may even lead a 
prosecutor to decide not to pursue a case, more especially when the said challenges have an 
adverse effect on the matrix of evidence upon which the case stands. In the context of piracy, 
there are challenges which law enforcement authorities around the globe have faced, 
including developed States with world class investigative capabilities. From a South African 
perspective, the Constitution guarantees all accused a fair trial which includes the right to 
adduce and challenge evidence, and the inadmissibility of unconstitutionally obtained 
evidence.
261
 Thus there exists a burden on investigators to adduce evidence of the accused 
person‘s commission of the crime with which he is charged. Investigation challenges, 
particularly those with an impact on the prosecution of pirates, are discussed in detail below. 
 
3 5 2 1 Crime Scene 
 
Article 105 of the UNCLOS provides inter alia that ―…[t]he courts of the State which carried 
out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed and may also determine the 
action to be taken with regard to the ships.‖ This provision contemplates the prosecution of 
                                                             




the accused in the arresting state, however successful prosecution is not a foregone 
conclusion given that the scene of the crime may be halfway around the globe. A Somali 
pirate can be transported by air to appear before court, but a large oil tanker upon which the 
alleged homicide or rape has occurred presents challenges.  
 
The other issue arising is the preservation of the crime scene and expertise required to do so. 
Military and naval personnel are not necessarily crime scene experts, yet during a piracy 
suppression operation they come into direct contact with the scene of the crime and thus 
evidence which may be crucial for prosecution purposes. This particular issue is universal in 
that advanced navies and those that are not so advanced face this identical challenge. 
Discussing the instant issue, Bahar notes that members of United States naval boarding teams 
involved antipiracy operations are not adequately trained in evidence handling and crime-
scene preservation.
262
 The preservation of maritime crime scenes thus remains a problem and 
hindrance to successful prosecution.  
 
3 5 2 2 Witnesses 
 
The recognition of the importance of witnesses in prosecuting piracy cases goes back 
centuries. In mid-16
th
 century England the eyewitness account of two witnesses was 
considered sufficient to conclude that an act of piracy was indeed committed.
263
 Eyewitness 
accounts are still relevant in prosecutions today. South African courts in particular assign 
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great weight to testimony given by an eyewitness. In the context of piracy, there are also 
practical challenges with witnesses – particularly securing their attendance at trial. Depending 
on the facts surrounding a particular piracy incident, witnesses could be the victim ship crew, 
holiday makers on a cruise ship, and/or military personnel. Professional sailors and crew may 
spend years at sea without a permanent mailing address to which summonses and other court 
documents can be sent.
264
Furthermore, there are logistical challenges such as facilitating the 
travel and accommodation of witness from foreign and oft far away countries.
265
The last 
issue that must be highlighted is the unwillingness of key witnesses to testify for fear of harm 




This challenge is seen in prosecutions (and abandonment thereof) in national courts. It has 
been reported that a Yemeni court convicted piracy suspects and meted out a death sentence 
for the crime notwithstanding the fact that there were no witnesses in the trial.
267
 Such an 
approach to piracy prosecution is, at least from a South African constitutional law 
perspective, unlawful and therefore undesirable. A prosecutor would be hard pressed to get a 
South African court to convict on allegation alone without the corroboration of key witnesses 
when there were in fact witnesses. That said, it is such difficulties that have seen a rise in the 
adoption of so-called ‗catch and release‘ policies – such as is rife practice by navies sailing 
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3 5 2 3 Detention and Incarceration 
 
Capturing pirates on the high seas is only the beginning of a protracted process which leads to 
the ultimate prosecution. The detention of suspects prior to trial and the incarceration of 
convicted pirates are issues that have been cited as barriers to the prosecution of pirates, 
particularly the cost associated with detention and incarceration.
269
 Once a suspect is 
apprehended, such suspect becomes a detainee and must be treated as such in accordance 




One of the major issues faced by navies and their governments arises when pirates are 
captured, and the capturing state is not desirous to prosecute. A state may find itself in a 
legal-cum-moral dilemma in that on the one hand the capturing state would not want to 
perpetuate a culture of impunity by either refraining from apprehending pirates or releasing 
them without any consequences. On the other hand, pirates (especially those of Somali 
nationality) are nationals of states with poor human rights records such that releasing suspects 
to security forces of their home country is never a viable option from an international law 
perspective.
271
 In 2008 the Absalon – a Danish navy vessel – undertook a military operation 
which led to the apprehension of ten pirates off the coast of Somalia. The pirates were 
detained for six days, thereafter the Danish government decided to leave the pirates the 
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pirates on a Somali beach – basically letting them off with no consequences.
272
 The torture 
dilemma rings true for both detentions before trial and the deportation of convicted pirates 
after having served their sentences. The latter further raises another deterrent to prosecution 
in the form of asylum seeking, this is discussed later in this chapter. The aforesaid dilemma 
may also flow from national law and policy.
273
 Advanced democracies such as the United 
States and much of the western world have national legal instruments and policies which 
prohibit torture of suspects. The U. S Court of Appeal in the Second Circuit laid out the 




―Among the rights universally proclaimed by all nations, as we have noted, is the right to be 
free of physical torture. Indeed, for purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become like the 
pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind. Our 
holding today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First Congress, is a 
small but important step in the fulfilment of the ageless dream to free all people from brutal 
violence.‖ 
 
Although this was a civil case, the Judge made a relevant observation (for present purposes) 
in likening the status of pirates to that of whosoever would inflict torture – one might assume 
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Detention also presents a constitutional challenge in that advanced democracies including 
South Africa generally adhere to strict timelines regarding the period between the 
apprehension of a suspect and being placed under arrest to first appearance before a court of 
law.
276
The European Court of Human Rights (―ECHR‖) had to determine in Ali Samatar v. 
France,
277
whether the rights of apprehended pirates were violated. In casu, the plaintiffs 
hijacked two vessels but were later apprehended by the French Navy. They were detained 
between 4 and 6 days prior to a court appearance in France in contravention of the French 
Constitution which stipulates that an accused must appear before a court within 48 hours of 
arrest. The ECHR held that the rights to freedom and security of the plaintiffs were violated 
and therefore the government of France had to pay compensation.  
 
3 5 3 Asylum as a Deterrent 
 
The peculiarities that arise from the ostensibly simple endeavour to prosecute piracy include 
the probability of a convict or suspect turning into an asylum seeker. This has led some legal 
commentators to conclude that the prosecution of pirates in EU courts would most likely have 
the effect of encouraging rather than deterring piracy because of a perceived window of 
opportunity to seek asylum and perhaps reside indefinitely in an EU state.
278
This fear of 
attracting undesirable asylum applications through in-country prosecutions is not exclusive to 
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the EU, but is common to most developed countries where there has been an influx in 
immigrants and refugees. 
 
The basis for asylum application is founded upon a principle of international human rights 
law, namely the principle of non-refoulement.
279
 The basic tenet of this principle is that no 
person may be transferred or returned to a state in which such person is likely to be subjected 
to torture or inhumane treatment.
280
 While this regime in international law pays due regard to 
the peremptory norm prohibiting torture, in the context of maritime enforcement and 
prosecution of piracy it is a consequence that some states take quite seriously. Some authors 
are of the view that the contemplated success rate of asylum applications is somewhat 
exaggerated, and that the risk of a fraction of successful applications must be borne by 
prosecuting states as a lesser evil than pirate impunity.
281
 In practice it does seem that some 
states are genuinely apprehensive given the fact that some pirates do in fact make asylum 
applications. For instance, two Somali nationals who were on trial in 2009 for piratical acts 
against a Dutch vessel applied to remain as residents in the Netherlands.
282
 And, in Sufi & 
Elmi v United Kingdom
283
two Somali nationals had been apprehended on the high seas and 
they were transferred to the United Kingdom for prosecution for piracy – a conviction was 
attained. Between the time of their apprehension and completion of their prison sentence they 
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made an application for asylum on the basis that they would face life threatening 
consequences if returned to Somalia. The European Court of Human Rights held that 
returning a Somali to Somalia, specifically Mogadishu, would violate Article 3 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights which militates against torture or to inhumane or 
degrading treatment or punishment. 
 
The legal challenges highlighted above are demonstrative of the practical hurdles common to 
most naval nations regardless of economic prowess and level of piracy suppression expertise. 
Thus, the problems do not stem from the inadequacies of the UNCLOS regime exclusively, 
but other challenges and unintended consequences of prosecution make piracy an 
international crime the presents numerous complexities. There is no doubt that piracy remains 
a real concern for regional security and of course there is the need to secure shipping lanes 
which form the backbone of international trade. While no state has the ability or resources to 
unilaterally assume the burden of ensuring that prosecutions are pursued despite the existing 
problems, countries such as Kenya, Seychelles, the United States, and Mauritius have 
undertaken the monumental task – a feat worth study. Further than that, there has been 
recognition that it is not enough that each naval state must follow its own unique approach, 
but that a regional approach must supplement efforts by individual states to suppress and 
ensure that piracy is prosecuted. 
 
3 6Regional and International Responses 
 
As the piracy problem persisted in some of the busiest and commercially important shipping 
lanes in the oceans around the globe, it became clear that naval countries would have to react 




challenges associated therewith. The very nature of piracy demands that there be regional and 
internationally backed approaches to eradicating piracy, more so in light of all the hurdles to 
effective anti-piracy strategies. Some regional states with common goals vis-à-vis piracy 
eradication are coordinating with some measure of success, but there are still some challenges 
which are worth study. 
 
3 6 1 EU NAVFOR – Operation Atalanta 
 
EU NAVFOR stands for the European Union Naval Force for Somalia. This is the first 
regional maritime operation of the EU which came about based on Decisions by the Council 
of the European Union in accordance with relevant United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions and International Law.
284
 The EU NAVOR has the mandate to police a certain 
area of the ocean and patrol the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor in the Gulf of 
Aden so as to deter, prevent, and repress acts of piracy and armed robbery at sea.
285
 EU 
NAVFOR operates in an area of operations covering the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden 
and a large part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles, Mauritius and Comoros.
286
 
The Area of Operations also includes the Somali coastal territory, as well as its territorial and 
internal waters. This represents an area of about 4,700,000 square nautical miles 
(approximately 8,700,000 square kilometres). The specific operation against piracy has been 
dubbed ―operation Atalanta.‖ 
 
The EU NAVFOR is the European Union‘s response to the menacing threat posed by pirates 
off the coast of Somalia. Initially when the EU NAVFOR was set up  on 8 December 2008, 
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the European Council directed and authorized a twelve month period within which the EU 
NAVFOR was to lead operations directed at the deterrence, prevention and repression of acts 
of piracy and armed robbery off the Somali coast.
287
 The legal framework governing the 
operations of the EU NAVFOR granted the forces authority to bring an end to piracy in the 
region by using necessary strategies including force against pirates.
288
 Persons apprehended 
by EU NAVFOR forces as suspects can be sent to an EU Member State for prosecution, or 
transferred to Regional States or any other third States with which the EU has agreements and 




The EU NAVFOR has extended its mandate and taken advantage of UN Security Council 
Resolutions to escalate its anti-piracy measures off the coast of Somalia, these developments 
are discussed in context in the next chapter which deals with the UN approach to piracy. 
Worth noting is that operations of EU NAVFOR have gone so far as conducting aerial 
military assaults along the Somali shoreline destroying all manner of apparatus that facilitate 




3 6 2 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation – Operation Ocean Shield  
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (―NATO‖) is a multi-state alliance between states in 
Europe and North America, the basis of which is the maintenance of peach and security of 
                                                             
287 Council Decision 2008/918/CFSP of 8 December 2008. 
288EU Naval Operations against Piracy (EU NAVFOR Somalia – Operation ATALANTA)‘,Fact Sheet, EU 
NAVFOR/11, September 2009, at www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=1521&lang=EN. 
289http://eunavfor.eu/mission/ (accessed 23rd May 2018).  
290E Lieblich ―Quasi-Hostile Acts: The Limits on Forcible Disruption Operations under International Law‖ 2014 




the North Atlantic Region through diplomatic and coordinated military means.
291
 NATO as a 
bloc and stakeholder in the safety of shipping lanes on the world‘s oceans also reacted to the 
threat of piracy at sea, and took on some short-term operations such as Operation Allied 
Provider and Operation Allied Protector in 2008 and 2009 respectively.
292
 In August 2009, 
European and American vessels and aircraft – acting under the auspices of NATO – have 
conducted patrols on the waters off the Horn of Africa as part of NATO Operation Ocean 
Shield which succeeded the aforementioned NATO operations in 2008 and 2009.
293
 The 
overall mission was, in sum, to prevent and stop piracy through direct actions against pirates, 
by providing naval escorts and deterrence, while increasing cooperation with other counter-
piracy operations in the area in order to optimise efforts and tackle the evolving pirate trends 
and tactics.
294
 The role of NATO much like the EU NAVFOR also extended to capacity 
building initiatives directed at regional and Somali authorities to deal with the crime of 
Piracy.
295
 Ultimately, in 2016 Operation Ocean Shield was terminated. The operation was 
viewed by NATO and the international community as a successful drive which significantly 
contributed to the decrease in the number of piracy attacks in the Gulf of Aden. 
 
3 6 3 ReCAAP – Asian Response 
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The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery Against 
Ships in Asia (―ReCAAP‖) is a 2006 regional multilateral agreement between Asian states 
and is also the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance 
cooperation against piracy and armed robbery against ships in Asia.
296
 Prior to this initiative, 
states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand were coordinating anti-piracy 
efforts with particular focus on aerial and maritime policing of the Strait of Malacca and intel 
sharing.
297
 The initiative was spearheaded by the government of Japan by issuing the Tokyo 
Appeal and the Tokyo Action plan in 2000. While the initiative started as an Asian initiative, 





ReCAAP somewhat differs from other regional responses to piracy in that it actually is a 
platform for facilitating communications and information exchange among participating 
governments to improve incident response by member countries, analyse and prove accurate 
statistics of the piracy and armed robbery incidents, and to lend context to the problem of 
piracy in Asia.
299
 Unlike other regional responses, ReCAAP is not a military coalition 
response even though it does allow for joint military exercises between contracting states 
within the framework of ReCAAP. As regards anti-piracy intervention in the high seas 
Article 3 of ReCAAP requires that member states make every effort and adopt necessary 
measures to prevent and suppress piracy, arrest pirates, and seize vessels committing piracy 
or armed robbery against ships giving due regard to national laws and international law. 
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After the conclusion of ReCAAP, the region saw a positive result in declining incidents of 
piracy in the Straits of Malacca. This demonstrated the effectiveness of a multilateral 
coordinated effort and it led the IMO to facilitate a similar arrangement with states in the 
Western Indian Ocean.
300
 The United Nations Security Council also made a recommendation 
that coastal states in East Africa follow suit in relation to the piracy off the coast of Somalia – 
which then spurred into existence the Djibouti Code of Conduct. 
 
3 6 4 Djibouti Code (Incorporating the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct 2017) 
 
The Djibouti Code of Conduct (―Djibouti Code‖) was adopted on January 2009 in Djibouti 
by representatives of numerous naval states with an interest in maintaining security in the 
Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.
301
 Signatory states to the Djibouti Code 
convened a high level meeting held in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in January 2017 and adopted a 
revised Code of Conduct, which is known as the ―Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code of 
Conduct 2017.‖
302
 The general spirit of the Djibouti Code is to promote information sharing, 
cooperation, and capacity building to counter piracy.
303
 and has prompted the formation of 
two specific coordinating mechanisms, the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia(―CGPCS‖)and the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction(―SHADE‖)process. 
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The Djibouti Code provides for definitions which are not necessarily universal but are to be 
understood as they are provided for purposes of implementing it. The definition of piracy is 
taken from the UNCLOS verbatim. In an ostensible drive to deal with piratical acts occurring 
within territorial waters, the Code provides for ―armed robbery against ships‖ which is 
defined as follows: 
―unlawful act of violence or detention or any act of depredation, or threat thereof, 
other than an act of piracy, committed for private ends and directed against a ship or 
against persons or property on board such a ship, within a State's internal waters, 
archipelagic waters and territorial sea‖ 
 
This definition of armed robbery against ships reinforces the idea that piracy is exclusively a 
high seas crime. Essentially, the elements of armed robbery against ships constitute piratical 
activity but the definition makes a confusing exception by providing that ―other than an act of 
piracy‖.
304
 This exception is confusing in that violence, detention, and depravation are in fact 
acts of piracy even though they do not amount to piracy when they occur within territorial 
waters. It also gives the impression that piracy could occur in territorial waters, when this is 
not the international law position. This is further exacerbated by the use of descriptive 
language such as the prosecution of ―perpetrators of all forms of piracy‖,
305
 which gives the 
impression that in law there are various forms piracy – whereas it may be prudent to say that 
only piratical activity can vary.  
 
In so far as the repression of piracy, the Djibouti Code provides for a few mechanisms worth 
considering. Firstly, it provides that any Member State may arrest and seize a pirate ship on 
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the high seas – which is basically allowed in terms of the UNCLOS. Reverse hot pursuit is 
not allowed without the prior consent of the territorial state concerned. This was a missed 
opportunity given that one of the issues with piracy repression is the fact that once pirates 
enter territorial waters pursuit must be halted. The Djibouti Code was an opportunity for 
Members thereof to extend inter se consent and define the parameters and conditions which 
must be met before the ‗limited‘ right to reverse pursuit is exercised. A comparable 
arrangement has been made by the Somali government and other naval states suppressing 
piracy under the auspices of the UN Security Council,
306
 and thus it follows that such an 
agreement can be reached for ad hoc purposes such as maritime suppression activity on the 
seas.  
 
The Djibouti Code also provides for the ability for an arresting or seizing Member State to 
(subject to its own laws) waive its right to exercise jurisdiction and ―authorise‖ another State 
to enforce its own laws against the ship and/or detained piracy suspects.
307
 The practicalities 
of making use of this provisions is not as simple as the stipulation. The exercise of 
jurisdiction must be lawful, and much will actually depend on the laws of the State which is 
being ‗authorised‘ by the arresting State. While it is said that piracy is a crime subject to 
universal jurisdiction, adjudicative jurisdiction in some legal systems (such as South Africa) 
must be sanctioned by law in order to be exercised without some nexus to the State 
concerned. 
 
3 6 5 Code of Conduct Concerning the Repression of Piracy, Armed Robbery against 
Ships, and Illicit Maritime Activity in West and Central Africa (“Yaoundé Code”) 
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The Yaoundé Code is a multilateral agreement between 25 States in Africa which was signed 
in 2013. The purpose of this agreement is to facilitate regional cooperation in matters of 
maritime security in West and Central Africa. The Yaoundé code is substantively identical to 
the Djibouti Code, and this is not surprising given that it was inspired by the success of the 
Djibouti Code and it was concluded under the auspices of the IMO.
308
 
3 6 6 Critique of Regional Responses 
 
International co-operation by regional states have been adversely affected by the fact that 
there is no supra-national commander with supreme authority over the naval forces, but each 
is answerable to individual national authorities as state level with different rules of 
engagement, as well as by incompatible communications.
309
 To contextualize the afore-
statement, Joint Command Lisbon (Portugal) exercises the overall responsibility over 
Operation Ocean Shield for instance, however day-to-day tactical control is exercised by the 
Allied Maritime Component Command, Headquarters Northwood, UK. When national 
vessels undertake activities as part of Ocean Shield or the Combined Task Force 151 
encounter pirates, they consult and get guidance from national authorities as to how to deal 
with them; moreover, there are times when national guidance and authorisation may be in 
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A good measure of success has been realized by regional responses such as EU NAVFOR, 
evidenced by the dramatic decline in piracy incidents in the Gulf of Aden since the 
implementation of Operation Atalanta. However, these regional responses are ad hoc and 
temporary in nature. Piracy as an evidently evolving crime in manner of execution needs a 
permanent progressive solution which must endeavour to keep ahead of piracy. If the EU 
should decide that Piracy has been defeated and is no longer a priority security concern for 
the Regional Bloc, there remains a risk of a vacuum and opportunity for piracy to re-emerge 
and threaten the security of the ocean space policed by regional forces. 
 
The other issue that rises in the context of regional responses is the legality and framework 
within which regional operations act vis-à-vis the UNCLOS. Concerns have been raised with 
the transfer of suspects to third countries once they have been captured by regional forces, in 
particular one author finds that this practice erodes a pertinent custom codified in the 
UNCLOS which dictates that a capturing state should be the one to prosecute suspects.
311
 The 
drafters of the UNCLOS did consider the option of transfer and assignment or apportionment 




Another observation is the singular approach that regional states have adopted. The responses 
to piracy are generally military interventionist in nature, whereas the available literature is 
rather silent on any efforts from a regional perspective in terms of developing a regional 
legislative framework for the prosecution of pirates. The EU NAVFOR and NATO for 
instance are military outfits whose operations are based on UN Resolutions and international 
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law governing the use of force.
313
 The lack of effort on the legislative front means that 
despite military intervention, if there are perceived difficulties in prosecution pirates are let 
go under the so-called ‗catch-and-release‘ policy.
314
 The prosecution of pirates apprehended 
by members of regional forces is done through transfer agreements which are discussed as 
part of the case studies below. There still is no regional body to prosecute piracy, and so 
prosecution at country level remains problematic from a legal and economic point of view. 
 
Lastly, even the best of regional responses can be hindered by the typical hurdles that plague 
international agreements such as consensus and differences as to approach, content, and 
meaning in relation to agreements. For instance, the Djibouti Code is criticized for being 
nothing more than a matrix of aspirations by signatory countries as opposed to being seen as 
a deliberate decisive action plan.
315
 Furthermore, the Djibouti Code does not provide for 
much where the prosecution of piracy is concerned aside from leaving this responsibility to 
Member States. This has not worked thus far, and there is not a solution tendered in the Code 
to encourage the national prosecution of piracy. 
 
3 7 Individual State Responses to Piracy Prosecutions 
 
                                                             
313https://eunavfor.eu/mission/ (Accessed 29th March 2019) 
314A Kiss ―Problems of the Investigation and Prosecution in Case of Piracy at Sea‖ 2015 (49) Zbornik Radova 
361 362. See also Press Release, EU NAVFOR, EU NAVFOR Releases Suspected Pirates After Prosecution 
Attempts Prove Unsuccessful (Apr. 21, 2011), http://www.eunavfor.eu/2011/04/eu-navfor-releases-
suspected-pirates-after-prosecution-attempts-prove-unsuccessful. 
315Douglas Guilfoyle ―Combating Piracy: Executive Measures on the High Seas‖ 2010 (53) Japanese Y.B. Int'l 






From the discussion above it is apparent that many naval states at least have the appetite for 
joint exercises and collective military pursuits in restoring and maintaining maritime security. 
This has, however, not replaced individual state efforts to prosecute pirates. A noticeable 
trend in so far as maritime security and piracy suppression are concerned is that enforcement 
and policing the high seas is generally done collectively, however prosecutions are still done 
at state level – not one of the regional responses make provision for a regional court to 
prosecute pirates, but this is still left at national level with some bespoke arrangements which 
are considered below. Moreover, international tribunals such as the International Criminal 
Court and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea do not have jurisdiction to try 
piracy cases notwithstanding that this is an international crime par excellence. This part of 
the dissertation considers the approach of different states, which have been at the forefront 
pioneering the prosecution of piracy as defined in the UNCLOS.  
 
3 7 1 The United States – Case Study 
 
Maritime piracy has been a security concern of the United States for a very long time. The 
United States approach at national level to piracy suppression and prosecution is influenced 
by its own outlook on security issues, especially with the drive to extinguish terror related 
criminal activity – even on the high seas. This is particularly motivated by the difficulty in 
drawing a distinction between piracy and maritime terror on the high seas – both complex 
phenomena with overlaps – no less when some commentators venture as far as stating that 
piracy is used as a mode of terrorism.
316
 That said, it must be pointed out that there is no 
evidence to legitimately draw a nexus between known terrorist groups and Somali 
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however the same cannot be said for piracy occurring in the Malacca Strait in 
Southeast Asia. Even so, caution must be exercised before certain groups are referred to as 
terrorist organisations – South Africa will particularly be apprehensive to labelling self-
professed struggle and liberation movements as terrorist groups.
318
 There is a thin line 
between terrorism and legitimate activity by groupings involved in armed struggle for the 
liberation of a people.  
 
The United States Constitution provides for Congressional power to define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of 
Nations.
319
 In criminalizing piracy, Congress in 1819 passed a law which provides that 
whoever, on the high seas, commits the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations, and 




The earliest reported case to deal with piracy under US law was the United States v 
Smith
321
where the US Supreme Court held that Common Law proscribes piracy not as an 
offence against the municipal law but as a transgression of the law of nations.
322
This 
interpretation is in line with the Constitutional tone which makes international law the 
authority of the definition and regulation of piracy. In Smith, the court also put forth an 
interpretation of piracy which would later be revisited in the context of contemporary piracy. 
It was held that there was a singular understanding of piracy by contemporary legal authors 
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on the law of nations, that piracy is a crime of a settled and determinate nature viz robbery or 
forcible depredations upon the sea, animo furandi.
323
In the prevailing customary international 
law, robbery at sea and piracy are two distinct crimes but this was not the view by the US 
judiciary two centuries ago. US courts lend considerable weight to legal writings as evidence 




Many decades later after Smith, and with the rise of piracy on the high seas, US courts started 
to see piracy cases and legal submissions which sought to challenge the Smith reasoning. This 
of course can be expected given the evolution of piracy as a concept and international 
(criminal) law over the decades. The definition of piracy was thus dealt with in the early 19
th
 
century in American courts, only for questions on the scope and content of piracy to arise 
again in the 21
st
 Century. In the year 2010, by sheer coincidence, two factually similar cases 
of piracy were brought before the federal court for the Eastern District of Virginia. The cases 
were heard by two different judges who, when faced with similar facts and an identical legal 
question, came to completely contradictory decisions. These were United States v Said,
325
 




The salient (and similar albeit totally unrelated) facts in both cases are that the accused 
persons were charged with committing the international crime of piracy. The accused persons 
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opened fire against United States Navy vessels on the high seas in the Gulf of Aden. The 
navy personnel on both occasions retaliated and managed to neutralize the attacks and take 
the suspects into custody. The accused were brought to the United States for prosecution for 
committing the crime of piracy as defined by the law of nations – in contravention of 18 




 was the first case to be heard by the federal court. The accused persons moved an 
application to dismiss the charge of piracy on the basis that they had neither boarded nor took 
control of the vessel or property thereon. The prosecution argued that the construction of 
piracy by the accused limits itself to common law boundaries of robbery at sea 
notwithstanding the fact that the evolution of international law has included numerous 
conduct which may amount to piracy.
328
In reaching its decision the court clarified that ‗law 
of nations‘ means customary international law.
329
 Further, and more interestingly the court 
makes much of the fact that there is no universally accepted definition of piracy – a basis 
upon which the courts speaks to the constitutional foundations of the principle of legality. 
The court held as follows: 
 
―Despite its reference to international law, piracy under the law of nations in § 1651, as with 
every other criminal statute in the United States criminal code, is subject to the constitutional 
rigors of due process. At a minimum, constitutional due process requires fair warning of the 
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charged conduct… Accordingly, the principle of due process is that no man shall be held 




The court did consider the UNCLOS provisions, however it did so on the basis that it was a 
source of international law – as opposed to it being a codification of customary international 
law, which then led the court to hold that to follow the UNCLOS (amongst other ‗sources‘) 
as authoritative was questionable. The charge of piracy against the accused was dismissed by 
the court. 
 
Hasan followed shortly after Said. The arguments made by the accused in Said was also 
made by the accused in Hasan. Furthermore, an argument was presented to the effect that 
because criminal statutes must be interpreted according to their meaning at the time of 
enactment, the phrase "law of nations," as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1651, cannot evolve and, 
consequently, the authoritative (and exhaustive) definition of general piracy is provided by 
Smith. In reaching its judgment, the court held that both the language of 18 U.S.C. § 1651 and 
Supreme Court precedent indicate that the "law of nations" connotes an evolving body of law 
that by no means should be construed as static, and that the definition of piracy in 18 U.S.C. § 
1651 must therefore be assessed according to the international consensus definition at the 
time of the alleged offense – not at the time of enactment of the law. The court in Hasan 
clarified that the evolution of the definition of piracy by the law of nations does not mean that 
courts create the law governing piracy anew, but it means courts must be cognizant and give 
due regard to customary international law at the time of the alleged offence. The court 
therefore concluded that the UNCLOS was in fact the codification of customary international 
law vis-à-vis piracy. While the United States has neither signed nor ratified the UNCLOS – 
                                                             




and therefore cannot be applied in the United States as treaty law, this does not alter the 
immutable fact that the instrument is an exposition of customary international law. The 
accused were therefore tried for piracy. 
 
Whereas the two cases came to different conclusions, and many a commentator find fault 
with Said and tend to agree with Hasan,
331
 both cases nonetheless are quite important in 
exposing the flaws that flow from the current international criminal law framework governing 
piracy. It is submitted that the court‘s reasoning in Said – particularly on the constitutional 
imperative that is the principle of legality – brings forth valid points for consideration. As 
discussed earlier in this Chapter, the principle of legality has an important place even in 
international law to ensure that suspects before tribunals applying international law are not 
prosecuted on analogous and creative rules of law – and further that criminality of conduct 
must have been deemed so before the fact. The issues raised in the Said judgment raise 
questions as to the scope and content of the international crime of piracy, and the authorities 
cited therein do in fact lend insight to fluid understanding of piracy – notwithstanding the 
UNCLOS.  
 
In the Hasan judgment the court made a compelling reasoning concerning the nature of 
customary international law. It is submitted that the maintenance of the UNCLOS as 
customary international law by the court is welcomed, however the inherent challenges of the 
UNCLOS were not given due consideration. An argument is made that the two judgments 
can be viewed as complementary, and that when read together they are illustrative of the 
thesis that the framework must be revisited. 
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The accused in Hasan were sentenced to life imprisonment. The State appealed the Said 
decision at the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.
332
 On appeal it was held that when Congress 
enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1651 and provided for piracy to be defined by the "law of nations," 
Congress contemplated that the definition of piracy would not be static but would always 
evolve with international law.
333
 Further, the court held that that limiting the definition of 
piracy to robbery on the high seas would "render it incongruous with the modern law of 
nations and prevent the federal courts from exercising universal jurisdiction in piracy 
cases."
334
 In addition to upholding the reasoning that informed the Hasan decision, the court 
reversed the dismissal of the piracy count in Said and sent that case back to the district court 
for further proceedings consistent with its holding that the crime of piracy within the meaning 
of 18 U.S.C. §1651 is not limited to robbery on the high seas. 
 
3 7 2 Republic of Kenya – Case Study 
 
Kenya has been at the forefront of piracy prosecutions in Africa. The Kenyan approach has 
also evolved over time, and it functions in partnership with foreign and regional military 
outfits. Kenya has concluded transfer agreements with regional blocs like the European 
Union and individual states like the United States.
335
 In terms of these agreements, when a 
naval operation in the high seas results in the apprehension of suspects, the apprehending 
navy shall transfer the suspects to the Kenyan government where they will be tried in Kenya, 
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and where there is a conviction, prison terms are also served in Kenya.
336
 The Kenya 
prosecutions have been justified on the basis of universal jurisdiction.
337
 
The legality of Kenya‘s jurisdiction was considered in two cases by Kenyan courts.
338
Ahmed 
was the first ever piracy case to be tried in Kenya. The United States Navy had apprehended 
10 pirates and handed them over to Kenya for prosecution. The accused raised some issues 
with the prosecution. Relevant for this chapter is the point of law that Kenyan courts had no 
jurisdiction to adjudicate the case. The argument was that Kenya‘s piracy law was codified in 
the Penal Code, but was not regulating piracy as under international law,
339
 and further that 
Kenya had not domesticated the UNCLOS and thus that instrument could not find 
application. The prosecution argued that any act of piracy on the high seas is a crime against 
mankind beyond the exclusive purview of any state. On appeal,
340
 the High Court upheld the 
Magistrate Court‘s decision citing that a Kenyan court was bound to apply international 
norms and instruments since Kenya is a member of the civilized world and is not expected to 
act in contradiction to expectations of member states of the United Nations. 
 
The issue arose again in the High Court of Kenya in Hashi. In this case, the accused persons 
argued that two key provisions of the Penal Code were contradictory with each other viz 
                                                             
336However, Kenya and the Seychelles have concluded transfer agreements in terms of which convicted pirates 
will serve their sentences in Seychelles facilities. See L M Diaz & B H Dubner ―Foreign Fishing Piracy vs. 
Somalia Piracy - Does Wrong Equal Wrong‖ 2010 (14) Barry L. Rev. 73 85. 
337J W Harlow ―Soldiers at Sea: The Legal and Policy Implications of Using Military Security Teams to Combat 
Piracy‖2012 (21)S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 561 577. 
338Republic v Hassan Mohamud Ahmed and Nine Others, (2006) Criminal Case No. 434 of 2006 (Chief Magis. 
Ct., Kenya) (hereinafter referred to as ―Ahmed‖), and Ex parte Mohamud Mohamed Hashi & 8 Others (2010) 
K.L.R. (H.C.K.) (hereinafter referred to as ―Hashi‖). 
339Penal Code, Chapter 63 of the Laws of Kenya – which was later repealed by Merchant Shipping Act 4 of 
2009.Section 69 of the Penal Code stipulates that any person who in territorial waters or upon the high seas, 
commits any act of piracy jure gentium is guilty of the offence of Piracy. 




Sections 5 and 69. Section 5 was not argued or raised in Ahmed, but it speaks to the issue of 
jurisdiction.
341
 After considering the substantive content of both provisions, the Judge in 
Hashi held as follows: 
―[K]enyan Courts are not conferred with or given any jurisdiction to deal with any matters 
arising or which have taken place outside Kenya. The Kenyan Courts have no jurisdiction in 
criminal cases and in particular in the offences set out in the Penal Code where the alleged 
incident or offence took place outside the geographical area covered by the Kenya state or the 
Republic of Kenya. The Local Courts can only deal with offences or criminal incidents that 




Ultimately, Section 69 of the Penal Code was repealed and replaced by the Merchant 
Shipping Act.
343
 The legislation provides for the customary international law definition of 
piracy, aligning Kenya‘s framework with the prevailing international law.
344
 Furthermore, the 
question of jurisdiction of Kenyan courts to hear cases of piracy committed on the high seas 
is also settled.
345
 As part of Kenya‘s move towards thwarting international crimes, the 
Judicial Services Commission of Kenya proposed an International Crimes Division of the 
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343Act 4 of 2009. 
344Section 369 (1) provides for the UNCLOS definition of piracy. 
345Section 430 of Merchant Shipping Act stipulates ―Jurisdiction for offences (1) For the purpose of conferring 
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(3) The jurisdiction under subsections (1) and (2) shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, any 




High Court which has since been set up
346
 to have jurisdiction over international and 
transnational crimes including piracy.
347
 
Kenya is arguably the region‘s foremost pioneer in piracy prosecutions. There may have been 
teething problems, however in all fairness even some of the oldest organized legal systems in 
the western world have had their share of teething problems.
348
 The setting up of the 
International Crimes Division is indicative of Kenya‘s attitude not only towards piracy but 
also to the development of a comprehensive approach to international criminal law at state 
level. What may continue to plague prosecutions will be common to all jurisdictions, which 
adopt the UNCLOS verbatim, as is argued elsewhere in this dissertation.  
 
Lastly, it is submitted that the prosecutions in Kenya can be criticized on the basis of the 
funding and resources received by the Kenyan government from foreign governments to 
conduct these prosecutions. Where a government apprehends a suspect and hands it over to 
another government and pays that receiving government to prosecute, that raises the question 
as to whether this is not in fact payment to convict.  
 
3 8 Concluding Remarks 
 
Piracy continues to be a menace that plagues important trade routes and undermines secure 
maritime navigation. The international legal framework designed to facilitate the prosecution 
                                                             
346The division was set up primarily as a response to the post-election violence and crimes against humanity 
committed in 2008/2009. See also the report on capacity building initiatives aimed at the training of judges in 
international and transnational criminal law, available at http://www.wayamo.com/international-and-organised-
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of pirates has been considered and found wanting. The UNCLOS lends itself to divergent 
interpretation primarily due to the definition of piracy which incorporates concepts such as 
private ends which are open to construction that defeats the purpose of the UNCLOS piracy 
provisions. Further, the UNCLOS does not take into account the practical execution of 
contemporary piracy by requiring that there be two ships. The commission of piratical acts 
absent a second ship means that the perpetrators are not liable to be charged with piracy, yet 
this undermines the international effort to eradicate piracy in all its forms. The very idea that 
criminals can board a ship unnoticed only to hijack it mid-voyage would mean that such 
criminals cannot be charged with piracy, surely is not in touch with contemporary methods of 
committing piracy. In response to the highlighted shortcomings the SUA Convention found 
relevance as an international law development, however because it was largely a reactive 
pursuit it also presents some challenges, and at times conflicts with the tone and policy 
direction of the UNCLOS. The legal and policy challenges that arise as a consequence of the 
SUA Convention either read with or against the UNCLOS exacerbate the problem and by no 
means should be used as a blueprint for South Africa or the region given the need for 
complementarity in the enforcement of international criminal law. The common thread that 
runs through all of the challenges with the UNCLOS is the failure to pass muster of the 
principle of legality which is a fundamental right afforded all accused persons and enshrined 
in a number of international human rights instruments. From a jurisdiction perspective, the 
UNCLOS piracy provisions have shortcomings which can undermine anti-piracy efforts and 
encourage a culture of impunity. 
 
Against the previously mentioned, it must be noted notwithstanding the challenges there have 
been prosecutions of piracy (jure gentium) by countries such as Kenya and the Seychelles. 




approaches to piracy. From the discussion in this chapter it appears that the maritime safety 
and security of the African region rests on ad hoc military arrangements which are a solution 
to one part of the problem, viz neutralising attack as they happen. There still remains a 
challenge as to the prosecution of pirates, because transfer agreements such as the ones 
concluded by Kenya and the EU are not sustainable and are tainted by the quid pro quo 
arrangements in terms of which a government receiving suspects also receives funding to 
prosecute those suspects. Problems stemming from the UNCLOS framework need to be 
addressed, for instance the question of piracy being exclusively a high seas crime must be 
considered particularly to determine if this is not a hurdle that can be resolved fairly quickly. 
As will be seen in Chapter V, Somalia opened up its territorial waters for piracy operations 
and there was no report of Somalia‘s sovereignty being undermined. Issues around arrest, 
witnesses, and crime scene integrity remain. The problems primarily stem from the 
burdensome nature of the logistic and financial arrangements associated with prosecutions, 
other national priorities such as healthcare, poverty eradication, and unemployment compete 
for resources and it may be difficult to justify expenditure for pirate prosecution. From a 
South African perspective, the issues around asylum applications may be a real problem 
which comes with prosecution of pirates. Thus there are still a number of challenges which 
are yet to be addressed. 
 
South Africa is a key naval nation in the African Region and there has not been a piracy trial 
before the courts. The next chapter constitutes a prognosis in the event that there would be a 
pirate accused under the prevailing international law regime. As a regional power and pioneer 
in making necessary legislative reforms to align itself with international law and human 




chapter will also provide a contextual appraisal of the approach progressively adopted by the 
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4 1 Introduction 
 
As a naval nation South Africa has an interest in ensuring that all the necessary legislative 
measures to suppress piracy are put in place and utilised efficiently. As alluded to in Chapter 
3, piracy is an international crime par excellence and thus its prosecution as such cannot be 
analysed in isolation but must be informed by the general approach and application of 
international (criminal) law by courts in South Africa. There have been significant 
developments in international criminal law both in South Africa and in the international 
arena, and one could say that generally the former has been influenced by the latter.   
 
The South African Constitution expressly stipulates the role of international law in relation to 
national law in South Africa.
349
 Sections 231 and 232 comprise the provisions that lay 
constitutional foundation for the role of international law and judicial application thereof in 
South Africa. Section 231 provides for international agreements (and domestication thereof), 
which of course fall under the scope of international law. The provision basically stipulates 
that treaties that are ratified after following the necessary parliamentary procedures and 
                                                             




implementation into domestic law in an Act of Parliament rank at par with domestic law as 
any Act of Parliament. Section 232 provides that ―customary international law is law in the 
Republic unless it is inconsistent with the Constitution or an Act of Parliament.‖ This is a 
confirmation of the common law (monist) position which provides that courts must ―ascertain 
and administer‖ the rules of customary international law as if it is part of South African law 




The constitutional principle is qualified in that it allows for statutory and constitutional 
deviation, and therefore when South African courts are confronted with the question whether 
international law finds application there must be consideration of statutory and constitutional 
enactments which may have contrary provisions. In Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others v Southern Africa Litigation Centre and Others,
351
 the Supreme 
Court of Appeal held that in terms of section 232 South Africa is ―entitled to depart from 
customary international law by statute as stated in s 232 of the Constitution‖.
352
 Professor 
Dugard also makes the same observation that greater legal weight is assigned to Statutes and 





While the consideration and application of international criminal law has featured in South 
African courts, thus far there has not been a prosecution of an individual for the core 
international crimes as generally criminalised under the instruments establishing international 
                                                             
350South Atlantic Islands Development Corporation Ltd v Buchan 1971 (1) SA 234 (C) at 238; John Dugard 
―International Law and the South African Constitution‖ 1 EJIL (1997) 77-92, at 79. 
351[2016] ZASCA 17 (SCA). 
352Ibid at Para 103. 




criminal tribunals (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and aggression),
354
 or for 
other crimes under customary international law or treaty law (which would include crimes of 
international concern like slavery, torture, piracy and terrorism).
355
 There has been a 




Issues such as universal jurisdiction for international crimes, the principle of legality in 
international criminal law, and the interplay between international criminal law and national 
law have been before the courts, and some important cases are discussed below to give 
context and insight as to the relevance of international criminal law in South Africa. 
Regionally, South Africa has been at the forefront of the development of international 
criminal law. It was the first African country to show commitment to ending impunity and 
championing the success of the International Criminal Court by not only being a founding 
member (as a member of the so-called ―Like-Minded Group of Nations‖ at the Rome 
Diplomatic Conference), but further by domesticating the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court
357
, thus providing for the criminalisation of the core crimes under South 
African law. There has also been a progressive adoption and domestication of legal 
instruments for the prosecution of other international crimes in accordance with section 231 
as discussed above. Over the last ten years, South Africa has realised developments such as 
the domestication of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols of 
                                                             
354For a discussion of the elements of the core crimes, see Gerhard Kemp (ed) Criminal Law in South Africa 3ed 
(2018) 593-622.  
355For a critical discussion of the categorization of crimes (―core‖ crimes, international crimes, crimes of 
international concern, and so forth) see Gerhard Kemp (ed) Criminal Law in South Africa 3ed (2018) 579-580. It 
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 the enactment of South Africa‘s obligations under the UN Convention against 
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (1984) in the form 
of the Prevention of Torture Act,
359
 and the enactment of South Africa‘s obligations under the 
UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (2000), in particular the Protocol on 





With the above overview in mind, we can now turn to the focus of this chapter, which is to 
unpack the development of international criminal law in South Africa and its application in 
national courts. A tentative prognosis of the current state of affairs will conclude the chapter. 
 
4 2 International Criminal Law Legislative Framework in South Africa 
 
Sections 231 and 232 of the Constitution give the foundational basis for the recognition and 
the applicability of international criminal law in South Africa. The legislature has made and 
passed laws domesticating international criminal law stemming primarily from international 
treaties to which South Africa is party. The statutes discussed hereunder also inform the 
general approach to international criminal law by the South African government, and of 
course serve as a point of departure in case law pertaining to the application of the statutes in 
question. 
 
4 2 1 Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 of 
2002 
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The domestication of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (―Rome Statute‖) 
through the Implementation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court Act 27 
of 2002 (―ICC Act‖) provides for the duty and responsibility of the South African 
government to investigate, prosecute and impose penal sanctions on individuals found guilty 
of committing international crimes.
361
 The ICC Act further provides for core international 
crimes as being genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes.
362
 Against the 
background of section 232 of the Constitution (and case law borne from the interpretation of 
this provision), the ICC Act makes some significant international criminal law developments 
from a South African perspective. These include the customary international law rule of 
diplomatic immunity afforded heads of state or government, universal jurisdiction for 
international crimes, and the principle of complementarity.  
 
While it is positive that the ICC Act was passed into law in South Africa, its application has 
not been without controversy. Professor Du Plessis prophetically wrote ―The true test for the 
ICC Act will come when an international criminal makes his or her appearance on our 
territory. While the ICC Act commendably puts in place ‗complementarity‘ structures and 
mechanisms whereby prosecutions of persons accused of international crimes can take place 
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362 See Section 3 (c) of the ICC Statute. Aggression, although recognised as an international crime in the 
Preamble to the ICC Act – and the ICC exercises jurisdiction over this crime, is not provided for as an 




within South Africa, the decision to institute a domestic prosecution lies with the 
government.‖
363
 Indeed, in July 2015 an international crime suspect with two ICC warrants 
issued for his arrest in the person of President Omar Hassan Ahmad al-Bashir of Sudan 
attended an African Union summit hosted by the South African government.
364
 South Africa 
as a Member State of the ICC which had domesticated the Rome Statute was expected to 
arrest and either institute criminal proceedings or surrender President Bashir to the ICC to 
face his charges.
365
 In so far as the jurisdiction is concerned, the ICC Act in Section 4(3) 
gives South African criminal justice authorities competence to investigate, enforce, and 
prosecute serious international crimes committed extra-territorially if the accused is South 
African, or if the victim of an international crime is South African, or if the accused enters 
South African territory after the commission of the crime. 
 
The reality of it all was that the suspected international criminal was ―allowed‖ by the South 
African authorities to leave the Republic despite an interim order of the High Court directing 
government to not only detain the suspect but to secure his presence in South Africa pending 





It is submitted that President Bashir‘s presence in South Africa triggered the application of 
the provisions of the ICC Act, and the failure of the South African government to implement 
                                                             
363M Du Plessis ―Bringing the International Criminal Court Home - The Implementation of the Rome Statute of 
the International Criminal Court Act 2002‖ (2003) 16 S. Afr. J. Crim. Just. 1 17. 
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the law had negative implications from both an international criminal law and a South 
African constitutional law perspective. Such impact is discussed below in context taking into 
account the consequential court cases that ensued and arguments made therein. The President 
Bashir matter is a classic example of the complexities that arise when the rule of law, geo-
politics, and treaty obligations converge. In the South African context matters and tensions 
between the ICC and the ANC government such that South Africa made the decision to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute and cease being a Member State from the very institution it 
helped found, however there was a withdrawal of the Bill which was meant to repeal the ICC 
Act.
367
The South African government then introduced the International Crimes Bill in 
2017
368
which also forms part of the effort to withdraw from the ICC. There has been little 
activity on the withdrawal effort by the South African government since the Bill was tabled 
in Parliament in 2017.On the 29
th
 October 2019 the National Assembly revived discussions 
and proceedings on the Bill,
369
 and it remains to be seen what the final decision will be as 
South Africa‘s ICC membership hangs in the balance. If passed into the law, the Bill will 
repeal the ICC Act in toto,
370
 it would also take South Africa a couple of steps back in that it 
will provide for immunity for sitting heads of state.
371
 This of course tallies with the political 
expedience which South Africa seeks in light of the Al Bashir incident which left the 
Government conflicted between diplomatic interests and international law obligations.  
 
4 2 2 Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act 8 of 2012 
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The Implementation of the Geneva Conventions Act 8 of 2012 (―Geneva Conventions Act‖) 
forms part of the international criminal law landscape in South Africa. It domesticates the 
provisions and grants South African courts jurisdiction over breaches of the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and Protocols of 1977.
372
 The Geneva Conventions and Protocols are 
international instruments with a particular focus on proscribed conduct during times of war 
and armed conflict. 
 
In relation to the domestication of the Geneva Conventions, Gevers observes as follows: 
 
―[C]reate[s] a war crimes regime for prosecuting ‗breaches‘ of the Geneva Conventions in 
South African courts, notwithstanding the fact that the ‗grave breaches‘ regime of the 1949 





In making the above statement the author relied on the fact that the grave breaches regime of 
the Geneva Conventions is the basis upon which the war crimes regime of the Rome Statute 
is framed. The Rome Statute explicitly references the Geneva Conventions and stipulates that 
the war crimes definition is linked to the said conventions.
374
 This is not to suggest that the 
Geneva Conventions Act is superfluous, especially given the provisions relating to the 
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jurisdiction of South African courts vis-à-vis international crimes as provided for in the 
Conventions. For purposes and scope of this research, the Geneva Conventions Act provides 
contextual insights as to the direction South Africa is taking coupled of course with the 
manner in which the courts apply the law. In this regard the Geneva Conventions Act 
provides that where a court is seized with a matter falling within its scope, the court must 
consider conventional and customary international law – and where appropriate apply it.
375
 
Thus it empowers courts to inform its decisions with reference to customary international law 
– giving the indication that South Africa is committed to continual subscription to 
international norms when dealing with international crimes.  
 
The Geneva Conventions Act also makes a development in that it crystallises the per se 
breach of the Conventions as a crime. In the piracy discourse, this is important in the context 
of using piracy or piratical attacks as a method of war. Article 33 of Schedule 4
376
 of the 
Geneva Conventions Act stipulates that ―reprisals against protected persons
377
 and their 
property are prohibited‖. This provision effectively criminalises the use of piracy as a method 
of warfare, given that the term ―reprisals‖ featured in classical piracy to describe piratical acts 
visited upon civilian vessels from enemy States – hence the letter of marque and reprisal. 
 
In terms of jurisdiction, the Geneva Conventions Act assigns universal adjudicative 
jurisdiction to South African courts.
378
 Which means when a person suspected of breaching 
                                                             
375 Section 3 of the Geneva Conventions Act 
376 Geneva Convention Relative to The Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War. 
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378 Section 7 (1) of the Geneva Conventions Act provides that ―Any court in the Republic may try a person for 




any of the Conventions anywhere in the world is present in South Africa, the courts can 
exercise jurisdiction over that person as if they had committed the breach in the area of that 
court‘s competence. 
4 2 3 Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act 13 of 2013 
 
The Prevention and Combating of Torture of Persons Act (―Torture Act‖) domesticated South 
Africa‘s obligations as signatory and party to the Convention against Torture and Other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of 1984. Torture is a crime under 
customary law and its recognition as such has been recognised by international tribunals,
379
 
thus both the Convention and Act codify and lend insights to acts that constitute torture. Of 
significance to this research are some of the salient features that further the development of 
international law in South Africa. Firstly, the jurisdiction provisions of the Torture Act are 
materially similar to the provisions of the ICC Act and the Geneva Conventions Act in that 
they provide for universal jurisdiction of South African courts over persons who committed 
crimes in terms of the Act notwithstanding that the crime was not committed within South 
Africa‘s borders.
380
 The Torture Act goes a step further to provide that a South African court 
has the competence to exercise its jurisdiction, even if the conduct of the accused does not 
amount to criminal activity at the place at which the conduct was carried out. For as long as it 
amounts to a contravention of the Torture Act, such person may be charged and undergo a 
criminal trial. The Act further criminalises torture, attempt thereof, and incitement to commit 
torture.
381
 It further bars an accused from relying on diplomatic immunities and privileges, 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
thatcourt, notwithstanding that the act or omission to which the charge relates wascommitted outside the 
Republic.‖ 
379In the case of Prosecutor v Furundzija ICTY IT-95-17/I-T the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslaviaheld that torture is absolutely prohibited under customary international law. See Para 153. 
380 Section 7 of the Torture Act. 




and the defence of superior orders to a charge of torture under the Act.
382
 The Torture Act 
specifically indicates that this position in South African law maintains notwithstanding any 
law to the contrary – including customary international law. In so far as sentencing is 
concerned, the aforesaid justifications cannot be used to mitigate sentencing, moreover no 
context of circumstance shall be accepted as a justification.
383
 Discussing the elements and 




4 2 4 Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act 7 of 2013 
 
The Prevention and Combating of Trafficking in Persons Act (―Trafficking Act‖) 
domesticated the United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons, especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention 
against Transnational Organised Crime.
385
 Human trafficking is a crime with both domestic 
and international dimensions in that it can be perpetuated within a country‘s borders or across 
borders, scenarios which are captured and covered in the Trafficking Act.
386
 As a crime of 
international concern, the Trafficking Act provides the necessary enforcement mechanism 
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Africa as a Discrete Crime and as aCrime against Humanity‖2015 (23)Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 339. See also L 
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4 2 5 Terrorism 
 
The definitional overlaps between maritime terror and piratical activity have occasioned 
intermittent reference to terrorism throughout this research. In the South African context the 
warped relationship between piracy and terrorism is more pronounced and finds expression in 
the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activities Act
388
 
(―Anti-terrorism Act‖) and the Defence Act.
389
 Thus further examination is warranted. The 
Anti-terrorism Act gives effect to South Africa's international obligations to counter 
international terrorism.
390
 Section 2 of the Anti-terrorism Act provides that any person who 
engages in a terrorist activity is guilty of the offence of terrorism. In section 1 terrorist 
activity is defined elaborately both in terms of what constitutes terrorist activity and what 
does not – this definition has, much like piracy provisions of the UNCLOS and the Defence 
Act, been criticised as vague and flouts the principle of legality.
391
 Relevant to this research is 
the approach of South African terrorism legislation to maritime security.  
 
The breadth of the Anti-terrorism Act provides for numerous provisions under which the 
State could prosecute piratical acts depending on the factual matrix and context of a given 
crime. Under Part II of the Act is the creation of convention crimes including offences 
relating to hijacking a ship or endangering safety of maritime navigation.
392
 It provides that 
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any person who seizes or exercises control over a ship by force or threat thereof or any other 
form of intimidation is guilty of an offence relating to hijacking a ship or endangering the 
safety of maritime navigation.
393
 The language used to describe the crime lends a very wide 
scope of application to the Anti-terrorism Act in that it covers a multitude of maritime 
offences.
394
 Piratical acts include the seizure of a vessel, but the scope of the crime of piracy 
under international law is restricted by other elements of the crime such as the private ends 
and the two ships requirements. It is submitted that the Anti-terrorism Act effectively renders 
the crime of piracy obsolete, the practicalities of a prosecution are likely to favour use of the 
convention offences in section 10 of the Act rather than piracy provisions of the Defence Act 
which incorporates UNCLOS piracy provisions. Looking at section 10 (1) of the Anti-
terrorism Act, another potential impediment which is of no consequence for prosecution 
under this Act is the high seas requirement. There is no distinction as to high seas and 
territorial waters, for as long as the crime occurred on the seas it is prosecutable under the 
Anti-terrorism Act. Thus, even if a vessel is seized in territorial waters as in the El Hiblu 
incident where the vessel was seized in the territorial waters of Libya. 
 
The Anti-terrorism Act also provides as follows: 
 
―Any person who intentionally- (a) seizes or detains; and (b) threatens to kill, to injure or to 
continue to detain, any other person (hereinafter referred to as a hostage), in order to compel a 
third party, namely a State, an intergovernmental organisation, a natural or juridical person, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
aforesaid instruments are listed in the Act itself as a number of Conventions and Protocols, noticeably the 
UNCLOS is not listed as an instrument dealing with terrorist and related activities. See Chapter I definitions and 
interpretation of the Act.   
393 Section 10 (1) 
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a group of persons to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit or implicit condition for 




This allows for the prosecution of piratical activity which features in contemporary piracy 
cases where perpetrators demand a ransom from shipowners as a condition for the release of 
crew and passengers aboard a seized vessel. According to the provision, a condition for the 
release of hostages can be directed to both private and state actors. The effect of this 
provision is that the ends (public or private) associated with maritime violence can be 
prosecuted separately as the crime of taking a hostage – unlike piracy where private ends and 
the illegal activity are cumulative elements of one crime. From a prosecution point of view 
this makes the Anti-terrorism Act the statute of choice vis-à-vis the Defence Act.  
 
The history of South Africa, in particular apartheid and the armed struggle by liberation 
movements, undoubtedly had some influence on the tone of the Anti-terrorism Act. 
Essentially, it provides for a defence to charges under the Act if the terrorist and related acts 
were carried out in furtherance of an armed struggle against an oppressive regime – in line 
with international and humanitarian law.
396
 This becomes relevant to the piracy discussion 
given the ‗armed struggle‘ by militia and para-militia groups such as Movement for the 
Emancipation of the People of the Niger Delta, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, and Moro 
Islamic Liberation Front all of which have been linked to piracy, robbery at sea, and other 
maritime crimes in Southeast Asian waters, Niger Delta and the Gulf of Guinea.
397
 The Anti-
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terrorism Act at the very least provides for a window of opportunity to raise a defence where 
piratical activity is prosecuted under that Act. Such a regime is not available under the 




The scope of the private ends requirement in the UNCLOS and Defence Act piracy 
provisions also comes into question in this context. If an armed struggle liberation bandit 
hijacks a yacht on the high seas belonging to a dictator in furtherance of its campaign against 
the ruling regime – and a South African Navy ship arrests members of the bandit and they are 
charged with piracy. Can it be said that the actions were for private ends simply because they 
were not state sponsored? The very dimensions of an armed struggle renders the answer to 
that question quite complex because even if the argument that armed struggle activity cannot 
be said to be for private ends, the accused would have to prove that they are indeed members 
of a liberation movement – which could be very hard to do without either self-incrimination 
or exposing the covert operations which usually are characteristic of liberation movements. 
 
At the international level, the inclusion of terrorism as a crime under the Rome Statute was 
considered by members of the international community however given the different 
experiences and divergent views, consensus on a universal definition proved a lofty ambition 
and so it was excluded.
399
 After the Kampala Review Conference,
400
 the New York Working 
Group on Amendments (―NYWGA‖) was organised to consider future amendments to the 
Rome Statute. One of the submissions made to the NYWGA by the Netherlands was the 
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inclusion of the crime of terrorism in the ICC statute as an international crime, and to avert 
the definitional problem it was submitted that terrorism be listed in Article 5 (1) as an 
international crime and including the following amendment: 
 
―The Court shall exercise jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism once a provision is adopted 
in accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out conditions under 




We are yet to see whether the crime of terrorism will eventually make it into the Rome 
Statute as did the international crime of aggression, but the very fact that there is dialogue 
pertaining to its inclusion coupled with the international community‘s pronounced stance 
against terror after 9/11 and the emergence of terrorist militia such as Boko Haram and ISIS – 
it may well be that ICC Member States will be forced to come up with a universally 
acceptable definition for inclusion in the Rome Statute. This development also spells progress 
for crimes such as piracy because the oft blurred lines between international crimes and 
transnational crimes is disappearing as the gravity of the heinous nature and menace to 
universal peace and security caused by terrorism, piracy, and human trafficking increases.   
 
In 2011, the Appeals Chamber of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon delivered a key judgment 
vis-à-vis the crime of terrorism and what the objective and subjective elements of the crime 
are in international law.
402
 The Office of the Prosecutor and the Defence Office both argued 
that at the time that the Court was asked to make a determination, there was no customary 
law definition of the crime of terrorism. The Tribunal disagreed on the basis that upon careful 
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scrutiny a definition has gradually emerged in customary international law. The Court held as 
follows: 
 
―A number of treaties, UN resolutions, and the legislative and judicial practice of States 
evince the formation of a general opinio juris in the international community, accompanied 
by a practice consistent with such opinio, to the effect that a customary rule of international 
law regarding the international crime of terrorism, at least in time of peace, has indeed 
emerged. This customary rule requires the following three requirements: (i) the perpetration 
of a criminal act (such as murder, kidnapping, hostage taking, arson, and so on), or 
threatening such an act; (ii) the intent to spread fear among the population (which would 
generally entail the creation of public danger) or directly or indirectly coerce a national or 
international authority to take some action or refrain from taking it; (iii) when that act 




The Special Tribunal for Lebanon‘s definition is expressed on the essential elements that 
constitute the crime of terrorism, however the Court‘s finding on the status of terrorism in 
customary international law has been criticised.
404
 That said, and for purposes of this 
research, it must be acknowledged that the deductions of the Tribunal having considered a 
library of sources and material, is quite useful in exposing demonstrable essentials of 
terrorism which cannot – and should not – be attributed to piracy. Terrorism is meant to instil 
fear in a general population, and it is generally directed at an authority or government.
405
 
Piracy is different in that it is a crime perpetrated against private persons, and the intent is not 
to instil fear but to make illicit economic gain. So, piracy may be used as a means to terrorist 
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ends – for instance by terror groups to raise funds to sustain terrorist activity, however that 
does not make piracy terrorism. These are two different crimes, as they would be if terrorists 
robbed a bank so as to fund their terrorist activities. It further demonstrates why from a 
doctrinal point of view the crime of terrorism must be differentiated from piracy. 
 
Against the background of the discussion above, it is clear that there are overlaps between 
piracy and terrorism. However, the two crimes are not mutually substitutable under the 
prevailing South African framework in that while piratical acts can prima facie constitute 
terrorism,
406
 acts of terror cannot constitute piracy – at least not from a prosecution 
standpoint. The jurisdictional provisions of the Anti-terrorism Act are similar to those of the 
other statutes as discussed above in that they give extra-territorial jurisdiction to South 
African courts. The approach of the courts towards the jurisdiction provisions of the Anti-
terror Act are discussed in S v Okah below. 
 
4 3 International Criminal Law in South African Courts 
 
There is yet to be a prosecution of international crimes in South Africa under statutory and/or 
customary international law. Thus far, the courts have been faced with legal questions 
pertaining to the interpretation of legislation domesticating international crimes and the 
application of customary international criminal law. The manner in which the courts have 
approached the said legal questions is worth studying in light of recent international events 
which have triggered litigation and thereby revealed the overall South African perspective in 
relation to international criminal law. From the onset it must be highlighted that the analysis 
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here will focus on two broad themes, namely jurisdiction of South African courts over 
international crimes and South Africa‘s international law obligations.  
 
4 3 1 Direct Application of Customary International Law – S v Basson
407
and National 
Commissioner of The South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights 




The application of treaty law and customary international law in South Africa in terms of 
sections 231 and 232 respectively have been discussed above as constitutional basis for the 
recognition of international law as a source of law. There is dissent amongst legal scholars as 
to the direct applicability of international law by national courts on the basis of section 232 of 
the Constitution. The above cited cases constitute different occasions on which the 
Constitutional Court progressively developed the jurisprudence with regards to the direct 
application of customary international law which has not been domesticated or codified by 
statute.  
 
In Basson, the Constitutional Court considered South Africa‘s international law obligations to 
prosecute international crimes in its courts and the basis of such prosecutions. The court held 
as follows: 
 
―The recent establishment of the International Criminal Court represents the culmination of a 
centuries-old process of developing international humanitarian law. It in no way deprives 
national courts of responsibility for trying cases involving breaches of such law which are 
properly brought before them in terms of national law… For the purposes of this case it is not 
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necessary to enter into controversies surrounding the existence of universal jurisdiction for 
crimes against humanity and war crimes, and a concomitant duty to prosecute. We have not 
found it necessary to consider whether customary international law could be used either as the 
basis in itself for a prosecution under the common law, or, alternatively, as an aid to the 




While there was a missed opportunity here with the court declining to answer the question as 
to the direct applicability of customary international law, it did acknowledge that South 
Africa as a member of the international community has the duty to do so when international 
crimes are brought in terms of national law. Such duty is, according to the court, 
demonstrated by the fact that even though there is a permanent international tribunal that 
deals with international crimes, this does not erode the duty for national courts to exercise 
jurisdiction over international crimes. In a separate opinion Judge Sachs held: 
 
―The rules of humanitarian law constitute an important ingredient of customary international 
law… it should be emphasised that none of the above should be taken as suggesting that 
because war crimes might be involved, the rights to a fair trial of the respondent as 
constitutionally protected are in any way attenuated. When allegations of such serious nature 
are at issue, and where the exemplary value of constitutionalism as against lawlessness is the 
very issue at stake, it is particularly important that the judicial and prosecutorial functions be 
undertaken with rigorous and principled respect for basic constitutional rights. The effective 
prosecution of war crimes and the rights of the accused to a fair trial are not antagonistic 
concepts. On the contrary, both stem from the same constitutional and humanitarian 
foundation, namely the need to uphold the rule of law and the basic principles of human 
dignity, equality and freedom.‖
410
 
                                                             
409 See para 172 and further fn 147. 





Judge Sachs‘ judgement does not explicitly deal with the direct application of international 
law but it does speak to the legal considerations that have a direct effect on the applicability 
of international criminal law by national courts. The judge marries the constitutional 
imperative of a fair trial and international community‘s interest in prosecuting international 
crimes, and he illustrates the common aim of both – which is the preservation of human 
dignity, equality, and freedom. The view of the court therefore is that basic constitutional 
rights must be respected, and undoubtedly the principle of legality will feature as a 
consideration. Thus, the question is whether a customary international crime formed part of 
South African law at the time of commission and related to that, whether the accused could 
have reasonably foreseen that his actions are in transgression of a law. As a matter of course 
there will be a need for justice for the victims of international crimes, particularly because of 
their grave and universally abhorrent nature. However, Judge Sachs drives the point that 
while international crimes are heinous, this does not mean that the rights of an accused are 
diminished. From this case one can deduce that South Africa as a constitutional democracy 
recognises international law as a sources of law, and even though at this point the court does 
not explicitly say that international law is directly applicable – the point is made that 
constitutional imperatives remain a primary consideration. 
 
The same legal question would arise again in National Commissioner of The South African 
Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre in the context of torture. 
The Constitutional Court held as follows: 
―Torture, whether on the scale of crimes against humanity or not, is a crime in South Africa in 
terms of section 232 of the Constitution because the customary international law prohibition 
against torture has the status of a peremptory norm… In effect, torture is criminalised in 




scale of crimes against humanity is criminalised under section 232 of the Constitution, the 




It is submitted that while the court seemingly espouses the view that customary international 
law is directly applicable, in the context of criminal law in South African courts competing 
constitutional principles must be considered.
412
 The court is correct that the prohibition of 
torture per se by the international community is a peremptory norm, however, absent the 
domestication through the Torture Act there are constitutional issues that arise. The first 
being whether the international norm criminalises torture simply by prohibiting it. Secondly, 
even if it is criminalised, does the crime attract individual criminal responsibility. Thus, the 
statement by the court that torture “is a crime in South Africa in terms of section 232 of the 
Constitution because the customary international law prohibition against torture has the status 
of a peremptory norm‖ is not a simple matter of direct application but must be qualified. With 
the international crimes of piracy, the very uncertainty and varying views as to the scope, 
content, and meaning of the crime would raise issues if directly applied without a 
domesticating statute which will give clear elements with a clear meaning. Therefore the 
statement by the court is automatically qualified by the latter part of section 232, especially 
vis-à-vis conduct that is criminal in terms of customary international law.
413
The principle of 
legality in South African courts is discussed in detail below. 
 
4 3 2 Universal Jurisdiction - National Commissioner of the South African Police v 
Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and another (Dugard and others as 
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National Commissioner of the South African Police Service and another v 
Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and another (The Tides Centre as 
amicus curiae);
415
Southern African Litigation Centre and another v National Director of 
Public Prosecutions and others;
416




The concept of universal jurisdiction and its applicability in national courts has been 
considered and developed in recent cases which deal with the correct interpretation of 
legislation providing for international crimes. National Commissioner of the South African 
Police v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre was first heard in the North 
Gauteng High Court.
418
 It was borne from the Southern African Human Rights Litigation 
Centre (―SALC‖) instituting legal proceedings against the National Prosecuting Authority 
and the South African Police service for failure to investigate allegations of crimes against 
humanity perpetrated by the government of Zimbabwe, in the territory of that country, and on 
its own citizens who were members of the Movement for Democratic Change political party. 
The SALC made submissions that any investigations and prosecutions of this matter must be 
carried out under the ICC Act because ―South Africa was legally required to investigate war 
crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide, regardless of whether they were committed in 
South Africa or by South African nationals, those responsible could and should be held 
accountable under South African law designed for this very purpose.‖
419
 This case was the 
first consideration of ICC Act provisions and thus set tone for the international criminal law 
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landscape in South Africa. In so far as the question of universal jurisdiction as provided for 
by the ICC Act, the court held that: 
 
―In order to give effect to the principle of universal jurisdiction, and to confer jurisdiction on 
domestic Courts for international crimes, the ICC Act deems that all crimes contemplated by 
that Act, wherever they may occur, are committed in South Africa. Therefore, it was legally 
irrelevant that the victims were tortured in Zimbabwe, because the ICC Act requires that they 
are to be regarded as having been tortured in South Africa. The Constitution, and its 
protections, therefore must be considered as extending to victims of the alleged torture raised 
in the torture docket. Respondents‘ approach, according to this argument, would lead to the 
untenable situation that it would deny victims of international crimes standing in South 
African proceedings, and would shield decision-makers, like the respondents, from 
accountability when faced with making decision regarding prosecutions of international 
crimes that had occurred outside South Africa. This would make a mockery both of the 
universal jurisdiction principle endorsed by Parliament when enacting the ICC Act, as it 
would render the legislative provisions redundant, as well as the principle of accountable 




Referencing South Africa‘s international law obligations which are sanctioned by the ICC 
Act, the court held: 
―The Act, read in the context of its purpose and Rome Statute, seems to require a broad 
approach to traditional principles of standing. Section 3(d) read with section 2 requires the 
High Courts of South Africa to adjudicate cases brought by persons accused of a crime 
committed in the Republic, and even beyond its borders in certain circumstances. The 
                                                             




relevant international imperative must not be lost sight of, and the constitutional imperative 




The SALC fared well in their arguments and the court set aside the decision by the National 
Prosecution Authority and the South African Police Service in failing or refusing to 
investigate the alleged international crime. The Respondents appealed the decision to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal set the tone of its decision by identifying the central question 
and classifying the gist of it all under the umbrella of international criminal law – as if to 
signal the importance of it to South African jurisprudence and will serve as authority in 
resolving the question of universal jurisdiction for international crimes.
422
 The court also 
summed up the different forms of jurisdiction as prescriptive, enforcement, and adjudicative 
jurisdiction.
423
 This distinction is important because it cements the sound view that 
jurisdiction is not a concept that must be understood as an ―all or nothing‖ facility, but rather 
that the different forms of jurisdiction while not mutually exclusive have different 
implications in law.
424
 Further, the court expressed its construction that the rationale for 
universal jurisdiction is the universality in the abhorrent nature of certain crimes. It was held: 
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―This increased consciousness of human rights and fighting impunity gave rise to an 
emerging and sometimes contested additional basis for prescriptive jurisdiction, namely the 
idea of universality which suggests that States are empowered to proscribe conduct that is 
recognised as ‗threatening the good order not only of particular states but of the international 
community as a whole. They are crimes in whose suppression all states have an interest as 
they violate values that constitute the foundation of the world public order.‘ Accordingly, this 
basis for jurisdiction is not tied to the State's territory or some other traditional connecting 
factor but is rather grounded in the universal nature of the offence committed. At customary 
international law, such international crimes include piracy, war crimes, crimes against 




The court then further made specific reference to contemporary international law as reflected 
in conventions. The observance here was that the customary principle of universality for 
certain serious crimes is also endorsed in modern treaties as evidenced by the Rome Statute 
which South Africa domesticated via the ICC Act.
426
 After giving due consideration to the 
ICC provisions on jurisdiction that court held: 
 
―In the light of the progressive development of the idea of universality, prescriptive 
jurisdiction is no longer necessarily limited in the manner suggested on behalf of the 
Commissioner. Section 4(1) read with the definitions of "crimes" and "crimes against 
humanity" and part 2 of schedule 1 makes the alleged conduct complained of by the 
respondents, notwithstanding that it was allegedly committed extraterritorially, a crime in 




                                                             
425National Commissioner of the South African Police Service v Southern African Human Rights Litigation 
Centre Ibid atPara 39. 
426Ibid at Para 40. 




Ultimately, the case went for further appeal to the Constitutional Court that mostly followed 
and agreed with the Supreme Court of Appeal‘s reasoning vis-à-vis universal jurisdiction. 
The court then held: 
 
―The Supreme Court of Appeal was, therefore, correct to rule that on the facts of this case the 
torture allegations must be investigated by the SAPS. Our country's international and 
domestic law commitments must be honoured. We cannot be seen to be tolerant of impunity 
for alleged torturers. We must take up our rightful place in the community of nations with its 





Even though in the Constitutional Court the legal question was framed around the 
competence of the police service to investigate international crimes perpetuated 
extraterritorially, the principles pertaining to jurisdiction overall were given treatment. The 
court also clarified the limits of universal jurisdiction as follows: 
 
―South Africa may, through universal jurisdiction, assert prescriptive and, to some degree, 
adjudicative jurisdiction by investigating the allegations of torture as a precursor to taking a 





Further the court held: 
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―[U]niversal jurisdiction to investigate international crimes is not absolute. It is subject to at 
least two limitations. The first limitation arises from the principle of subsidiarity… The 




In S v Okah the Constitutional Court was confronted with the question as to whether in terms 
of the Anti-terrorism Act, South African courts have jurisdiction over terrorism activity 
which occurred outside of South African borders. Thus, the primary question in the case was 
whether the language of section 15 of the Act confers extraterritorial jurisdiction on the 
courts to try alleged offences over and above the financing of an offence is such alleged 
offences occurred outside South Africa. The court dealt with the textual make up of section 
15 and grammatical meaning thereof, however of importance for purposes of this research is 
the holistic approach to interpreting the scope of the Act vis-à-vis international law. The court 
adopted an expansive permissive approach by looking beyond the letter of the law to the duty 
of South Africa as a member of the international community. The court held as follows: 
 
―The statute fulfils a number of international instruments. These establish that South Africa is 
under both a general duty to combat terrorism and a specific duty to bring to trial perpetrators 
of terrorism, wherever perpetrated, whom it does not extradite. The international instruments 





The court‘s philosophical approach to terrorism is that the universality of the anti-terror 
sentiment is such that jurisdiction of South African courts to try persons accused of terrorism 
wherever allegedly committed cannot be raised as an issue. This is to say if the Anti-terrorism 
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Act gives effect to South Africa‘s treaty obligations, then surely it cannot in its provisions 
also limit the jurisdiction and/or role of the Courts in seeing to it that those obligations are 
fulfilled. In giving expression to its view, the court relied heavily on contemporary 
international law which in its view created both a general and specific duties for the State as a 
whole to align itself with the international approach to terror by combating terrorism and 




In light of the discussion of the cases above, the logical conclusion is that South African 
courts recognise that universal jurisdiction forms part of South African law through both 
customary international law and contemporary treaty-based legislation.  
 
4 3 3 Complementarity: obiter dicta in – Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and others v Southern African Litigation Centre (Helen Suzman Foundation 
and others as amici curiae);
433
 and National Commissioner of the South African Police v 
Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centre and another (Dugard and others as 
amici curiae). 
 
Complementarity is closely tied to jurisdiction of courts in an international criminal law 
context. The basic tenet of this concept is that Member States and not international tribunals 
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bear the primary responsibility to prosecute international crimes at national level.
434
 
Deviation from this deference is warranted only when the concerned Member State is either 
unable or unwilling to prosecute.
435
 In the South African international criminal law 
framework, the principle of complementarity is endorsed and codified in the ICC Act.
436
 In 
both National Commissioner of the South African Police v Southern African Human Rights 
Litigation Centre, and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others v 
Southern African Litigation Centre the Constitutional Court and Supreme Court of Appeal 
both recognised the significance of the principle of complementarity in South African law, 
and international law in general. The following obiter dicta from the Constitutional Court 
decision encapsulates the South African judicial view on the principle of complementarity: 
 
―International criminal law and the ICC system in particular are premised on the principle of 
complementarity. States parties may take the lead in investigating and prosecuting 
international crimes. The ICC will only undertake investigations and prosecutions as a court 
of last resort where states parties are unwilling or unable to do so. The primary responsibility 
to investigate and prosecute international crimes remains with states parties.‖
437
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436See Preamble of the ICC Act. See also section 3(d) & (e). 
437National Commissioner of the South African Police v Southern African Human Rights Litigation Centreat 
Para 30; and Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and others v Southern African Litigation 





This view expressed by the Constitutional Court is particularly insightful because it also 
gives clarity as to the extent and scope of complementarity. This position is in line with the 
preamble to the ICC Act which expresses South Africa‘s commitment to seeking justice for 
international crimes having due regard to the principle of complementarity.
438
 The Court‘s 
recognition of State parties as primary bearers of the responsibility to investigate and 
prosecute international crimes indicates that national police and courts are given powers 
necessary to investigate and adjudicate as would the ICC. This for instance means that issues 
such as diplomatic immunities which ordinarily would bar courts and enforcement 
government agencies from exercising jurisdiction over diplomatic figures, do not hold as a 
defence when international crimes are under investigation and before the national courts. 
 
An issue may in the future arise will ensue from the brewing tripartite relationship that may 
materialise once the Criminal Chamber of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(―ACJ‖) is operational. South Africa has not yet ratified the Malabo Protocol, but given the 
fact that the country has attempted to withdraw its membership from the ICC coupled with 
the current relationship between the AU and the ICC it is not a stretch to imagine that it will 
ratify the Protocol in the future. The Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights provides for complementarity with national courts and courts of regional economic 
communities such as the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (―COMESA‖) 
                                                             
438 The preamble of the ICC Act provides that ―the Republic of South Africa is committed to- 
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whenthe Republic became party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, or in 
the eventof the national prosecuting authority of the Republic declining or being unable to do 
so, in line withthe principle of complementarity as contemplated in the Statute, in the 






 and goes beyond the complementarity provisions in the Rome Statute. 
The question remains whether the complementarity rule in the Malabo Protocol can be 
interpreted to encompass tribunal deference in general, and if the ICC or the ACJ would 
recognise the other‘s jurisdiction. One way to look at it is that the ACJ being a construct of 
the AU renders the ICC obsolete, and State parties to the ACJ enjoy complementarity with it 
to the exclusion of the ICC – which of course would see an en masse withdrawal or 
coordinated disregard between AU Member States of their international obligations vis-à-vis 
the Rome Statute. 
 
The principle of complementarity is of course underscored by considerations that inform the 
integrity of the international criminal law framework as a whole, and thus the ICC has given 
clarity as to its views on how the relationship founded on complementarity between national 
courts and international tribunals should function. The ICC also stresses that primary duty to 
adjudicate international criminal law prosecution lies with the national courts. In Prosecutor 
vKony
440
 the pre-trial chamber of the ICC held as follows: 
―Complementarity is the principle reconciling the states‘ persisting duty to exercise 
jurisdiction over international crimes with the establishment of a permanent 
international criminal court having competence over the same crimes; admissibility is 
the criterion which enables the determination, in respect of a given case, whether it is 
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440Prosecutor v Joseph Kony et al, decision on the admissibility of the case under art 19(1) of the Statute, 10 
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, 10 March 2009. 




Thus, while the international court also has jurisdiction, there is a persisting duty on national 
courts to exercise primary jurisdiction – and complementarity is the catalyst that harmonises 
the two.  
 
South African courts thus accept that complementarity is not just attached to prosecution and 
adjudication but also extends to investigations of alleged international crimes in 
contravention of the ICC Act and thus the Rome Statute.  
 
4 4 National Prosecution of the Crime of Piracy 
 
To date there has not been a piracy prosecution in South African national courts, however the 
theoretical framework to do so exists in the provisions of the Defence Act.
442
 There is one 
recorded appearance of a fugitive suspected of piracy before a South African Magistrate‘s 
court for extradition proceedings in terms of which the suspect was detained in South Africa 
as part of an INTERPOL operation – and the Netherlands was requesting the extradition of 
the suspect, and such request was granted by the court.
443
 These proceedings were procedural, 
and none of the substantive provisions of piracy either under international law or the Defence 
Act were subject of the proceedings. An opportunity was missed when pirates hijacked a 
South African yacht off the coast of Tanzania on its voyage to South Africa. The South 
African government refused to receive and prosecute the captured Somalians, and therefore 
                                                             






they were sent to the Netherlands for trial.
444
 This refusal may have been on grounds of 
jurisdiction as provided for in the Defence Act which is discussed below.  
 
The provisions of the Defence Act are significantly similar to the piracy provisions of the 
UNCLOS; minor alterations pertain to the inclusion of a ship Master‘s conduct as potentially 
constituting piracy, and localising the crime by making reference to it being prosecutable in 
―the Republic‖.
445
 The numerous challenges associated with the interpretation of the crime of 
piracy have been discussed in detail in the previous chapter, and they find application here as 
well, and yet the discussion deepens at the interface between piracy and the domestic 
framework.  
 
The point of departure is reiterating the view that UNCLOS and thus the Defence Act are 
codification of customary international law position regarding piracy. However, going back 
to the days of the Harvard Draft Commentators and the Sub-Committee of the League of 
Nations Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law 
(discussed in Chapter II), it is clear that prior to the 1958 Geneva Convention and the 
succeeding UNCLOS there were conflicting legal views amongst Member States of the 
League of Nations as to the meaning of piracy according to the ‗law of nations‘.
446
 Thus 
ultimately, the definition of piracy – while accepted as customary international law – is also a 
compromise between a range of divergent views as to what conduct amounts to piracy. Much 
of the criticism of the definition can be attributed to the fact that the ostensibly definite 
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provisions of the UNCLOS amount to a vague crime the contents of which, it is submitted, 
would hinder successful prosecution. 
 
The Merchant Shipping (Maritime Security) Regulations of 2004
447
 make provision for the 
regulation of activity that can be classified as piratical, however there is no express reference 
to piracy and there is no differentiation as to acts that occur on territorial waters and the high 
seas. The Regulations provide that their purpose is to safeguard against the unlawful 
interference with maritime transport.
448
 Unlawful interference with maritime transport is 




(1) Any of the following done without lawful authority is an unlawful interference with 
maritime transport 
… 
(b) taking control of a ship by force, or threat of force, or any other form of 
intimidation; 
… 
(d) causing damage to a ship that is being used for maritime transport that puts the 
safety of the ship, or any person or property on board or off the ship, at risk; 
(e) doing on board a ship that is being used for maritime transport anything that puts 
the safety of the ship, or any person or property on board or off the ship, at risk. 
 
The sub-regulations describe activity which may be construed to amount to piracy, however 
they are couched in broad terms by making reference to maritime security in general. The 
weakness in the Regulations is that it appears to be very limited in scope of application, and it 
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does not purport to be an instrument with criminal sanctions. For instance, nowhere in the 
Regulations is there a provision that unlawful interference with maritime navigation is an 
offence, rather it provides for an elaborate framework in terms of which enforcement orders 
can be issued to ensure compliance with the Regulations and to safeguard against the 
unlawful interference of maritime navigation.
450
 There are criminal consequences for failure 
to comply with an enforcement order,
451
 however the perpetuation of unlawful interference 
with maritime transport is not an offence. In terms of scope, the substantive content of the 
Regulations suggests that they are essentially a framework for legitimate sea vessel operators 
who in the course of legitimate seafaring may engage in conduct provided for in regulation 5. 
This however should not be construed to mean that legitimate seafarers cannot be pirates. 
Which segues into an interesting provision in the Regulations which provides thus: 
 
[U]nlawful interference with maritime transport does not include lawful advocacy, protest, 
dissent or industrial action that does not result in, or contribute to, an action of a kind 
mentioned in sub-regulation (1)(a) to (h). 
 
This provision makes a very thin line between protest and advocacy activity at sea, and 
conduct that amounts to unlawful interference with maritime transport. It is unclear what 
yardstick would be used to determine if organisations such as Greenpeace would have 
crossed the Rubicon in their activism activity. Nonetheless, this lends insight as to South 
Africa‘s approach to maritime safety and security. 
 
Whereas there has not been a prosecution pertaining to piratical activity in South Africa, 
reference has been made in passing by the courts recognising piracy as an international crime 
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coupled with the theory that it attracts universal jurisdiction under customary international 
law.
452
 This view by national courts is not restricted to South Africa. In The Attorney General 
v. Adolf Eichmann, the District Court of Jerusalem held: 
 
―Maritime nations have, since time immemorial, enforced the principle of universal 





Thus, it is important to discuss as to what universal jurisdiction means from the perspective 
of a national court hearing a piracy trial. Against the discussion of the international criminal 




4 4 1 Defence Act Jurisdiction Provisions 
 
The South African legislative and judicial approach to jurisdiction as discussed above is 
aligned and centred on the international obligation of the State to meet international crimes 
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with the necessary framework for their eradication. Jurisdiction is central to that framework 
because without sound jurisdictional provisions, even the best drafted laws are deprived of 
enforcement power. South African courts have recognised that crimes such as piracy are 
under customary law subject to universal jurisdiction, however there must be a law to that 
effect in the statute domesticating an international crime – as a matter of constitutional 
obligation. The laws pertaining to terrorism, human trafficking, and war crimes have all 
explicitly provided for the competence of courts to exercise extraterritorial jurisdiction even 
when there is no traditional jurisdictional nexus between South Africa and the international 
crime suspect. Piracy as a classical international crime subject to universal jurisdiction is 
subject the same constitutional imperatives. The UNCLOS, from which section 24 of the 
Defence Act is borne, has a universal jurisdiction provision in Article 105 which provides as 
follows: 
 
―On the high seas, or in any other place outside the jurisdiction of any State, every State may 
seize a pirate ship or aircraft, or a ship or aircraft taken by piracy and under the control of 
pirates, and arrest the persons and seize the property on board. The courts of the State which 
carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be imposed, and may also determine 
the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or property, subject to the rights of 
third parties acting in good faith.‖ 
 
The universality of the provision is in the fact that pirates and pirate ships are subject to arrest 
and trial by any State desirous to do so. The only proviso is that a pirate ship and pirates can 
only be arrested on the high seas. From a South African courts‘ perspective, this provision 
only serves as a confirmation of the customary law position, and so there has to be a statute 




Act, Torture Act, and the Geneva Conventions Act, the Defence Act does not expressly 
provide for universal jurisdiction. It provides as follows: 
 
―Any person who commits an act of piracy is guilty of an offence, which may be tried in any 
court in the Republic designated by the Director of Public Prosecutions and, upon conviction, 




This provision criminalises piracy in South Africa, but in so far as the jurisdiction of the 
courts it may ostensibly be that universal jurisdiction is afforded the court, but it really is not. 
Piracy unlike other crimes is a crime that occurs outside the territory of any State anyway, 
jurisdiction is only established when an arrest and seizure is carried out. Even under the 
Defence Act the crime of piracy remains exclusively a high seas crime,
455
 meaning if piratical 
activity took place in territorial waters of South Africa it would be prosecuted under different 
laws pertaining to theft, murder, rape, and so on. The Defence Act then makes provision for 
arrest based on articles 105 and 107 of the UNCLOS. It provides as follows: 
 
―An officer of the Defence Force may seize a ship or aircraft and the property on board, and 




―Any ship, aircraft or property seized, or any person arrested, in terms of this section, must as 
soon as possible be brought to the Republic or to any other authority determined by the 
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Minister of Foreign Affairs, with the concurrence of the Ministers of Defence and of Justice, 




The provisions above authorise members of the South African military to make arrests on 
persons and ships suspected to be carrying out piratical activity, but they also make a clear 
stipulation that after such arrest, the suspects are to be brought to South Africa or any other 
authority determined by the relevant South African ministers to face the law. These 
provisions thus bring a very important dynamic into the question of a South African court‘s 
jurisdiction vis-à-vis piracy. In so far as investigation and apprehension of pirates is 
concerned, the South African military is sanctioned by law and customary international law 
to patrol the high seas and within the bounds of the law (including South African 
constitutional law) do whatever is necessary to effect an arrest on persons suspected of 
piracy. However, where there is nothing linking the accused to South Africa, it is submitted 
that South African courts do not have competence to adjudicate, nor does a South African 
prosecutor have the duty and/or obligation to bring such person to trial. If therefore a person 
accused of committing piratical Acts on a foreign vessel and as a fugitive made his way to 
South Africa, the courts would not be able to try such a person. Section 25 (3) of the Defence 
Act clearly stipulates that a piracy suspect must be brought to the Republic if arrested by the 
South African military personnel. This is to say South Africa has unqualified universal 
jurisdiction as regards enforcement jurisdiction, but adjudicative jurisdiction can be 
challenged by raising the point that South Africa was not the arresting state – and yet arrest is 
the qualifying jurisdictional link in terms of the Defence Act.  
 
The UNCLOS itself buttresses this view. Article 105 provides that  
                                                             





―…The courts of the State which carried out the seizure may decide upon the penalties to be 
imposed, and may also determine the action to be taken with regard to the ships, aircraft or 
property, subject to the rights of third parties acting in good faith.‖ 
 
Thus, it is submitted that section 24 of the Defence Act allows for the South African military 
to effect arrests on the high seas regardless of the suspect person‘s and/or the victim ship‘s 
nationality, residence, and other jurisdictional nexus. However, for purposes of prosecution 
of persons for the crime of piracy in a South African court, it must be the South African 




It must be highlighted that States such as Kenya and the United States have ventured into 
transfer agreements in terms of which pirates apprehended by the latter would be transferred 
to the former for trial and incarceration, and as discussed in Chapter III such arrangements 
have been controversial for a reason. South Africa cannot use them as a blueprint for 
establishing jurisdiction. South Africa is a State Party to the Djibouti Code which provides 
that: 
 
―The Participant which carried out the seizure pursuant to paragraph 4 may, subject to its 
national laws, and in consultation with other interested entities, waive its primary right to 
exercise jurisdiction and authorize any other Participant to enforce its laws against the ship 
and/or persons on board.‖
459
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There is nothing in the Defence Act that allows the South African government to authorise 
another State to exercise its own laws upon apprehended pirates and a seized pirate ship, nor 
is there precedent where South Africa has given an authorisation to another state to exercise 
jurisdiction over an alleged perpetrator of an international crime. The situation contemplated 
in the provision is not an extradition request where one country makes a request for a fugitive 
to be returned so as to undergo a trial – this is a matter where suspects are effectively peddled 
to States as willing takers. It is puzzling why the Parties to the Djibouti Code did not rather 
direct that each State must enact national laws that vest their courts with universal 
jurisdiction. This would not have been controversial because there would not be a need for 
extra-judicial authorisations between States. Further, piracy is an international crime subject 
to universal jurisdiction without a doubt.
460
 States have been known to jealously defend their 
right to primary jurisdiction – the legality and status of an agreement to authorise the exercise 
of jurisdiction is uncertain. If it is lawful to do so; there are quite a number of considerations 
that come into play at least from a South African perspective.  
 
Firstly, piracy is not purely a legal issue it is also a security issue. Consequently, if the 
government is to authorise the exercise of jurisdiction by a third party State there has to be a 
designated authority to do so on behalf of South Africa. In the case of extraditions, it is the 
Minister of Justice who exercises authority.
461
 For the matter at hand it is rather complicated 
because there are overlaps in scope and the Department concerned with foreign affairs and 
international cooperation, and the Department of Defence may all have an interest in the 
exercise of jurisdiction over piracy. Secondly, the South African government would have to 
consider whether the suspects would receive a fair trial in the receiving country, and if found 
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guilty whether they would receive humane punishment. This is in line with the constitutional 
imperative that every person has a right not to be subjected to punishment that is cruel, 
degrading, and inhumane, and the right to a fair trial.
462
 In Mohammed v President of the 
Republic of South Africa
463
 the Constitutional Court held thus: 
 
―For the South African government to cooperate with a foreign government to secure the 
removal of a fugitive from South Africa to a country of which the fugitive is not a national 
and with which he had no connection other than that he is to be put on trial for his life there, 
is contrary to the underlying values of the Constitution. It is inconsistent with the 
government‘s obligation to protect the life to life of everyone in South Africa, and it ignores 
the commitment implicit in the Constitution that South Africa will not be party to the 




The context while different, captures the view of the Constitutional Court towards sending 
fugitives to a country where they are likely to face a violation of their constitutional rights. 
Signatories to the Djibouti Code such as Somalia, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Ethiopia, and the 
United Arab Emirates still impose capital punishment as a sentence to certain crimes.
465
 
Yemen recently convicted accused persons of piracy and imposed the death penalty as 
punishment.
466
 Saudi Arabia also attracted international condemnation for the barbarism with 
which journalist Jamal Khashoggi met his death at the hands of Saudi government officials in 
a Saudi Embassy in Turkey.
467
 This simply demonstrates that South Africa is not in the 
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company of governments with a clean bill of human rights protection. Thirdly, South Africa 
domesticated the UN Convention against Torture when it enacted the Torture Act discussed 
above. The Torture Act provides that no person shall be expelled to another State where there 
are substantial grounds that the person will be subjected to torture.
468
 This is in line with the 
international law norm of non-refoulement. Thus, this would have to inform the decision by 
South Africa to authorise another State to exercise jurisdiction over persons arrested and 
property seized by South Africa.  
Whether South Africa can be authorised by co-Signatories to the Djibouti Code to exercise 
jurisdiction over pirates and a pirate ship arrested by that Signatory will be informed 
primarily by whether South African law allows for the exercise of jurisdiction. With the 
current piracy jurisdiction regime in the Defence Act, it is submitted that South Africa cannot 
exercise jurisdiction. Jurisdiction in South Africa is a constitutional issue, and so it is 
inconceivable that a South African court would exercise jurisdiction solely on the basis that a 
foreign government waived its jurisdiction and authorised South Africa to visit its own laws 
upon the accused and the seized property. Unless there are lawful grounds for the exercise of 
jurisdiction, South African courts would not do so. The Djibouti Code in and of itself is a 
treaty from which some obligations for South Africa flow, however international instruments 







4 4 2 Nullum Crimen Sine Lege – Legality 
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The issues that plague the piracy definition under the codified customary international law 
have been discussed and analysed in Chapter III and the principle of legality in international 
criminal tribunals has also been discussed. The Defence Act also adopted the international 
law definition of piracy with negligible changes, which means the issues that arise with the 
international law definition also find application in the Defence Act and therefore a further 
discussion would be a duplication of efforts. What remains is the consideration of these 
problems against the principle of legality which is part of South African law. 
 
The principle of legality has featured in a number of cases in South Africa both prior to the 
Constitutional dispensation and after.
470
 Section 35(3)(l) of the Constitution also provides for 
the legality principle in stipulating that a right to a fair trial is guaranteed all accused and this 
includes the right not to be convicted for conduct which was not criminalised at the time of 
commission. Of fundamental importance for purposes of this research is the tenet of the 
principle of legality that says crimes should not be vaguely defined.
471
 This element of the 
principle of legality is not to be construed to mean that certainty is an absolute standard that 
must always be observed in defining the elements of a crime,
472
 however an offence couched 
in terms that allow for multiple interpretations is vague and will not pass constitutional 
muster. In S v Lavhengwa the court held that the right to be informed of the charge with 
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sufficient detail means that the accused must know the necessary particulars of the charge he 




As regards the crime of piracy in a South African court, it is submitted that such a 
prosecution would be marred by the uncertainties that plague the definition, scope, and 
substantive content of the crime of piracy. Regrettably, customary international law would 
not shed light as an interpretive tool because the provisions in the Defence Act are 
substantially similar to those of the UNCLOS. Given the fact that the piracy provisions under 
the Defence Act are imported from the UNCLOS, the court would be remiss if it did not 
consider the writings of authors old and contemporary on the subject of piracy under 
international law – however it is very hard to decipher which is commentary and which is 
authoritative. For instance, there are authors who believe the private ends requirement does 
not include acts perpetrated for political reasons, while other authors believe that all ends that 
are not commissioned by the State are private. The UNCLOS and its travaux préparatoires 
would have to be employed as an interpretive tool as per section 233 of the Constitution, but 
then this begs the question as to whether those reflect custom as it is today in relation to 
contemporary piracy. The uncertainty in international law, in so far as the meaning of the 
elements of the crime of piracy are concerned, would undoubtedly form part of the defence of 
an accused. The problem takes a more interesting twist when one considers activist work 
such as Greenpeace and Sea Shepard Conservation Society which sometimes culminates into 
violent confrontation with other ships on the High Seas – are these activism actions piracy? Is 
maritime security compromised because of such activity? The private ends requirement in 
particular would be under scrutiny, and what this means in customary international law is 
unclear. 
                                                             





4 5 Concluding Remarks 
 
The South African international criminal law landscape has been shaped by interesting 
occurrences which are not purely legal but affected by geo-politics and Africa‘s relationship 
with the ICC and more developments are on the horizon with the emergence of the ACJ 
vested with the competence to try international crimes, including piracy. Complementarity 
will certainly be an issue that will be contested and the general relationship between the ICC 
and the ACJ will be worth monitoring. Much has been done by South Africa to progressively 
meet its obligations and discharge its international law duties and the domestication of 
international treaties and criminalisation of some breaches to international norms are 
testament of South Africa‘s leadership approach to ending impunity for the commission of 
international crimes. From an enforcement perspective there have been challenges and 
apparent abdication of duties and international obligations by South Africa, which was 
followed by an inchoate withdrawal from the Rome Statute. The interpretation by the Courts, 
of South Africa‘s international obligations and the application of international criminal law 
nationally has been progressive and illustrative of the judiciary‘s commitment to developing 
the law in line with international customary law. That said, much is yet to be done as the 
courts continue to face complex legal questions as to the interpretation and application of 
international criminal law statutes in South Africa. 
 
As regards piracy, it is submitted that while the UNCLOS piracy provisions have been 
incorporated into the Defence Act it is unlikely that a prosecution would succeed on account 
of the principle of legality. The Defence Act does criminalise piracy committed on the high 




framework are vague as to allow for ambiguity in interpretation, and customary international 
law as codified by the UNCLOS does not provide answers. Further, while there is the view 
that piracy is a crime over which states can exercise universal jurisdiction, this is accurate 
only as regards prescriptive and enforcement jurisdiction. Adjudicative universal jurisdiction 
is qualified by the fact while pirates can be arrested by any State on the high seas, it is the 
court of that arresting State that may impose penalties. The Defence Act essentially provides 
for that too in relation to South Africa – but what is does not do is provide that where a 
perpetrator of piracy should be within the borders of South Africa, he may be arrested and 
tried for piracy notwithstanding that he was not arrested by a South African Navy ship on the 
high seas. The laws which provide for the criminalisation of international crimes in South 
Africa make it clear that perpetrators thereof can be subject to the jurisdiction of the courts 
regardless of there being no jurisdictional nexus between the perpetrator and South Africa. 
The Djibouti Code also has shortcomings and does not help South Africa‘s cause in 
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction as regards piracy. There is the option that it could be 
domesticated, and perhaps the Courts would help with the question of ―authorisation‖ to 
exercise jurisdiction. In so far as the definition of piracy, scope, content, and meaning of 
piracy – these are not explained or unpacked in the Djibouti Code. It only defines piracy as 
does the UNCLOS. 
 
Given the international nature of the crime, it is pertinent to assess developments that have 
taken place at international level that have an impact or may provide guidance on the 
prosecution of piracy. International and regional initiatives have been discussed in Chapter 
III, the next Chapter focuses on international institutional development and how some of 
those institutions have developed and interpreted international criminal law. This of course 




of complementarity assigns national courts the primary duty to prosecute international 
crimes, but they must do so in line with customary and contemporary international law. It is 
also important to analyse some of the UN Security Council resolutions pertaining to piracy 
and how they have shaped the approach to piracy and maritime security. The regionalisation 
of international criminal law through the adoption of the Malabo Protocol will also be 
examined as a general development in the international law framework and with regards to 
piracy which is now an international crime under the jurisdiction of the ACJ. This 
development was spurred by geopolitical considerations, but it will have an impact on the 
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5 1 Introduction 
 
The very nature of piracy and its effect on regional security and international trade dictates 
that much like other international crimes, piracy can neither be localised to individual 
countries nor can it be assigned to a select few countries to confront on behalf of the 
international community. There has to be a genuine collective effort which, it is submitted, 
should be based on regional and international law that enjoins all the necessary stakeholders 
and provides for a sound framework to prosecute pirates. It must however be borne in mind 
that such progressive endeavours do not occur in a vacuum, there is already a regime 
complex vis-à-vis international criminal law in general obtaining both regionally and 
internationally. Much of the collective action to repress piracy regionally has generally 
comprised joint military interventions on the high seas. The efforts of multinational military 




strategy (which originally formed part of the so-called ‗War on Terror‘ led by the United 
States) is indeed to capture and prosecute pirates, but it can be argued that much of the 
success realised was with arrest rather than prosecution.  It is submitted that this strategy is 
neither coherent nor based on a comprehensive legal framework and certainly not a blueprint 
for South Africa and regional international criminal law. The aforesaid efforts are coupled 
with ad hoc agreements with states such as Kenya and the Seychelles to prosecute on the 
backbone of the principle of universality of jurisdiction over piracy. Of course, these 
arrangements (particularly sending pirates to third states for prosecution) flounder in the face 
of sound construction of jurisdiction, constitutionalism, and the principle of legality. As such 
the countries cited have had to make various adjustments to their laws to remedy some of the 
glaring legal flaws emanating from these arrangements.  
 
While criticism of the ad hoc arrangements between arresting and prosecuting third states is 
valid, on the flipside of that is the risk of impunity because there is no international or 
regional tribunal that has tried piracy notwithstanding the existence of numerous regional 
courts and tribunals in and around Africa. Piracy is not solely a legal problem; it is also very 
much a security problem. That is why it has prompted a series of reactions from the Security 
Council as conduct that threatens regional peace, security, and stability.
474
 The purpose of 
this chapter is to discuss the current development of an international/regional body that will 
have jurisdiction over piracy. The proposed draft protocol on the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights will form the basis of the discussion. An analysis of the proposed jurisdiction 
of the court in question will be conducted. The possible role of the ICC will be considered 
briefly, as some avid piracy commentators have posited the view that perhaps the scope of 
                                                             




ICC crimes should be extended to cover piracy as well.
475
 By any measure, this constitutes a 
very complex legal, diplomatic and political exercise – one that is not without risks for the 
evolving international criminal justice system. However the assumption is that such a 
regional or international approach is, in principle at least, desirable. 
 
As is clear from the preceding chapters, it is safe to assert that the UNCLOS remains the 
prevailing legal framework at international law level for the prosecution of piracy. The 
United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations Security Council have recognised 
it as such without giving any sort of interpretive aid or guide as to the content, scope of 
application, and insight as to the meaning of the definition of the crime of piracy.
476
 
Consequently, there is no prescriptive approach and this has allowed for some developments 
of alternatives at international law level that deviate somewhat from customary international 
law. 
 
5 2 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence against the Safety of 
Maritime Navigation (“SUA Convention”) and the 2005 Protocol 
 
Driven by the International Maritime Organisation, the SUA convention of 1988 came into 
force in 1992, ten years after the UNCLOS was adopted. This is another instrument 
developed and implemented at international level to develop the international criminal law 
relating to maritime safety. It features heavily in literature pertaining to piracy, however as a 
                                                             
475Y M Dutton ―Bringing Pirates to Justice: A Case for Including Piracy Within the Jurisdiction of the 
International Criminal Court‖ 2010 (11) Chi. J. Int’l L. 197. 
476Report on the Work of the United Nations Open Ended Informal Consultative Process Established by the 
General Assembly in its Resolution 54/33 in Order to Facilitate the Annual Review by the Assembly of 
Developments in Ocean Affairs at its Second Meeting Held at United Nations Headquarters from 7 to 11 May 




point of departure there are certain points which must be highlighted so as to inform the 
relevance of the SUA Convention to contemporary piracy. Firstly, the SUA convention in its 
text does not make a single express reference to the concept of piracy, or at least reference to 
an expansion of the international criminal law piracy regime. It merely provides for a broad 
offence within which piracy or piratical acts may fall.
477
 Secondly and related to the first 
point, the general theme of the SUA convention heavily channels terrorism.
478
 From reading 
the text and paying particular attention to the references to terrorism, it is not far-fetched to 
construe the instrument as primarily a maritime terror suppression effort.  
 
Some remedial approach to the shortcomings of the UNCLOS are presented by the SUA 
Convention, not by shedding clarity or lending insight but by providing for broad language 
that foregoes concepts such as the ‗two ships‘, ‗high seas‘, and ‗private ends‘ requirements 
provided for in the UNCLOS. Moreover, the SUA Convention makes it a treaty obligation for 
states to criminalise the offences created in Article 3 of the Convention in their domestic 
laws, however it leaves penal consequences ―which take into account the grave nature of 
those offences‖ at the discretion of individual states.
479
 In so far as jurisdiction is concerned, 
the SUA Convention does not afford universal jurisdiction, but creates a numerus clausus of 
jurisdictional links which may be relied upon by a state to make the case that its national law 
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The lack of clear distinctive characteristics between maritime terror and piracy has been 
described as unsound legal policy.
481
 The author instant is inclined to agree with this view for 
the reason that while maritime terror and piracy may have some overlap in content and scope, 
it would be imprudent to paint the two international crimes with one broad brush – and the 
SUA Convention does this in the sense that it allows for a discretionary movement of the 
penal goalposts depending on how a prosecuting state views the gravity of an Article 3 
contravention.
482
 The very fact that accused persons would be neither terrorists under a state‘s 
national law nor pirates under domesticated UNCLOS provisions, but simply a criminal who 
unlawfully and intentionally seized or exercised control over a ship by force or threat thereof 
or any other form of intimidation – is in itself problematic. Given current geo-politics and 
policies passed by states such as the United States vis-à-vis terror – including the 
conceptualisation of the idea of radical Islamic terrorism, the enforcement of SUA 
Convention provisions could have unintended but dire consequences. Maritime states such as 
The United States and Israel would likely view an attack on ships sailing under their flags as 
more ‗grave‘ if the attackers were Muslims from certain Middle Eastern states, than if they 
were nationals of other states.
483
  After 9/11 in 2001 and the consequential United States led 
                                                             
481 H Tuerk (2009) U. Miami Int'l & Comp. L. 32. 
482It is submitted that the term ―gravity‖ allows for penal powers that are so wide as to be abused. Gravity 
denotes ‗degrees‘ and that basically means an Article 3 contravention could attract a small fine as well as life 
imprisonment or capital punishment – depending on the degree of seriousness the prosecuting states deems the 
contravention. It is further submitted that this defeats the goal of international consensus on measures to 
eradicate maritime crimes. 
483This fear is captured in the preamble of the SUA Convention, which provides: RECALLING resolution 40/61 
of the General Assembly of the United Nations of 9 December 1985 which, inter alia, "urges all States 
unilaterally and in co-operation with other States, as well as relevant United Nations organs, to contribute to the 
progressive elimination of causes underlying international terrorism and to pay special attention to all situations, 
including colonialism, racism and situations involving mass and flagrant violations of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and those involving alien occupation, that may give rise to international terrorism and 




fight against terror, many countries have passed national anti-terror laws.
484
 The SUA 
convention, it is argued, opens the possibility to de facto try an accused as either a pirate or a 
terrorist depending on the subjective views of the prosecuting state. It is further submitted 
that the principle of legality may be raised against a prosecution of a crime formulated on the 
basis of the SUA Convention, given the uncertainty of the meaning and scope of Article 3 
(1). 
 
The SUA Convention, as highlighted above, does not allow universal jurisdiction over Article 
3 contraventions. However, it does allow for a state to assert jurisdiction over unlawful acts 
which occurred in territorial waters of another state provided there is a nexus as detailed in 
Article 6.
485
 This is a marked move from the UNCLOS which only applies on the high seas to 
the exclusion of territorial waters. Given that the SUA Convention does not expressly make 
reference to piracy, it perhaps would be difficult to justify universal jurisdiction to Article 3 
contraventions. Whereas piracy is, in theory, an international crime par excellence.  
 
Given the scope and content of the SUA Convention, it is submitted that the instrument is 
largely a teleological response to the shortcomings of the UNCLOS piracy provision rather 
than a framework to facilitate legally sound prosecution of piracy. Some scholars make the 
submission that the SUA Convention should not be construed to replace the UNCLOS but to 
complement it.
486
 While it is true that it does not replace the UNCLOS, one is hard-pressed to 
conclude that there is a complementary relationship between the two instruments. It gives rise 
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to incoherence and legal uncertainty and thus does not contribute positively to the piracy 
framework. The fact that it has not been utilised by any of its signatories thus far is certainly 
testament to its perceived success potential.
487
 South Africa is not a state party to the 
Convention, but it has adopted the maritime safety provisions thereof verbatim,
488
 the 
implications thereof have been discussed in detail in Chapter IV of this research.  
 
5 3 United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) Resolutions on Piracy 
 
The UNSC‘s role as a stakeholder in the elimination of piracy is discussed in the first chapter 
of this research, but its prominence as a key international actor is rooted in its resolutions. 
The said resolutions are important in that they inform state action pertaining to security 
matters, the scope of which covers piracy – a modern day threat to regional stability and 
viability of strategic international shipping routes. The UNSC resolutions on piracy constitute 
a body of work that has occasioned some noteworthy developments at international level 
which can be described as the transforming if not bending of international law rules on 
confronting piracy. The UNSC is of course driven to present pragmatic solutions to pressing 
security problems, and the resolutions are indicative of the contextual approach by the UNSC 
– meaning the resolutions are (strictly speaking) a mechanism to resolve piracy in a given 
context as opposed to providing a generic approach. That said, some of the UNSC resolutions 
are adopted under the UNSC‘s Chapter VII powers, and the use of such powers is generally 
associated with the so-called ‗by all necessary means‘ resolutions adopted in relation to 
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serious thwarting grave threats in armed conflict and times of war.
489
 Thus, there arises the 
question as to the UNSC‘s view of maritime piracy and whether this means that anti-piracy 
activities by states are governed by international humanitarian law – or perhaps that piracy 
itself now should be viewed under the lens of international humanitarian law. This is a 
development that will be analysed in context. 
 
The first of a series of UNSC resolutions focusing on piracy off the coast of Somalia was 
Resolution 1816.
490
 The UNCLOS piracy provisions are identified by the UNSC as the 
existing framework governing piracy at international law, further that the UNCLOS is an 
expression of customary international law. In its language, the resolution uses the term 
‗piracy‘ in tandem with the phrase ―robbery against vessels‖ and there seems to be a strong 
suggestion either that these are two distinct crimes which both fall under the purview of 
international law or that piracy and robbery at sea are intertwined such that one cannot be 
considered without the other.
491
Some authors are in fact of the view that the language used by 
the UNSC captures robbery at sea as a subset of piracy, and thus the interpretation that anti-
piracy efforts must not be arrested by legal definitions of essentially largely indistinguishable 
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The use of such language by the UNSC blurs the line between a high sea and 
territorial waters crime in that robbery at sea is not necessarily a high seas crime whereas the 
international crime of piracy cannot occur on any body of water that forms part of the 
territory of any state. This expression by the UNSC is not novel, it has featured in literature 
discussing piracy under international law and has been discussed by national courts and 
actually validated as sound construction by a U.S court.
493
 Nonetheless, robbery at sea is 
prosecuted by the state which exercises territorial, port-state, and/or coastal state jurisdiction 
because there exists a jurisdictional link to that state.
494
 Customary international law 
separates piracy from other marine crimes such as maritime terror and robbery at sea, in fact 
there is no mention whatsoever of robbery in the UNCLOS provisions. 
 
While piracy and robbery at sea are distinct legal concepts falling under the scope of different 
laws, the fact of the matter is that from a pragmatic viewpoint contemporary piracy does not 
comprise clear cut activity which at first glance can be categorised as piracy to the exclusion 
of all other maritime crimes – not in the least when piratical acts are compared to robbery 
against a vessel in territorial waters. The UNSC seems to concede this point by providing a 
working resolution to allow for anti-piracy initiatives that would not ordinarily be lawful 
action under international law, especially against customary international law rules on state 
sovereignty, jurisdiction, and of course the UNCLOS piracy provisions. This is countered 
with a reaffirmation by the UNSC of its respect for Somali statehood under international 
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 Against the aforesaid, the UNSC resolution provides for a facility in terms of which 
naval states cooperating with the Somali Transitional Federal Government (which is 
recognised as the de jure government of Somalia) may lawfully enter into Somali territorial 
water to enforce laws governing both piracy and robbery at sea and employ all necessary 
means to fight piracy.
496
 The UNSC imposed a 6 month timeline with an allowance to renew 
or extend the authorisation.
497
 Taking care not to be misconstrued, the UNSC ensured to 




Subsequent resolutions by the UNSC follow, generally without deviating from Resolution 
1816 but developing in line with the substantive content thereof. Acting under Chapter VII 
powers, the UNSC in Resolution 1846 includes the SUA Convention as a framework for the 
creation of maritime offences, establishing jurisdiction, and prosecution transfer 
arrangements.
499
 It therefore urges: 
 
―States parties to the SUA Convention to fully implement their obligations under said 
Convention and cooperate with the Secretary-General and the IMO to build judicial capacity 
for the successful prosecution of persons suspected of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the 
coast of Somalia‖ 
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As discussed earlier in the chapter, the terms ―piracy‖ and ―pirate‖ do not appear at all in the 
SUA Convention, and yet the UNSC expressly links the prosecution of piracy with the 
Convention. It is unclear whether the UNSC is encouraging the use of the SUA Convention 
to remedy the shortcomings of the UNCLOS, or if it merely construes the SUA Convention 
as an instrument that can equally be used by State parties to prosecute persons suspected of 
piracy by creating crimes under the Convention which have definitional overlaps with piracy. 
In the preamble of Resolution 1851 the UNSC notes with concern the pirate catch-and-
release practice by some naval states operating off the coast of Somalia, and in the same 
breath puts forward the SUA Convention as a legislative avenue to facilitate the prosecution 
of pirates. Once again the SUA Convention is associated with the prosecution of pirates, 
further casting doubt on the current piracy prosecution framework under customary 
international law.  
 
Since the UNSC started adopting resolutions particularly focused on piracy off the coast of 
Somalia the encouragement of states to adopt national laws for the prosecution of piracy has 
been part of the drive to address the crime. In Resolution 1976,
500
 the UNSC makes the 
undertaking to consider the establishment of an extraterritorial Somali piracy court.
501
 From 
subsequent resolutions one can only deduce that upon consideration the UNSC abandoned 
this avenue in favour of specialised anti-piracy courts established in national jurisdictions, 
states such as Kenya, Mauritius, and Tanzania pioneered this initiative. The subject of an 
extraterritorial piracy court does not feature in any of the piracy resolutions adopted by the 
UNSC after Resolution 1976. The implementation of this policy of the UNSC was not 
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It appears the UNSC – at least from a practical point of view – considers piratical actions to 
constitute armed robbery and vice versa. This lends credence to the view that the UNCLOS is 
outdated and thus does not suffice in regulating contemporary piracy, and perhaps more 
importantly that international law has to develop to provide for a progressive framework that 
effectively regulates the practical realities of modern day piracy.  
 
5 4 Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (“Malabo Protocol”) – Regionalisation of International 




 June 2014, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the African Union 
adopted the Malabo Protocol an instrument the purpose of which was to extend the 
jurisdictional scope of the African Court of Justice and Human rights.
503
 Prior to the adoption 
of the Malabo Protocol, the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and 
Human Rights had merged the African Court on Human and Peoples Rights and the Court of 
Justice of the African Union into a single Court known as the African Court of Justice and 
Human and Peoples‘ Rights (―ACJ‖). 
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The Malabo Protocol establishes an International Criminal Law Section of the ACJ which is 
made up of a Pre-Trial Chamber, a Trial Chamber and an Appellate Chamber.
504
 The 
International Criminal Law Section is vested with competence to hear all cases relating to the 
crimes specified in the ACJ Statute.
505
 There are fourteen international crimes specified in the 
Statute, comprising both core and non-core crimes. Specifically related to this research is the 
inclusion of piracy as a crime falling under the jurisdictional scope of the International 
Criminal Law Section of the ACJ.
506
 The Malabo Protocol definition of piracy is 
substantively similar to the UNCLOS piracy definition, and thus offers no novel approach to 
modern piracy – it would seem that even under the regime of the Statute of the ACJ piracy 
remains a controversial crime which will be subject to development by the Court when there 
is a piracy case before it. 
 
The move by the AU to set up an exclusively African international criminal law framework is 
a double-edged sword in that the benefits thereof differ in accordance with the vantage point 
of its beneficiaries. The historic conceptual genesis of an African international criminal court 
and the implementation thereof has not been without controversy, however on the balance 
there are some positives as well. Before discussing the intricate effects of having a regional 
criminal tribunal, a few general remarks must be made about the Malabo Protocol and the 
ACJ. The Malabo Protocol requires ratification of at least fifteen AU Member States before it 
can become operative.
507
 The AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government made a 
recommendation for accelerated ratification of the Protocol.
508
 As at May 2018 only 11 AU 
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Member States have signed the Protocol,
509
 and only 5 have ratified it.
510
 South Africa has 
done neither. 
 
From a purely legal perspective, the Malabo Protocol is a welcome development in 
international criminal justice particularly considering the substantive content thereto. It is trite 
that the African continent has been associated with grave human rights abuses, civil strife, 
and impunity for commission of international crimes. The number of active armed 
international and non-international conflicts in Africa is not readily ascertainable, however it 
is trite that the region still faces challenges with rising hostilities, and it is the context of 
warfare that international crimes occur. Moreover, there are known perpetrators of 
international crimes that are yet to be prosecuted such as leaders and members of terrorist 
groups such as Boko Haram and the Lord‘s Resistance Army who have either claimed 
responsibility for devastating atrocities or are suspected of being responsible for gross human 
rights violations and international crimes in Africa. The Prosecutor‘s Office will certainly not 
be without work if the duties are executed in good faith.  The tone of the Malabo Protocol 
seeks to address some of these issues, and the preamble thereto makes the following key 
observations: 
 
―The Member States of the African Union parties to the Constitutive Act of the African 
Union: 
… 
FURTHER RECALLING their commitment to the right of the Union to intervene in a 
Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
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namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as well as a serious threat to 
legitimate order to restore peace and stability to the Member State of the Union upon the 
recommendation of the Peace and Security Council; 
… 
FURTHER REITERATINGtheir respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and 
rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism and subversive activities, 
unconstitutional changes of governments and acts of aggression; 
FURTHER REITERATINGtheir commitment to fighting impunity in conformity with the 




The emphasised assertions concerning the eradication of the culture of impunity within the 
broader context of African international justice constitute a positive development. The move 
towards a regional approach to international criminal law founded up concessions regarding 
historical regional shortcomings demonstrates, at least in principle, the AU‘s outlook in 
aligning the framework with other international legal instruments and institutions pursuing 
identical goals.
512
 The said concessions can also be used to justify the expansive jurisdiction 
provided for by the Malabo Protocol amendments such as the competence to hold juristic 
persons accountable for international criminal law contraventions,
513
 and competence to try 
crimes of an international character such as corruption and drug trafficking which do not 
necessarily fall within the category of ‗core international crimes‘.
514
 It is thus laudable that 
there is a concerted regional effort to craft a comprehensive African approach to safety and 
security issues. The international community will be keeping an eye on the developments 
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around the ACJ, and the Court will have to feel the pressure of having to demonstrate that it 
is indeed a credible regional institution that will not be constrained by regional politics but 
driven by the ideals enshrined in the Statute‘s preamble. The Court‘s competence (or lack 
thereof) over Heads of State and senior state officials is worrying because it inadvertently 
allows for impunity which could be perpetual in the African context where some leaders have 
been known to commit gross human rights violations and international crimes to hold on to 
power indefinitely.
515
 This is also not in line with the Rome Statute which and the 
Convention against Torture which do not allow for diplomatic immunities as a ground to 
avoid prosecution. South Africa has of course ratified and domesticated the said instruments 
and made this law, thus it would be interesting to see how it would navigate these divergent 
laws once it ratifies the Malabo Protocol. 
 
The AU is of course a political organisation, and this is an important consideration when 
analysing the role of the AU sanctioned ACJ in African and international criminal justice 
frameworks. There is a widespread view amongst legal commentators that the Malabo 
Protocol is essentially a reactive move by the AU informed by the perception that the ICC 
and European courts are biased against Africans while impunity continues in the western 
world and other parts of the globe.
516
 This stance by the AU calls into question the gravity of 
the impact the hostile relationship between African states and the ICC has on international 
criminal law on the one hand, and the relationship (if any) of the ICC and the ACJ going 
forward. The other concern is whether or not it will be possible for States to be party to both 
the Rome Statute and the ACJ Statute. The Rome Statute of the ICC incorporates the 
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principle of complementarity and thus the relationship between national courts and the ICC is 
complementary in that the ICC will only hear trials within its purview when national courts 
are either unable or unwilling to prosecute.
517
 Available literature on the mandate and activity 
of the ICC support the AU observation that although the court has international scope which 
allows it to investigate the commission of international crimes around the globe, its caseload 
and history is comprises only matters where the accused are of African origin.
518
 Countries of 
the world, including western States, are always at war and there are frequent reports of 
possible international crimes being committed in contravention of the Rome Statute and a 
variety of Convention to which western democracies are party to.
519
 The caseload of the ICC 
is therefore not reflective of the true picture of Western involvement in international crimes 
in comparison with their African counterparts. The ICC presents itself as a tribunal whose 
decisions and activity are governed solely by the law and pursuit of justice for victims of 
international crimes, however the prima facie selective prosecutions raise questions as to 
credibility and political pliancy. This lends some credence to the concerns by AU Member 
States. Political postures adopted by the AU and its predecessor – the Organisation of African 
Unity – towards the ICC is indicative of a shift induced by perceived biased in the 
international criminal justice framework, and it seems regional efforts to address gross human 
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Considering the now stale relationship between the AU and the ICC, coupled with the 
formation of the ACJ an argument is made that concerns of the negative impact of this 
arrangement on the development of international criminal law are progressively becoming 
irrelevant. The reasoning behind this argument is thus, the ICC‘s manner of approach to 
international criminal justice is in itself symptomatic of an imbalance in international 
relations which is biased against a particular region. The caseload of the ICC being 
exclusively African does not give a true reflection of global affairs, it in fact gives the 
impression that there is nowhere else on the planet where the Rome Statute provisions find 
application save for the continent of Africa – a sentiment reminiscent of ‗unfortunate‘ 
western views about a dark Africa. Given the widely reported alleged atrocities by western 
militaries in conflict areas such Syria and Iraq, the question of international law being truly 
international arises. While much is made of the AU‘s (and Member States) decision to 
maintain a non-cooperative relationship with the ICC, it is important to bear in thought that 
African states played a crucial role in setting up the contemporary international criminal law 
framework and the ICC and bringing it to fruition. It is thus questionable whether any 
regional bloc or member thereof would subject itself to an international court which 
demonstrably is biased against members of that particular region, notwithstanding its stated 
international scope. Further, an argument is made that a regional criminal court is not 
necessarily a bad approach, not in the least for Africa. This not only takes care of the 
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―perceived bias‖ problem, but it also serves to illustrate the African commitment to observe 
international human rights norms and develop international criminal law. This is not to say 
that there is a brand of justice that only an African Court can mete out, however there is 
something to be said about fairness when one is judged by a peer approved court as opposed 
to being subjected to a court that has international scope but chooses to indict leaders of 
African origin.  
 
In so far as piracy is concerned, the ACJ is the first regional/international tribunal with the 
jurisdiction to hear piracy cases. There have been suggestions at UN level, one of which 
included setting up a piracy court within the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in 
Arusha Tanzania.
521
 As cited earlier, the definition of piracy in the ACJ statute is 
substantively similar to the UNCLOS – only the use of a few terms differs but in terms of 
substance the provisions are virtually identical. This can be looked at from two opposite 
vantage points. Firstly, this can be seen as an opportunity for the ACJ (an international 
tribunal) to develop international jurisprudence which will inform future prosecutions of 
piracy under UNCLOS inspired provisions. As an international court it will have the power to 
not only interpret but to also develop the law and shed clarity where there are doubts. Thus 
far, there is no consensus as to the scope, content, and meaning of the crime of piracy – and 
as discussed in Chapter III there are conflicting national views on this issue. Secondly, this 
can conversely be looked at as a missed opportunity to develop international criminal law on 
piracy by a region within which piracy is rife and yet in close proximity with some of the 
most important international shipping lanes. Africa has enough experience with modern day 
piracy to have a fundamentally meaningful multilateral exchange on what constitutes piracy 
today, what may constitute piracy in the future given technological advances such as aerial 
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drones, and how international law can be developed to effectively prosecute piracy. 
Currently, the definition of piracy as provided in the UNCLOS and ACJ Statute is at best a 
reflection of archaic ideas that inform that definition. Nonetheless, the Malabo Protocol is a 
significant development for both piracy and international criminal law in general. 
 
5 5 Emergence of Hybrid Criminal Courts 
 
Contemporary evolution of international criminal law has also occasioned the emergence of 
the idea of hybrid criminal courts. The nature, mandate, and jurisdictional scope of such 
courts justify the descriptive title ―hybrid‖. The idea behind special hybrid criminal courts is 
that there is established a national tribunal with jurisdiction to hear international crimes and 
whose make up comprises international jurists and judicial officers.
522
 Thus it is hybrid in 
that it is not established under a regional or multilateral arrangement and yet it bears all the 
salient hallmarks of an international tribunal. As international criminal law has evolved since 
the days of Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals, its evolution has not been without challenges – 
some of which are yet to be resolved. While the ICC is in principle a symbolic progression 
towards the legitimacy on international criminal justice, it too has been subject to much 
criticism for its failure and in particular how it has pursued a course which saw its caseload 
having African leaders as accused whereas international atrocities can be described as having 
a diverse pool of perpetrators. Hybrid courts represent an alternative to ICC proceedings 
without compromising justice for both the victims and the accused. 
 
The Central African Republic is the latest state in the context of Africa to implement a hybrid 
court which will look into international crimes and atrocities carried out in that country from 
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  In August 2015 the Inter-governmental Authority on Development concluded the 
Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan. In Chapter V 
the said Agreement provides for the establishment of a hybrid court for South Sudan.
524
 In the 
wider international context, the United Nations Human Rights Council has recommended the 
establishment of a hybrid court in Sri Lanka. The Council‘s report recommends that: 
 
―In these circumstances, OISL believes that for an accountability mechanism to succeed in 
Sri Lanka, it will require more than a domestic mechanism. Sri Lanka should draw on the 
lessons learnt and good practices of other countries that have succeeded with hybrid special 
courts, integrating international judges, prosecutors, lawyers and investigators, that will be 
essential to give confidence to all Sri Lankans, in particular the victims, in the independence 
and impartiality of the process, particularly given the politicisation and highly polarised 




Hybrid courts present an alternative (or a complement) to traditional international tribunals 
the basis of which lies in multilateral agreements. However, they have been criticised as 
posing an existential threat to fully fledged international tribunals by undermining and 
avoiding their jurisdiction over international crimes.
526
 Given the current regional tensions 
with the ICC, it may be argued that hybrid courts may well be the best available option to end 
impunity for offenders and render justice for victims of international crimes.  
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As regards piracy, it is doubtful whether a specialised hybrid court would be suitable for 
purposes of prosecuting piracy. From available literature, hybrid courts are generally 
established in response to a state‘s internal atrocities amounting to international crimes and 
violations of human rights.
527
 Thus it seems that the scope and focus of specialised hybrid 
courts are limited to crimes that occurred within the State for which such court is set up. 
There has been a recommendation at UN level that a specialised anti-piracy tribunal would be 
an appropriate response to the lack of piracy prosecution especially in Somalia where it is 
reported  
that much of piracy in the Gulf of Aden can be traced back to.
528
 Further there rises a 
question as to whether this is a desirable tone to set given that the world‘s oceans are 
expansive and piracy occurs in other parts of the world, and in fact can (at least in theory) be 
committed anywhere. It therefore follows that unlike international crimes such as genocide 
and crimes against humanity which have political undertones and are therefore likely to be 
localised, piracy is a regional problem the responsibility of which must be shared. In any 
event, the recommendation by the UN was never implemented. It is submitted that a 
permanent regionally sanctioned tribunal as envisaged in the Malabo Protocol is preferred. 
 
5 6 Regional Policy on Piracy as an International Crime 
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In 2002 the African Union established the Peace and Security Council within the Union 
(―AUSC‖).
529
Its mandate is stated as being ―a collective security and early-warning 
arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient response to conflict and crisis situations in 
Africa.‖
530
 Thus, this is an organ of the AU to which the region looks for direction as regards 
crisis situations requiring a collective response by Member States. One of the objectives of 
the AUSC is to engage in the promotion of stability and security in the African region.
531
 
This was a positive development when compared to the erstwhile Organisation of African 
Unity (―OAU‖) which subscribed to an absolutist approach to sovereignty and non-
interference. Given the recent history of Africa as regards civil wars, terrorism, and other 
events which threatened the stability of the Region, the AUSC has been seized with a 
multiplicity of issues including dealing with the Lord‘s Resistance Army in East Africa, Boko 
Haram in West Africa, the Sudan Crisis, and many others. Piracy, which has seriously posed 
a menace to stability and security in Africa and adjacent oceans would be assumed a priority 
issue for the AU organ, however it has not been afforded adequate attention as a crime.There 
is hardly any communication or publication by the AUSC pertaining to either a clear strategy 
or policy on how the piracy problem in the region would be confronted.Piracy, it seems, 
suffers the disservice of being seen as a consequence of a bigger localised problem. The 
AUSC has made the following submission in relation to piracy: 
 
―While expressing appreciation for the efforts being exerted to address this problem, Council 
urges that the zeal and mobilization displayed by the international community in the fight 
against piracy and armed robbery at sea also apply to efforts required in order to bring to an 
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end the violence and suffering being witnessed on main land by Somalia. Council stresses that 
any lasting solution to the problem of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of 





Thus the view of the AUSC is not that piracy is a crime that must be met with a bespoke 
strategy, but it is of the view that underlying problems are responsible for the rise in piracy 
incidents and must therefore be resolved to eradicate piracy.
533
 This approach is criticised for 
the reason that while it is accurate that root causes of criminal activity may be traced, that is 
not to say crime cannot be met with a strategy to suppress and eradicate. Piracy is a security 
issue the effects of which are felt well beyond the East African region. It therefore must be 
addressed as a threat as opposed to an unintended consequence of a bigger problem. The 
issues that plague Somalia have persisted for decades, and it is impossible to say how long it 
will take until Somalia has a unified stable national government. It is for this reason that the 
confrontation of piracy cannot be pegged onto the resolution of the situation in Somalia. 
Further, piracy is not solely an East African problem. West Africa is also dealing with a rise 
in piratical activity, and while the coastal States have their problems, they are stable relative 
to Somalia. Other regional security bodies such as the Arab Peace and Security Council have 
recognised the importance of addressing piracy as a security issue independent of the issues 
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The rise in piracy incidents off the West African coast has also suffered the 
disservice of a somewhat similar approach which basically makes the proposition that piracy 
in the Gulf of Guinea is largely ‗petro-piracy.‘
535
 This view paints a picture of piracy in West 
African waters being primarily concerned with oil theft as a lucrative criminal enterprise, 
sometimes bordering on categorising oil as a sine qua non to piracy in the Gulf of Guinea.
536
 
Dr Otto after analysing the data on piracy occurrences in West Africa between 2009 and 
2013, concluded that only 2% of the reported piracy incidents fell under the scope of petro-
piracy.
537
It is therefore simplistic to adopt an approach whose premise is that piracy is a 
crime that can be resolved by addressing other issues, of course it may help to do so but 
piracy as a crime can be confronted with a dedicated strategy and a strong legal framework 
separate from issues which may be identified as root causes of piracy.  
 
5 7 Role of the National and International Courts in Developing the Scope and Content 
of International Crimes 
 
The gist of this research is determining the scope and content of the crime of piracy, and this 
of course is done with reference to commentary and literature on the subject of piracy and the 
                                                             
534 See United Nations Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council 
Resolution 1846 (2008), 16
th
 March 2009, Para 9 provides that ―The League of Arab States held an 
extraordinary session of the Arab Peace and Security Council in Cairo on 4 November 2008, to examine the 
issue of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia. The meeting issued a number of 
recommendations, condemned all instances of piracy and armed robbery at sea, called for closer cooperation 
with the Government of Somalia, and consultation, coordination and information exchange between Arab States 
and the relevant organizations and specialized agencies, including the Arab Sea Ports Federation, the 
International Maritime Organization, the United Nations and the African Union‖ 
535L Otto ―Maritime Security in the Gulf of Guinea: Establishing Law, Generating Order‖ (2016) SAIIA Pol. 
Brief.1 2. 
536For a general overview of the links between piracy and oil in West Africa see M Murphy, ―Petro-Piracy: Oil 
and Troubled Waters.‖(2013) 57 424-437. 




law of the sea. Much is made of the vagueness of the definition and the concomitant elements 
of the crime, and it thus raises the question as to how international criminal law has evolved 
as regards the ability of judges to develop international criminal law at the bench and the 
ability of States to legislate in deviation of the international law definitions of international 
crimes. This analysis becomes particularly relevant when considered against the 
developments pertaining to the Malabo Protocol and the introduction of the Criminal 
Chamber of the African Court. As stated, the Malabo Protocol committed to the UNCLOS 
piracy provisions notwithstanding the plethora of literature exposing the shortcomings of that 
definition. This raises the question whether definitions of international crimes as provided for 
in international instruments are so rigid as to not allow States (and regional bodies) to deviate 
therefrom.  
 
There are a number of international conventions and treaties which provide for definitions 
and substantive meaning of international crimes, and when States ratify and domesticate 
international conventions, they can customise the laws to meet their unique and specific 
needs. In many States including South Africa, there are constitutional considerations and 
definitions of crimes must be tested against the principle of legality before they are made law. 
The national courts are then charged with the responsibility to interpret and apply the law. 
These considerations however pertain to the ‗national side‘ of things, but they do have 
implications on the international aspect which in effect is the international community‘s 
interest that ultimately international crimes as defined in conventions and treaties must have a 
common meaning to all.  
 
5 7 1 International Crime Interpretation and Development of International Criminal Law 





This very issue was considered in the European Court of Human Rights (―ECHR‖) in the 
Jorgic case.
538
 Mr Nicola Jorgic was charged with and convicted of Genocide in Germany. 
He appealed his conviction at the ECHR where he argued inter alia that his conviction was in 
breach of article 7 (1) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms
539
 (―Convention‖) because the German courts adopted a wide 
interpretation of the crime of genocide in violation of Germany‘s own laws and public 
international law. Article 7 (1) of the Convention stipulates as follows: 
 
―No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which 
did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it 
was committed.‖ 
 
The accused was charged under the German Criminal Code which provides as follows: 
 
―Whoever, acting with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, racial, religious or 
ethnical group as such, (1) kills members of the group, (2) causes serious bodily or mental 
harm to members of the group, (3) places the group in living conditions capable of bringing 
about their physical destruction in whole or in part, (4) imposes measures which are intended 
to prevent births within the group, (5) forcibly transfers children of the group into another 
group, shall be punished with life imprisonment‖  
 
The appellant argued that a mere attack on the living conditions or the basis of subsistence of 
a group did not meet the standard of the term ―destroy‖ and therefore did not constitute 
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destruction of the group itself.
540
 Further, he argued that the ―ethnic cleansing‖ by Bosnian 
Serbs against Muslims in the Doboj region was done with the sole intent to expel that group 
from the region, but it was not done to destroy the very existence of Muslims. The appellant 
also made the argument that the German court had erred in its interpretation of the phrase 
―intent to destroy‖ in that it did so contrary to the interpretation of Article II of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (―Genocide 
Convention‖), and diverging from established doctrine in international law which states that 
genocide is said to happen where extermination, murder, and deportation are means to 
physically and/or biologically destroy a narrowly defined group.
541
 It for the aforesaid 
reasons that the appellant argued that he could not have foreseen that his actions would be 
construed by a court to satisfy the crime of genocide – essentially stating that the German 
courts‘ interpretation of genocide is so wide as to violate Article 7 of the Convention. 
 
The ECHR primed its findings on the reasoning that even the best drafted legal provisions are 
subject to judicial interpretation and adaptation to meet contemporary circumstances.
542
 In 
unpacking the meaning of Article 7 of the Convention, the ECHR held that the principle in 
the provision is that the law must be clear so that legal subjects know which actions will 
attract criminal liability. As regards the rationale of Article 7, the court held as follows: 
 
―Article 7 of the Convention cannot be read as outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules 
of criminal liability through judicial interpretation from case to case, provided that the 
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The court considered the substantive elements of genocide and held as follows: 
 
―The national courts‘ interpretation of the crime of genocide could reasonably be regarded as 
consistent with the essence of that offence and could reasonably be foreseen by the applicant 
at the material time. These requirements being met, it was for the German courts to decide 
which interpretation of the crime of genocide under domestic law the wished to adopt. 
Accordingly, the applicant‘s conviction for genocide was not in breach of Article 7 (1) of the 
Convention‖ 
 
The ECHR in Jorgic formulated a standard which guides as to the leeway that national courts 
have in interpreting the scope and content of international crimes. The court‘s tone suggests 
that definitions of international crimes are to be construed as principles rather than rules so as 
to allow national courts to approach interpretation that prioritises substance over form. What 
should be central to a court‘s interpretation, according to the ECHR, is that the essence of the 
crime should be aligned to whatever construction the court settles for. Therefore, it is not so 
much that a national court is allowed to deviate from international law, but rather that a court 
may when appropriate pursue an interpretation that develops the understanding of 
international crimes without compromising the essence of the actions that are criminalised. 
The ECHR also highlights the foreseeability element and attaches an objective test of 
reasonableness to it. From the language used by the courts, it seems that foreseeability 
pertains to criminal liability as opposed to foreseeing that certain acts will amount to a 
specific crime. Thus the accused must have the sense that his actions will attract criminal 
                                                             




sanctions, or put differently that he should be aware that his actions are criminal and 
punishable by law. 
 
Heeding the guidance of the ECHR and applying it to the UNCLOS in the South African 
context, it is submitted that the courts would have difficulties in attaining a conviction even 
with the latitude to develop the understanding of the international crime of piracy. The 
vagueness that plagues the UNCLOS piracy provisions render it difficult to determine the 
essence of the crime without disregarding some of its definitional elements. The high seas 
requirement is particularly problematic to the inquiry into the essence of the crime, because 
identical piratical conduct is judged differently depending on where it happened – unlike 
other international crimes which are concerned with the substance of the conduct and not so 
much where it took place.
544
 A practical consideration linked to the high seas requirement is 
whether piratical activity occurring within territorial borders has the same effect as piracy 
which occurs only on the high seas. It clearly does as it compromises maritime security not 
only in the locale of the coastal State but beyond it. Without concise elements, it is difficult to 
establish the scope and content of the crime – and so a court would be hard pressed to carve 
out a defensible essence of the crime of piracy. 
 
5 7 2 Law Development by International Tribunals 
 
International tribunals form part of the framework upon which international criminal law and 
justice develops, and necessarily so. These institutions, be it permanent or ad hoc are created 
by statute which also lays down their mandate, have, through their decisions, an impact on 
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field of international criminal law. The international criminal law regime complex is, like 
many other frameworks, not perfect and thus subject to critique from a variety of 
stakeholders including victims, accused, and commentators. With international tribunals at 
the centre of competing interests, the development of international criminal law in pursuit of 
justice must be understood in the context of the attendant pressures and constraints. In recent 
history there are two decisions of particular importance as regards the construction of 
international crimes which are also imperfectly defined, and perhaps impossible to define 
perfectly. These decisions are discussed with a view to gauge whether the latitude to develop 
the law can be a tool suited to resolving the issues that plague piracy. While it is trite that 
courts and international tribunals are adjudicative bodies and are thus not tasked with the 
mandate to make law, the parameters within which tribunals must venture in interpretation 
are not defined thus there is in reality a thin line between a court embarking on a course of 
progressive developing the law and judicial law making.  
 
In Prosecutor v Sam Hinga Norman
545
the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone was seized with deciding whether the recruitment of children into armed forces was a 
war crime under customary international law at the time that the accused is alleged to have 
engaged in conduct amounting to child recruitment. The appellant further argued that even 
though the Geneva Conventions created an obligation on the part of States to refrain from 
recruiting children into armed forces, the international instruments did not criminalise such 
conduct. The prosecution argued that the crime of child recruitment was part of customary 
international law in 1996 when the accused engaged in recruitment of children in armed 
forces. Further, the prosecution relied on the Tadic
546
case to argue that individual criminal 
responsibility can exist notwithstanding lack of treaty provisions specifically referring to 
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criminal liability. The court having considered a variety of subject matter sources and the test 
for criminal liability for violations of customary international law as espoused in Tadic
547
 it 
held as follows:  
 
―A norm need not be expressly stated in an international convention for it to crystallize as a 
crime under customary international law. What, indeed, would be the meaning of a customary 
rule if it only became applicable upon its incorporation into an international instrument such 
as the Rome Treaty? Furthermore, it is not necessary for the individual criminal responsibility 
of the accused to be explicitly stated in a convention for the provisions of the convention to 




This excerpt of course is borne from a deep context, but it does sum up the foundational 
thinking behind the Appeal Chamber‘s approach. This approach to the question of criminal 
liability was revolutionary in that conduct can be found to have been international customary 
law and criminal notwithstanding that there was inadequate authority as concerning the latter. 
Judge Robertson in his dissenting opinion raised some of the traditional issues that must be 
heeded before a norm is said to have crystallised into custom and before criminality can be 
attributed to such conduct. These include ―factors such as Security Council resolutions stating 
that individuals will be held criminally responsible; to the existence of specific criminal laws 
and the decisions of criminal courts; to statements by warring parties accepting the 
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prohibition; to ‗the behaviour of belligerent states and governments and insurgents‘, and to 
General Assembly and European Union statements assuming criminality; to legal 
interpretations published by the international committee of the Red Cross and so forth. Such a 





Judge Robertson summed up his findings thus: 
 
―So what had emerged, in customary international law, by the end of 1996 was an 
humanitarian rule that obliged states, and armed factions within states, to avoid enlisting 
under fifteens or involving them in hostilities, whether arising from international or internal 
conflict. What had not, however, evolved was an offence cognizable by international criminal 
law which permitted the trial and punishment of individuals accused of enlisting (i.e. 
accepting for military service) volunteers under the age of fifteen. It may be that in some 
states this would have constituted an offence against national law, but this fact cannot be 
determinative of the existence of an international law crime: theft, for example, is unlawful in 




When the majority decision is read against the dissenting judgement, the activism becomes 
clear. The very fact that the traditional factors indicative of international consensus as to the 
criminality of conduct was lacking and yet the court decided that these factors (or absence 
thereof) were immaterial as regards criminality is in itself activist. The court‘s approach 
amounted to a creation of an international crime and the manufacturing of a basis upon which 
to prosecute the accused. This case was followed by other decisions by international tribunals 
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which adopted a similar approach to interpretation of the scope, content, and meaning of 
international crimes.  
 
In Prosecutor v Ntaganda
551
 the accused appealed a decision of the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber 
where the one of the disputed matters was whether crimes committed by members of armed 
forces on members of such armed force fall within the scope of international humanitarian 
law or international criminal law and therefore the jurisdiction of the ICC the International 
Criminal Court. The Pre-Trial Chamber held that it had jurisdiction to hear the matter 
because members of the same armed force are not per se excluded as potential victims of war 
crimes as listed in the Rome Statute provisions or on the basis of international humanitarian 
law and international law.
552
 Pertinent in the arguments made by the accused is the 
submission that the issues arising concern the existence of a crime in respect of an entire 
category of circumstances. On appeal, held as follows: 
 
―If customary or conventional international law stipulates, in respect of a given war crime, an 
additional element of that crime, the Court cannot be precluded from applying it to ensure 
consistency of the provision with international humanitarian law, irrespective of whether this 
requires ascribing to a term in the provision a particular interpretation or reading an 
additional element into it. This does not violate the principle of legality recognised in article 
22 of the Statute, which protects accused persons against a broad interpretation of the 
elements of the crimes or their extension by analogy; therefore, it does not impede the 
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Even in the most conservative of descriptive language, the ICC‘s approach to the question as 
to relationship and range of influence between codified criminal definitions in its statutes and 
customary international law can at the very least be described as judicial activism. To say that 
the ICC ventured into the realm of law making would not be a preposterous observation as 
well. The court‘s reasoning deviated from ―trite law‖ to formulate a new law that violence 
between members of an identical armed force constitutes an international crime, and it did so 
by reading an additional element to a crime which was designed to protect civilians as 
opposed to co-combatants. As regards international humanitarian law vis-à-vis co-combatants 
in an armed force, the Special Court for Sierra Leone held as follows: 
 
―It is trite law that an armed group cannot hold its own members as prisoners of war. The law 
of international armed conflict was never intended to criminalise acts of violence committed 
by one member against another, such conduct remaining first and foremost in the province of 
the criminal law of the State of the armed group concerned and human right law. In our view, 
a different approach would constitute an appropriate reconceptualisation of a fundamental 





What the Special Court for Sierra Leone was not prepared to do did not inform the ICC‘s 
approach to interpretation of a legal question on an identical war crime. The activist approach 
of the ICC appears to be informed by moral considerations rather than positivist theory. The 
principle of international humanitarian law was in fact developed by the ICC‘s decision in 
Prosecutor v Ntaganda to incorporate the protection of members of an armed force against 
violence by members of the same armed group – and it does this by making it a war crime. 
The idea that members of an armed force qualify as ‗protected persons‘ in an armed conflict 
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does in fact require a shift in thought as to the rationale of international humanitarian law and 
the scope thereof. The decision of the ICC went beyond establishing the existence of the 
crime in question but ventured into creating it. 
 
Against the discussions above, this is the international criminal law jurisprudence that has 
developed from both a national court and an international tribunal perspective. International 
law is continually developed and there seems to be a judicial movement that employs the 
developing of law such that it borders on judicial law making.  
5 8 Concluding Remarks 
 
The problems associated with the prosecution of maritime pirates has long been an issue for 
individual states and regional blocs alike. Developments at international level illustrate the 
recognition by the international community of the shortcomings of the current framework, 
and perhaps also demonstrates a desire to cure such shortcomings. Unfortunately, efforts 
adopted thus far are either inadequate or still appeal to the piracy definition of old which is 
vague and thus open to varied manner of construction. For instance, the SUA Convention is 
not a piracy prosecution instrument, but it only covers activity best described as piratical in 
nature. The UNSC Resolutions fall short of a solution as well, and their undoing can be 
summed up into two theories. Firstly, UNSC Resolutions encourage UN Member (maritime) 
States to implement the current flawed framework to address maritime piracy. The main 
problem with this is that the uncertainty that plagues the UNCLOS trickles down to national 
courts and thus runs the risk of vitiating against the principle of legality and the rule of law in 
modern democracies. Perhaps the question which must be borne in mind is whether sound 
prosecution which passes constitutional muster can be expected from domesticating the 




resolutions focus primarily on military intervention and the stabilization of Somalia which is 
believed to be one of the root causes of piracy off the coast of Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. 
It is submitted that the militarization of the high seas is not a sustainable resolution to the 
piracy problem, it is very costly and therefore unsustainable. One might suggest that this is a 
solution that is temporarily viable only to maritime states with strong militaries and the 
financial power to sustain operations which involve policing and arresting Pirates on the high 
seas – however over time this may be burdensome to even the most militarily advanced 
states. The ACJ in principle provides an opportunity for the prosecution of piracy by an 
international tribunal. However, the ACJ Statute also uses the UNCLOS Piracy provisions so 
while it is a positive move to have an international tribunal, the legalities of prosecution of 
piracy remain. Having considered decisions of the ICC and other international tribunals, it 
may well be that the ACJ has the authority to develop the law pertaining to the international 
crime of piracy when it hears piracy cases. Similarly, and in consideration of the principle of 
complementarity, national courts also have leeway in developing international criminal law 
as was done by the German courts in Jorgic. These developments are a positive for the piracy 
course, but they do not negate the need to address the issues. In sum, regional and 
international developments in relation to piracy have generally remained faithful to the 
problematic UNCLOS provisions which in any event hold the status of customary 
international law. While attacks on international shipping lanes and on the high seas have 
since declined, it is important to note that ultimately those are the results of military 
campaigns run by individual states and clusters of states working in concert. There remains a 
vacuum in so far is the law is concerned. 
The focus of the next chapter is on recommendations to resolving the challenges in the 














CHAPTER VI: TOWARDS AN EFFECTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK TO 










6 1 Introduction 
 
The preceding chapters of this dissertation have constituted a commentary and critical 
analysis of the crime of contemporary piracy vis-à-vis the existing international and domestic 
legal and institutional framework. The aim has been to give comprehensive insight as to the 
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issues that render piracy prosecutions controversial when juxtaposed against constitutional 
imperatives. Considering the content of the discussions preceding this chapter, the issues that 
obtain can be classified under two broad themes, namely a flawed piracy regime and the 
absence of a regional or international tribunal to prosecute piracy. 
 
Piracy is of course an international crime par excellence and is subject to universal 
jurisdiction under customary international law which is codified in the UNCLOS piracy 
provisions. It continues to have a negative effect on the safety and security of regions wherein 
it occurs, which has led to some international responses essentially fashioned in military 
operations backed by the UNSC. This approach can best be described as a military-cum-
political approach in that it does not form part of lasting legal framework but nonetheless 
constitutes a lawful use of military force crafted by the international community as a reactive 
measure to secure the oceans and affected regions. This strategy is reminiscent of the 
approach adopted by ancient Athenians who put together anti-piracy fleets and 
fortifications.
555
 Shortcomings of military solutions to the piracy problem have already been 
discussed in previous chapters and will not be repeated here, but the point is made that such 
an approach is certainly not a blueprint for South Africa (or any other maritime state in the 
region) for there must be a sound legal approach accompanied by the necessary institutional 
setup which takes into account the need for complementarity. However, that is not to suggest 
that a military-cum-political approach is necessarily inimical to a legal approach – the 
approaches can sustain a synergetic existence.  
While the study has exposed the weaknesses of the status quo re piracy, it must be conceded 
that some of these concerns were highlighted from the early to mid-1980s when the 
UNCLOS was ratified and replaced the 1958 regime, and yet there still is no solution because 
                                                             




consensus is not an readily achievable feat. Since the 1980s to present there have been 
changes in the landscape of international criminal law, the crime of piracy itself has changed, 
and therefore the framework governing piracy cannot remain unchanged if it is to be an 
effective tool for the suppression of piracy. This chapter thus seeks to draw conclusions and 
make recommendations against the background of the discussion. 
 
6 2 Submissions as to the Definition of Piracy 
 
Against the discussions in previous chapters, it is concluded that the current definition of the 
crime of piracy on the high seas as provided for by the UNCLOS and domesticated in South 
Africa with a few changes by the Defence Act is vague as to content, meaning, and scope – 
therefore it offends international criminal law and constitutional imperatives such as the 
principle of legality. This definition was of course the result of an involved multilateral 
engagement by the international community, and as such it ought not to be simply discarded 
but viewed as a skeletal frame from which to develop a definition suited for contemporary 
piracy. In developing a definition, the caution by scholars in the Harvard Draft that ―continual 
amendment should be obviated by foresight as far as possible‖
556
 must be heeded and 
observed as the point is neither to create a new crime altogether nor rigidly closely channel 
the current definition which will soon be outdated and thus require further amendment.  
 
Piracy as a crime has in and of itself changed from the time the provisions of the UNCLOS 
were drafted to contemporary times. On the one hand sea travel, marine tourism, and world 
trade have evolved and intensified. On the other hand, technology such as geo positioning 
systems, speedboats, and automatic weaponry have influenced the manner in which piracy is 
                                                             




carried out. A much less considered dynamic in the fight against piracy is the impact the 
insurance and banking industries have had on the rising numbers of piracy incidents.  
  
6 2 1 Private Ends 
 
The first issue for discussion is the private ends requirement which is a vague concept the 
meaning and scope of which has been subject of creative conjecture at worst and deductive 
reasoning at best. Notwithstanding the uncertainty associated with this concept, it does have 
functional significance in that it at least gives us the general idea that private interests of 
perpetrators thereof inform that very nature of the crime. Given the nature of contemporary 
maritime piracy and the emergence of ocean borne activism, terrorism, and armed struggle 
activism it is difficult to say with legal certainty which motives would fall under the ambit of 
private or public ends, however that very distinction in a sense signals the need for a clearer 
definitive hallmark. It is submitted that given the overwhelming evidence that piracy is no 
longer associated with small-scale plunder but with the request of significant amounts of 
ransom as a condition of releasing the pirated vessel and crew to its owners, the amendment 
should entail abandoning the words ―private ends‖ for ―purpose of personal criminal 
economic gain‖. This clearly makes piracy an economic or financial crime and thereby makes 
the private ends debate moot, and further aids in differentiating piracy from terrorism and 
other maritime security concerns. Where piratical activity is accompanied by demand for 
economic consideration to the exclusion of all else then one of the elements of the crime of 
piracy would have been satisfied. This would also address legal questions as to maritime 
activism by organisations such as Greenpeace, who it is submitted are not pirates – at least 





There also is the question as to whether States still commission non-state actors to carry out 
piratical activity against enemy ships even during times of war. There is no record in modern 
academic literature or in the media of a piratical incident that was found to have been State 
sponsored, and while there has been commentary on the contemporary use of letters of 
marquee
557
 no government has actually issued one in recent history. It is highly unlikely that 
in the foreseeable future international geo-politics are likely to see the return of the letter of 
marque or letter of reprisal. This projection is based on current and past developments around 
how the world views terrorism and state sponsored terrorism – this is more pronounced when 
considered against the background of the 9/11 terror attacks on the US World Trade Centre. 
Another factor to consider as regards state sponsored terrorism is the application of the UN 
Charter and in particular Article 2 (4) which stipulates as follows: 
 
 ―All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations‖ 
 
From as early as 1970, the United Nations has linked this provision with the commission of 
state sponsored terrorism. The General Assembly made a declaration where it states that: 
 
―Every State has the duty to refrain from organising, instigating, assisting or 
participating in the acts of civil strife or terroristacts in another State or acquiescing 
in organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such 
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The letter of marque considered in light of this Declaration can be construed as a State 
organising or instigating terrorist acts against another State. Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter 
was also relied upon by the UN Security Council when it dealt with the Libya over the 
Lockerbie incident which saw terrorists detonate a bomb on Pan Am Flight 103 where all on 
board perished. The Security Council‘s resolution the matter reiterated the General 
Assembly‘s position regarding state sponsored terrorism.
559
 This position remains even when 
considered in the context of war and conflict. In decades past, the international community 
has through international instruments regulated methods in which States can engage in armed 
warfare. The Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War (―IV Geneva Convention‖)
560
 provides that: 
 
―No protected person may be punished for an offence he or she has not personally 
committed. Collective penalties and likewise all measures of intimidation or of 





While letters of marque were, amongst other things, a tool in the arsenal of States in times of 
war they are now effectively outlawed as a method of war.
562
 The IVth Geneva Convention 
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makes it unequivocal that reprisals against civilians and their property is prohibited as a 
method of warring with an enemy State. 
 
In contemporary maritime piracy the private ends requirement is obsolete, and it is 
recommended that it be abandoned. It is a requirement that serves no purpose when 
considered against the discussion above. While naval States may have sanctioned private 
individuals to carry out piratical activity in medieval times, there is no report of this practice 
in modern international law – and given the current framework there will not be any. Further, 
even from an interpretation point of view the discussion as to whether this requirement covers 
piratical activity motivated by politically held views is now moot – given the international 
instruments and municipal laws on terrorism. It is submitted that even activism activity by 
organisations such as Greenpeace falls under the purview of terrorist activity notwithstanding 
that they are largely fashioned on noble pursuits. It is further submitted that Piracy as a crime 
should be limited to ship hijacking for the purposes of demanding a ransom for release – this 
would be a clear and definite requirement as opposed to private ends which is a vague and 
irrelevant concept. 
 
6 2 2 Two Ships 
 
The two ships requirement is also criticised as a handicap in the current framework in that 
mutinies are not covered, this lends the piracy framework to limited application which could 
result in either impunity or prosecution for crimes analogous to piracy, and potentially 
unintended consequences such as adaptation of modus operandi by pirates. For instance, if a 
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band of stowaways arose mid-voyage outside the territorial waters of any state and took the 
vessel by force and demanded a ransom the two ships requirement would not be met and thus 
they could not be tried as pirates notwithstanding that their criminal intention was to commit 
piracy. In the case of mutinies, the law of the vessel‘s flag State applies – but if a mutiny 
went beyond internal revolt and amounted to piracy surely that threat to maritime security 
becomes a concern to the international community.  
 
A case in point is the El Hiblu hijacking (disregarding that it happened on territorial waters) 
where there was not another ship but persons who were already aboard the ship violently 
assumed control of it. The two-ship requirement in effect provides a defence to a piracy 
charge, and one would be hard pressed to articulate a logical rationale as to substantive 
difference of a stowaway or crew member from an accused who boarded the vessel from 
another vessel when in fact, they exercised identical mens rea. If indeed this defence 
succeeded pirates would be inclined to adapt their criminal activity so as to minimise 
exposure to harsh sanctions under the piracy regimes. While the Geneva Convention of 1958 
trauvaux preparatoires are supportive of a two ships requirement,
563
 it is submitted that a 
progressive piracy regime ought to be comprehensive. After the Achille Lauro incident and 
the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Centre, it is not implausible that an elaborate scheme to 
board a vessel ostensibly as legitimate passengers only to illegally rise up and assume control 
of that vessel mid-voyage can be carried out successfully. The question becomes whether the 
perpetrators of the aforesaid crimes would have been classified as terrorists if they had 
demanded a ransom from the owners of the vessels they hijacked.  
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Piracy must also not be viewed with an archaic eye which ignores the possibility that pirates 
are in fact criminals whose ways will evolve with the progression of time. Given the fast pace 
at which technology advances coupled with the fact that pirates are reported to use 
technology and electronic gadgetry, the two-ship requirement may soon become irrelevant 
and out of touch with modern methods of hijacking ocean borne vessels. Technologies such 
as unmanned aerial vehicles which make it possible to stage an attack remotely may well be 
used by pirates in the future, and when they are, the two ships requirement will once again be 
under scrutiny because an unmanned aerial vehicle cannot reasonably be said to be a ship or 




6 2 3 High Seas 
 
The high seas requirement is a distinguishing feature between piratical activity which occurs 
in territorial waters of a state and that which occurs on the high seas. The distinction is so 
pronounced that even in instruments such as the Jeddah Amendment to the Djibouti Code are 
This requirement is criticised as a superficial differentiation, the consequences of which 
precludes illegal activity in territorial waters from prosecution as piracy under international 
criminal law. However, the UNCLOS provides that only government vessels may effect 
arrest and seizure of pirates and pirate ships,
564
 further the right of hot pursuit does not apply 
to instances where pursuit commences from the high seas onto territorial waters (colloquially 
known as reverse hot-pursuit).
565
 Thus, while the UNCLOS piracy provisions make piracy a 
high seas crime, the exercise of investigative jurisdiction is also confined to the high seas. 
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This has led to adhoc political solutions such as Security Council Resolution 1816 which was 
adequate for the reason that such an approach was necessary given that piratical activity on 
territorial waters threatened regional or international maritime peace and security – as is the 
case with territorial waters off the coast of Somalia. This approach is favoured over a purely 
legal approach because it can be customised to suit the particular context for which it is 
formulated, so for instance with Somalia the Resolution only allowed particular states to enter 
Somali waters for purposes of suppression of piracy and this allowance was time bound. This 





That said, the high seas requirement is useful only on account of the protection of the 
territorial rights that coastal States ought to enjoy – even so, it is not the foundational 
provision for territorial protection as this is provided for in Article 111 of the UNCLOS. 
There is no solid indication that classical piracy made a distinction between high seas and 
territorial waters when dealing with piracy. The focus was on substance over form. Moreover, 
if as legal scholars we are to present doctrinal arguments that piracy is an international crime 
par excellence, then it should present as other international crimes do – that is to say 
whenever conduct occurs and it bears the hallmarks of piracy then it should be treated as such 
notwithstanding the geographic location where it happens. Piracy does not stop being a 
menace to maritime security when it occurs in the territorial waters of a coastal state, and the 
effects thereof are not trivialised by the fact that it occurred in territorial waters. When a 
vessel is hijacked and held for ransom in territorial waters the effects thereof have an impact 
on the marine economy as a whole – which is not restricted by territorial borders. Of 
importance to note is that the submission does not advocate for the coastal state surrendering 
                                                             




its jurisdiction over territorial waters, but rather that coastal states should try piratical acts on 
territorial waters as an international crime – as they would try piracy occurring on the high 
seas. This will allow for a comprehensive approach to piracy by concentrating on the 
substantive essence of the crime. There is no notable reason that justifies the high seas 
requirement, not in the least if an argument is made that piracy is an international crime and 
its impact on global maritime security is pronounced. All of piracy is an attack on maritime 
security interests. 
 
It is submitted that the high seas requirement militates against a comprehensive global 
approach and therefore should be abandoned so as to align the substantive scope and content 
of piracy with contemporary piracy. All of piracy should be prosecuted as an international 
crime by national and international tribunals. 
6 3 Submissions as to Institutional Framework for Piracy Prosecution 
 
The numerous challenges associated with piracy prosecution have been discussed at length, 
and though these challenges are as old as the UNCLOS piracy provisions there has not been 
an  international tribunal with competence or mandate to hear piracy cases until recently – 
this had been left to national courts and as a result the law governing piracy has remained 
static even with the issues obtaining. The most recent and welcome development on this front 
is the Malabo Protocol which creates a regional criminal court for Africa with jurisdiction to 
hear a host of international crimes including piracy. The establishment of a regional criminal 
court has some far-reaching consequences for the international criminal law landscape, the 
most prominent being the relationship between the ICC, African states, and the regional 
court. However, in so far as piracy is concerned this is a positive step as it provides an 





This research has shown that the prosecution of piracy at national level has been a challenge 
for many states, it is thus submitted that a regional/international approach is favoured taking 
into account the need for complementarity. A regional tribunal would be able to address 
many of the hurdles that individual states face when confronted with the piracy prosecution 
problem such as securing the attendance of witnesses and lack of resources to sustain 
maritime prosecutions. Thus, when a Member State is unable or otherwise unwilling to 
prosecute, the regional court will ensure that impunity is not perpetuated.  That said, from a 
regional security perspective it is important that the Peace and Security Council of the 
African Union plays a more prominent role in formulating policy and issuing directives 
which are geared at addressing piracy as an international crime as opposed to treating it as an 
unintended consequence of the fragility of one country in the region. As has been discussed, 
piracy is also occurring off the West African coast too under the watch of governments 
considered to be functional. 
 
In so far as South African is concerned, there are two available avenues to remedy the 
shortcomings of the Defence Act. Firstly, it is submitted that the Defence Act piracy 
provisions must be repealed, and a new anti-piracy statute be enacted as has been done with 
other international crimes such terrorism, human trafficking, and torture. When one considers 
different South African legislation domesticating international crimes, and in particular 
jurisdiction provisions thereto, the common thread is that extraterritorial application of the 
law is expressly provided for – leaving no doubt that the proscribed conduct is subject to 
universal jurisdiction and thus a suspect who enters into the territory of South Africa can be 
detained and tried in South Africa notwithstanding the lack of a traditional nexus to establish 




subject to universal jurisdiction. Thus, it is submitted that the piracy provisions in the 
Defence Act ought to be repealedin favour of a dedicated piracy statute which will be aligned 
with the prevailing international crimes framework in South Africa. Secondly (and 
alternatively), the Defence Act piracy provisions can be piracy provisions could be included 
in the International Crimes Bill as one of the crimes governed by the proposed statute. The 
former recommendation is favoured over the latter for the reason that the International 
Crimes Bill as an ICC withdrawal effort by South Africa has a negative impact on South 
Africa‘s approach to international criminal justice, and from a policy point of view it sets a 
bad precedent which undermines much of the regional leadership efforts that have defined 
South Africa as a regional leader and champion of international criminal law. Moreover, the 
International Crimes Bill much like the ICC Act is focused only on core international crimes, 
thus piracy is not suited to the general scheme and scope of the Bill.The general 
recommendation therefore is that a new legal framework is needed to make provision for the 
definition of piracy, universal jurisdiction, and the enforcement of the anti-piracy measures.  
 
As regards the substantive meaning, scope, and content of the crime of piracy it is 
recommended that a new definition be adopted inthe new piracy law in South Africa. This 
definition will retain piracy‘s international crime status but make provision for clear and 
concise elements of the crime. A working definition tendered is as follows: 
 
Piracy means the direct or indirect unlawful assumption of control and seizure of a 
maritime vessel on all parts of the sea including territorial waters and the exclusive 
economic zone, with the intent toeither demand a form of financial consideration from 
the vessel owners as a condition precedent for the release of the vessel and its crew or 





It is submitted that this definition is progressive without compromising on the essential 
elements which have been the mainstay of piracy from classical ages to contemporary times 
transcending geographic location, culture, and race. Piracy is therefore a universal concept 
like other international crimes, and so with the proposed definition South African law would 
find relevance regardless where and by whom piratical acts were committed.  
 
6 4 Concluding Remarks 
 
The crime of piracy predates the recognition of international criminal law as a recognised 
body of enforceable law that could hold individuals accountable and assign criminal 
responsibility. However, even before the international community could convene to create 
international institutions to drive the international criminal justice program, piracy was 
already recognised by naval nations that piracy in the world‘s oceans created a common 
enemy. In the early ages they were referred to as enemies of all mankind, sailing under no 
flag, and not protected by the laws of any state. This was perhaps a befitting description of 
pirates as the concept of an international criminal would not have been developed at the time. 
So they were outlawed and in medieval England they were summarily executed if convicted. 
During time of war, pirates were commissioned by letter of marque and reprisal to attack and 
plunder ships sailing under the flag of enemy states. During times of peace, pirates would in 
any event attack and loot any vessel indiscriminately for personal gain. Then there was a time 
when piracy was thought to have disappeared and was not a matter of international concern, 
only for it to re-emerge and as global affairs started to be addressed under the umbrella of 
multilateral organisations such as the League of Nations and the United Nations after the 




was the UNCLOS which crystallised customary international law. Today pirates are no 
longer considered enemies of mankind; they are criminals carrying on an enterprise that 
affects maritime security the same when it did in historical times. Given the prevalence of 
piracy attacks in West and East Africa, the menace to global marine travel and international 
trade invoked the attention of the world‘s superpowers, and the response was pragmatic – 
military resources were mobilised and there has been a drop in attacks particularly in the Gulf 
of Aden and off the coast of Somalia since the intervention of the EU and countries in North 
America and Scandinavia. While a military approach was effective, there has not been an 
effective legal approach to addressing piracy. A legal approach is necessary because it would 
underscore national approaches to prosecuting pirates. Furthermore, military intervention is 
very expensive and therefore unsustainable – it certainly does nothing to develop the law.  
 
Much discussion has been had about international criminal law in general and piracy as a 
crime, and recommendations on how to approach the issues have been made. Piracy 
continues to pose a serious threat to the security of maritime navigation upon which 
international trade, travel, and tourism rely. Given its international dimension, it will continue 
to flourish if maritime nations address a common problem in silos. Moreover, from a regional 
perspective, the duty to eradicate piracy should not be outsourced to western militaries – but 
should be met with a cohesive regional legal and institutional framework. The adaptation of 
both the international law and South African domestic law framework governing piracy 
would be a step towards the realisation of a goal common to regional and international 
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